A report of that was also made, Document Number L-79. According to the wording of that report, you participated in this meeting, but the witness Milch stated that you were not present.
GÖRING: Actually I was not present. Milch was called in at the last moment to represent me. But, of course, if the witness says that he had not received any permission from the Führer to inform me, then you must understand that the Führer did not want to have me informed of this matter by way of my state secretary, but wanted rather to inform me himself. But no, I was actually present at this meeting—I see that now from another clue. But even if I had not been present, I think Milch must have been thinking of another meeting. That would not be one of any importance, for it is out of the question that the Führer would have had a conference with such gentlemen without notifying me either before, or afterwards if I myself were absent. It is, therefore, not at all important. It is quite obvious that in such cases I was informed either previously or, if I was not present, afterwards in great detail by the Führer. But I see now that Milch must have made a mistake here, and he is probably thinking of another meeting, for at the very end I asked some questions with respect to the armament program which I now recall very well.
DR. STAHMER: What was the significance of this meeting?
GÖRING: It was a conference held by the Führer at which he once more stated his views with regard to the situation and the tasks demanded of the Wehrmacht as a result of this situation. Once more the main point was to inform the Armed Forces concerning armament and preparedness, that he was considering all possible developments, political and otherwise, and that he himself wanted to have complete freedom of decision.
Looking back, in regard to the events which have occurred up to this moment—and I need not emphasize how easily matters viewed in retrospect, in the light of their development, are seen and presented differently to what they actually were when they occurred—but I can now easily say that even at that time I wanted this or that, since I have in the meantime achieved it. I can easily say also—this involuntarily suggests itself—that this or that was always my intention, even though one knows perfectly well that one was originally very dependent on other factors, and that under certain circumstances one’s intentions at that time might have been quite different.
Generally speaking, this is another case where there are misconceptions on the part of the adjutant; but, on the whole, it is typical of the conferences which the Führer used to hold when he had some particular purpose in mind which he wanted to achieve and wanted to give this aim the necessary emphasis.
DR. STAHMER: During the period from 1935 to 1938 you made many state visits to Poland. What was the purpose of these visits?
GÖRING: After German-Polish relations had been clarified in 1934, the Führer wished a strengthening of that pact and the creation of a better atmosphere. He requested me to take over this task because he believed that I would find it easy to talk to these Polish gentlemen, which was indeed the case.
The President of the Polish State had invited me. That was in 1935, and from then on—in 1935, 1936 and 1937—I spent about 1 or 2 weeks in Poland each year. I had a long discussion with the then Marshal Pilsudski, and afterwards always with the Foreign Minister, and Marshal Rydz-Smygly.
At that time the Führer had given me the serious task—not a task of deception—while improving relations, to tell Poland that he was interested in a strong Poland, because a strong Poland would be an excellent barrier between Germany and Russia. The Führer had laid stress on the solution of the Danzig question and the Corridor question in speaking to me at that time, and had said that the opportunity for this would come, but that, until then, there might be some sort of opportunity to come to an agreement with Poland about that problem. The Lithuanian problem played a part in this. But the decisive factor is that he did not say, “Lull Poland to sleep. I am going to attack Poland afterwards.” It was never the case, that from the very beginning, as has often been represented here, we got together and, conspiring, laid down every point of our plans for decades to come. Rather, everything arose out of the play of political forces and interests, as has always been everywhere the case, the whole world over, in matters of state policy. I had this task, and I consciously considered it a serious task and carried it out with an honest belief in it. Consequently, when the clash with Poland came about it was not a very pleasant situation for me.