DR. SERVATIUS: I should not like to commit myself without having spoken to my colleagues. It is a question of great importance which I should not like to deal with by myself.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Yes, but it is the basis of this entire argument. The very purpose of the argument was to develop that.
DR. KUBUSCHOK: In the course of yesterday’s debate the problem was discussed as to whether the task set before the Tribunal by the Charter can be considered a legislative act. The question was brought up as to whether, if we answer the preliminary question in the affirmative, the Court has the possibility of giving any binding instructions to the national court which has to try individuals, according to Law Number 10. That concerns, above all, the extent of the examination of the guilt of the individual member and the limitation of the scope of punishment for minor cases. I believe that if we follow up this deliberation we shall be led from a play upon words into a labyrinth when it comes to the practical application. Actually the task given the Court is not a legislative act. It is not a procedural innovation, if the national court in subsequent proceedings is bound by the previous decision of this Tribunal. Such cases are quite plausible and legally admissible. If elsewhere in criminal procedure a criminal court is bound by a previous decision, say of an administrative court, we consider these cases quite in order and unobjectionable. Likewise a criminal court could, for instance, be bound in judging a case of embezzlement to wait for the previous decision of the civil court as to whether the object embezzled was the property of somebody else.
Here, too, nobody would think that the civil judge was undertaking an act of legislation. That another court’s decision is binding on the criminal court and is the premise for its sentence does not in any way mean that the author of the criminal code has not completed his legislative task and that this has now to be done by the court which takes the preceding decision. In my opinion we therefore do not have to consider this point any further, for Article 9, Paragraph 1, of the Charter demands of the Tribunal a clear and unequivocal decision of the question whether the organization is criminal or not.
More cannot be read either into the Charter or into Law Number 10. Yesterday Sir David defined his attitude to the five points which were submitted by me for consideration as to relevancy of evidence. In regard to the two last points he raised the objection that they were to be dealt with in the subsequent trials envisaged by Law Number 10. It was a question of the grounds for exonerating persons—for instance, coercion, deception, et cetera. I want to avoid repetition and point out only the following: It is quite correct that the question of coercion and deception and other reasons for the exoneration of persons be discussed in subsequent trials. In connection with this, Sir David also called the attention of the Court to a really noteworthy problem—that is, the problem of a deception by the state, that is, a problem of mass suggestion. This is really a very important problem. It affects many members, as far as their joining is concerned. But it leads to the broadest deduction as to the guilt of the entire membership and the character of the total organization.
We have therefore to pay particular attention as to how the problem of deception on the part of the state affected the member and thereby was characteristic of the organization. All grounds for the exoneration of persons are therefore also to be examined by the Tribunal in judging the question of the character of the organization. Furthermore, evidence must be taken on the broadest basis.
If the Tribunal were to make any limitation now, there would be the possibility that later, at the end of the Trial, in contrast to its present opinion, it might consider as relevant material now excluded.
In yesterday’s debate the importance of the question was discussed, in regard to the proposed declaration of criminality, as to what should be considered as constituting knowledge on the part of the single member. Sir David here applied the standard of a person of average intelligence and wants to consider as guilty anybody who was above that standard.
I have already recently explained that in regard to laws threatening such a severe punishment as in this case, all systems of penal law require that willful intent on the part of the perpetrator be proved. Offenses of negligence are punishable only in exceptional cases, and then only with minor penalties. At any rate in a case of an offense by negligence it must be clear to the offender that he is under an obligation to examine his action from the point of view of penal law. Law Number 10—and now in connection with it the proposed verdict of this Court—represents an ex post facto law.
In the case of the main defendants the Prosecution have justified the deviation from the generally recognized principle nulla poena sine lege on the ground that they themselves did not act in accordance with this principle and cannot, therefore, base themselves on it now. This, however, does not in any way apply to the organizations, quite apart from the question whether this argument can be accepted at all.