Another step taken by the Germans was to prohibit a certain number of books of which they disapproved. I present in this connection Document Number RF-1103, which is the “Otto” list, published in September 1940; it is a list of 1,074 volumes forbidden by the Germans. I shall not, of course, read it to the Tribunal. It appears in the document book under Document Number RF-1103, as I have just said.
A second “Otto” list, longer than the first, was drawn up later and published on 8 July 1942, and I present it as Document Number RF-1104. The conclusion to this second document, which is the last page in my document book, gives a clear indication of the principles on which the German authorities worked. I read a few lines:
“As a matter of principle, all translations of English books, except the English classics, are withdrawn from sale.”—And further—“All books by Jewish authors, as well as books in which Jews have collaborated, are to be withdrawn from sale with the exception of works of a scientific nature where special measures are anticipated. From now on biographies of Jews, even if written by French Aryans, as, for instance, the biographies of the Jewish musicians Offenbach, Meyerbeer, Darius Milhaud, et cetera, are to be withdrawn from sale.”
This method of procedure may have appeared fairly harmless at first, since only about 1,200 volumes were involved, but one can see the significance of the principle itself. By this procedure the German authorities achieved the practical result they sought, which was essentially, apart from other prohibitions, the complete disappearance of serious and objective works permitting a study of German doctrines, the policy of Germany, and the philosophy of Nazism.
Apart from prohibiting works already existing, the Germans naturally established a censorship. At first they proceeded in a veiled manner by making a kind of agreement with publishers in which the publishers themselves were made responsible for indicating which of the books appeared to them to be subject to censorship. I submit this censorship agreement as Document Number RF-1105; and I wish, without reading it, to make but one observation in this regard which is highly characteristic of the invariable German method.
In the printed brochure of this agreement, of which the original is submitted, there appears, in addition to the agreement itself, a notice drafted in terms which do not reflect French feeling. This notice was not drafted by the publishers upon whom the agreement itself was imposed but was drafted by the Germans and published in the same brochure, which bears the words, “National Syndicate of Publishers,” so that one might think that the French publishers accepted the phrases occurring in this preamble. For that matter, the attentive reader has only to see that this brochure does not bear the printer’s name to realize that this is a German publication and not one put out by French publishers, for only the Germans were exempted from the French rule requiring mention of the printer’s name.
The Germans did not limit themselves to this procedure which was apparently rather liberal; and later an ordinance of 27 April 1942 entitled, “Concerning the Rational Use of Printing Paper,” was published in the Journal Officiel of 13 May. This ordinance stated, on pretext of the rational utilization of paper, that all publications without exception should bear the German authorization number.
I point out in addition that in their control of paper the Germans had a very effective weapon with which to put a stop to French publishing. I submit as Document Number RF-1106 the affidavit of M. Marcel Rives, Director of Internal Commerce at the Ministry of Industrial Production. In order to shorten the proceedings I shall not read this document. I may say in short that this document makes it clear that the distribution of available paper stocks was made entirely under the authority of the Germans and that the Germans reduced the amount of paper placed at the disposal of publishers in a proportion exceeding that of the general reduction in paper quotas as compared with the prewar situation.
I must add that the Germans also took for their own propaganda publication a certain amount of the reduced paper quota allotted to the French publishers. Thus, they not only used for their propaganda the paper which they themselves had in Germany, but they also took some of the small amount of paper which they allotted to the French publishers. I should like simply to read in this connection a few lines of the document which constitutes Appendix 2 of Document Number RF-1106, which I have just submitted. I merely read a few lines of this Appendix 2, which is a letter from the German Military Command to the Ministry of National Economy dated 28 June 1943:
“More especially during the month of March, which you particularly mention, it has been impossible to allot the publishers any quantity from current production, as this was needed for urgent propaganda purposes.”