In order to define the limits of this concept, I should like to discuss two further points concerning the determination of guilt and therefore necessarily relevant to the question of admissibility of evidence. First, there is the question of the members’ lack of knowledge of this criminality—the lack of knowledge resulting from secrecy—and then the attitude of the members after they had recognized the offenses being committed. In my opinion, the examination of guilt cannot be dismissed by pointing to the alleged knowledge of foreign countries about the real conditions. In foreign countries a propaganda was effective which exaggeratedly brought these things to light. In Germany all these facts remained secret, since because of their very nature they had to be secret—for instance, what was going on in the extermination camps—and because they had to be kept secret for political reasons. Moreover, the things which have become known here were so unimaginable that even in Germany one could not have believed them, had they become known during the war. It must be relevant to determine not whether a single individual member had no knowledge, but that 99 percent of the individual members acted in good faith. In this case, the organization is not criminal, but there could have been a criminal in it. If this is determined, then the legal construction of the criminal organization is superfluous and thereby false. The legal concepts existing until now will then be sufficient for bringing the guilty to trial.
The next viewpoint: The criminal nature or the criminal character of which the Charter speaks shows that that must be something which concerns the entire organization, and that it must be a continuous state of affairs. Individual acts which were rejected as wrong by the organization or the overwhelming majority of its members cannot establish the criminal character of the organization. The attitude of all the members to the incriminating acts is therefore of decisive importance and thus of evidentiary relevancy.
We do not need the concept of the criminal organization in order to punish individual criminals whose acts were rejected by the majority. Among such individual cases, in organizations which comprise millions of members, there may be cases in which smaller or even larger groups or merely certain local districts took part.
I believe that it is really a major task of the Tribunal to define, with the objectivity of the judge, the nature of this guilt as applied to the entire organization. I am of the opinion that the points I have mentioned, the secrecy of these facts and the attitude of the members after gaining knowledge, must form the basis for the collecting of evidence.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I want to ask some questions.
Dr. Servatius, I would like to ask you—and I will ask other counsel for the organizations—whether in general you accept the definition of criminal organizations suggested by Mr. Justice Jackson, which is found on Pages 19 and 20 of his statement? You will remember that he made five general tests. Now, in order to determine what evidence should be taken, we must determine what is relevant. Now, the test of what is relevant depends on a general definition of what is common to all organizations for that purpose. Now, do you or could you now say whether in a general way you accept those tests for the purpose of taking evidence?
DR. SERVATIUS: I have not yet thought about that and have not had a chance to discuss it with my colleagues. I should be grateful if we would be given such an opportunity. Perhaps this afternoon a representative of the Defense Counsel for the organizations could report to the Court about this.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Let me ask you another question. What, in your mind, are the tests that should be applied for the purpose of taking evidence?
DR. SERVATIUS: I did not quite understand the question.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I said that Mr. Justice Jackson had suggested a definition from which the relevancy of certain evidence could be established. Now, have you got any suggestion to offer for that same purpose?