PAULUS: I do not see any contradiction in that. As I saw the situation then, the Yugoslavian Government had made an agreement with us which placed the railway line from Belgrade to Nish at our disposal, and that after that agreement was concluded, a revolution took place in Yugoslavia which created a different policy. Therefore, this plan of attack was believed necessary to eliminate a danger. In other words, I do not see that the decision to attack Yugoslavia and to delay Barbarossa form a contradiction. I merely see that one is a prerequisite for the execution of the other.
DR. LATERNSER: Witness, were you present at a conference of the General Staff on the Obersalzberg on 3 February 1941?
PAULUS: Yes.
DR. LATERNSER: Are you aware of the fact that at that time the strength of the Soviet Russian deployment was estimated at 100 infantry divisions, 25 cavalry divisions, and 30 mechanized divisions, and that this was reported by Generaloberst Halder?
PAULUS: I cannot remember that. Nor am I sure whether Generaloberst Halder was actually present during that conference.
DR. LATERNSER: But, witness, such a conference must have been an unusual one?
PAULUS: Yes.
DR. LATERNSER: And I believe that that conference must at least have given the impression that a very strong concentration of troops on the Eastern Front was in question.
PAULUS: I myself have at least no recollection of any such impression.
DR. LATERNSER: At the beginning of that attack against the Soviet Union, were you still Chief Quartermaster I?