The next entry at Page 48 of the document book, for the 14th of November:
“Naval Supreme Commander with the Führer. Führer is ‘still inclined’ to instigate the conflict with Russia. Naval Supreme Commander recommends putting it off until the time after the victory over England, since there is heavy strain on German forces and the end of warfare is not in sight.”
Then there is the entry on Page 50 for 27 December 1940:
“Naval Supreme Commander with the Führer. Naval Supreme Commander emphasizes again that strict concentration of our entire war effort against England as our main enemy is the most urgent need of the hour. On the one hand, England has gained strength by the unfortunate Italian conduct of the war in the eastern Mediterranean and by the increasing American support. On the other hand, however, she can be hit mortally by a strangulation of her ocean traffic which is already taking effect. What is being done for submarine and naval air force construction is much too little. Our entire war potential must work for the conduct of the war against England; thus for the Navy and Air Force, every dispersion of strength prolongs the war and endangers the final success. Naval Supreme Commander voices serious objections against Russia campaign before the defeat of England.”
At Page 52 of the document book, on the 18th of February 1941, there is the entry:
“Chief of Naval Operations (SKL) insists on the occupation of Malta even before Barbarossa.”
On the next page, on the 23rd of February, there is this interesting entry:
“Instruction from Supreme Command, Armed Forces (OKW) that seizure of Malta ‘is contemplated for the fall of 1941 after the execution of Barbarossa’ ”—which the Tribunal may think is a sublime example of wishful thinking.
The next entry, for the 19th of March 1941, which is at Page 54 of the document book, shows that by March of 1941 Raeder had begun to consider what prospects of naval action the Russian aggression had to offer. There is the entry:
“In case of Barbarossa, Supreme Naval Commander describes the occupation of Murmansk as an urgent request of the Navy; Chief of Supreme Command Armed Forces considers compliance very difficult. . . .”