During the last months I have seen too many records and interrogations which in part had nothing to do with it nor with the interpretation which had been given to it; for that reason I must here too point out the sources of mistakes.
As far as the word “testament” is concerned, the use of this word contradicts the Führer’s views completely. If anybody at all knows anything about these views, it is I.
The decision that I was to be the successor was not made first on 1 September 1939, but as early as the late autumn of 1934. I have often had the opportunity of discussing the question of a so-called political testament with the Führer. He turned it down, giving as his reason the fact that one could never appoint a successor by means of a political testament, for developments and political events must allow him complete freedom of action at all times. Quite possibly one could set down political wishes or views, but never binding statements in the shape of a will. That was his view then and as long as I stood in his confidence.
Now, what did he aim at in this discussion? The Minister of War, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy and the Luftwaffe and the then Reich Foreign Minister were called together. Shortly before the Führer had informed me, as I was there earlier, that he was going to call this meeting mainly in order, as he called it, to put pressure on General Von Fritsch, since he was dissatisfied with the rearmament of the Army. He said it would not do any harm if Herr Von Blomberg would also exercise a certain amount of pressure on Von Fritsch.
I asked why Von Neurath was to be present. He said he did not want the thing to look too military, that as far as the commanders-in-chief were concerned it was not so important, but that he wanted to make it very clear to Commander-in-Chief Fritsch that the foreign political situation required a forced speed in armament and that for that reason he had asked the Foreign Minister, who knew nothing about the details, to come along.
The statements were then made in the way the Führer preferred on such occasions. He went to great lengths to picture things within a large political framework and he talked about the whole world situation from all angles; and for anybody who knew him as well as I did the purpose which he pursued was obvious. He was quite clearly aiming at saying that he had great plans, that the political situation was such and such, and the whole thing ended in the direction of a stronger armament program. I should like to say that, if the Führer, a couple of hours later, had talked to another group, for instance, diplomats of the Foreign Office, or Party functionaries, then he probably would have represented matters quite differently.
Nevertheless, some of these statements naturally do reflect the basic attitude of the Führer, but with the best intentions I cannot attach the same measure of significance to the document as is being attached to it here.
DR. STAHMER: You said you had been considered as the Führer’s successor. Were you in this capacity initiated in all political problems by Hitler?
GÖRING: I am now talking of the period of my good relations, which lasted until long into the war. Of course he informed me of all important political and military problems. He initiated me into these problems for the most part in many long discussions, which would take place for many hours, day after day. Sometimes I was certainly surprised concerning foreign political questions, but whenever possible I found things out for myself, and on one occasion he said, in fact, that I had a decided opinion of my own on foreign matters and that he did not always find it easy to agree with me. But I want to emphasize that on all important political questions I was, of course, always informed.
DR. STAHMER: On 23 May 1939 a conference took place with the Führer, which was briefly discussed in connection with the examination of the witness Milch.