DR. STAHMER: When were you first informed that Hitler thought a war against Russia necessary?
GÖRING: It was not until the late fall of 1940, in Berchtesgaden, that I was informed about the intentions of the Führer to enter into conflict with Russia under certain circumstances.
DR. STAHMER: Were you present at the conversation, which took place in Berlin in November 1940 with the Russian Foreign Minister, Molotov?
GÖRING: I personally was not present at the conversation between Hitler and Molotov. Mr. Molotov, however, also paid me a visit, and we discussed the general situation. I know, of course, about the conversation with Molotov, because the Führer informed me about it in detail. It was just this conversation which very much increased the Führer’s suspicion that Russia was getting ready for an attack upon Germany, and this was brought out during this discussion by the remarks and demands which Mr. Molotov made.
These were, firstly, a guarantee to Bulgaria, and a pact of assistance with Bulgaria, such as Russia had made with the three Baltic states.
Secondly, it involved the complete abandonment of Finland by Germany, to such an extent that Russia, who had signed a peace with Finland a short time ago, thought herself justified in attacking Finland again in order not to have to acquiesce in the results of the previous agreements, Hangö, et cetera.
Thirdly, it dealt with discussions about the Dardanelles and the Bosporus; and the fourth point was the possibility of penetration into Romania beyond Bessarabia.
These were the points which were discussed with the Führer. There was also a hint to the Foreign Minister about an occupation, or securing of interests, at the exit of the Baltic.
The Führer viewed these demands in a different light. Although Russia might have been justified in making demands to Germany concerning Finland, he believed, that in connection with other reports which he had received about Russian preparations and deployment of troops, Russia wanted to strengthen her position in Finland, in order to outflank Germany in the north and to be in immediate proximity to the Swedish ore mines, which were of vital or at least very decisive importance to Germany in this war. Secondly, as to the advance, as demanded, into the Romanian and Bulgarian area, the Führer was not at all sure that this pressure would continue in the south, that is, the Dardanelles, or in a near-easterly direction, but rather in a westerly direction; that is to say, that here also Russia might push into the southern flank of Germany and, by getting control of the Romanian oilfields, make Germany absolutely dependent on Russia for deliveries of oil. In these demands he saw the camouflaged attempts to deploy troops and obtain troop positions against Germany. The suggestion of securing an outlet to the Baltic did not even come up for discussion, as far as Germany was concerned, at that time. Altogether that conversation caused the Führer to feel that further relations were being menaced by Russia.
Already in his discussion with me the Führer told me why he was thinking about anticipating the Russian drive under certain circumstances. The information about feverish work on deployment preparations in the area newly acquired by Russia, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Bessarabia, made him extremely suspicious. Until then we had sometimes only 8, later 20 and 25 divisions along the entire eastern border. Further reports came that Russia might be expected to attack us from the rear as soon as Germany had gone to war in the West, either because of an invasion by Britain or because Germany on her part had decided to invade England. His arguments were strengthened even more by the fact that shortly before, contrary to anything practiced in Russia before this, engineers, and, I believe, also officers of ours, that is, Germans, were suddenly shown the tremendous Russian armament works of the aviation and tank industry. These reports about the surprisingly high production capacity of these armament works further strengthened the Führer’s conviction. He was so firmly convinced because, he said—and this was his political reflection—if England still will not consider coming to an agreement with us, although she now stands alone against us, she must have something at the back of her mind. He had information that Prime Minister Churchill had pointed out two things to worried elements in England.