“Japan wishes, if possible, to avoid war against the U.S.A. She can do so if she determinedly takes Singapore as soon as possible.”
The Japanese, of course, as events proved, had different ideas from that.
By the 20th of April 1941, the evidence is that Hitler had agreed with this proposition of Raeder’s of inducing the Japanese to take offensive action against Singapore. I refer the Tribunal again to the Document C-170 and to an entry at Page 56 of the document book, for the 20th of April 1941. A few sentences from that read:
“Naval Supreme Commander with Führer. Navy Supreme Commander asks about result of Matsuoka’s visit and evaluation of Japanese-Russian pact. . . . Führer has informed Matsuoka ‘that Russia will not be touched if she behaves in a friendly manner according to the treaty. Otherwise, he reserves action for himself.’ Japan-Russia pact has been concluded in agreement with Germany and is to prevent Japan from advancing against Vladivostok and to cause her to attack Singapore.”
Now an interesting commentary upon this document is found in the Document C-66, at Page 13 of the document book. The Document C-66 has already been exhibited as GB-81. I would refer the Court to Paragraph 3 at Page 13 of the document book. At that time the Führer was firmly resolved on a surprise attack on Russia, regardless of what was the Russian attitude to Germany. This, according to reports coming in, was frequently changing; and there follows this interesting sentence: “The communication to Matsuoka was designed entirely as a camouflage measure and to ensure surprise.”
The Axis partners were not even honest with each other, and this, I submit, is typical of the kind of jungle diplomacy with which Raeder associated himself.
I now, with the Tribunal’s permission, turn from the field of diplomacy to the final aspect of the case against Raeder, namely, to crimes at sea.
The Prosecution’s submission is that Raeder throughout his career showed a complete disregard for any international rule or usage of war which conflicted in the slightest with his intention of carrying through the Nazi program of conquest. I propose to submit to the Tribunal only a few examples of Raeder’s flouting of the laws and customs of civilized states.
Raeder has himself summarized his attitude in the most admirable fashion in the Document UK-65, which the Tribunal will find at Page 98 of the document book, and which will be Exhibit GB-224. Now that Document UK-65 is a very long memorandum compiled by Raeder and the German naval war staff on the 15th of October 1939—that is to say, only a few weeks after the war started. And it is a memorandum on the subject of the intensification of the war at sea, and I desire to draw the Tribunal’s attention to the bottom paragraph at Page 98 of the document book. It is headed, “Possibilities of Future Naval Warfare”:
“I. Military requirements for the decisive struggle against Great Britain: