First, that increased support by the United States could be expected, first of all in the technical field, that is, with respect to armaments, and then extending to other fields; and, secondly, which he considered even more probable, that Churchill had already come to an understanding with Russia in that direction, and he pointed out that here sooner or later there would be a clash. His calculations were the following: Before the United States could be ready with her armaments and the mobilization of her army, he would have to smash the Russian troop concentrations, and break down and weaken the Russian forces to such an extent by strong concentrated attacks, that they would not represent a danger in the rear if he had to enter into an English-American conflict on the Continent. These were the explanations of the Führer.
Then came the visit of Molotov, which I just mentioned and which enhanced this point of view considerably.
DR. STAHMER: What was your attitude toward an attack on Russia at that time?
GÖRING: At first I was very much surprised at the time and asked the Führer to give me a few hours to state my view. It came entirely as a surprise to me. Then in the evening, after this conversation had taken place in the afternoon, I told the Führer the following:
I urged him most particularly not to start a war against Russia at that moment, or even a short time after; not that I was moved by considerations of international law or similar reasons; my point of view was decided by political and military reasons only. First, at all times since the seizure of power I, perhaps of all the leading men in Germany, was the only one who always considered conflict with Russia as a threatening menace to Germany. I knew—and many others with me—that for over 10 years an exceedingly strong rearmament and training program had been in effect in Russia, that the standard of living had been lowered in all other fields in favor of one single tremendous rearmament. The deliveries made by German industry and examination of the deliveries made by the American, British, and other industries always showed clearly that they consisted only of such machines as were directly or immediately necessary for a gigantic industrial rearmament program. One could thereby estimate the speed and the size of the Russian rearmament. If Germany had now developed in the way of communism, then of course the Russian rearmament, in my opinion, would have been directed against other danger. But since we had come to power, the inner political and ideological contrast naturally played, in my opinion, a menacing part. I have come to understand that such contrasts do not necessarily have to lead to conflicts between countries, because the political interests of nation and state will always be stronger and greater than all ideological contrasts or agreements. But here also I saw a menace, because what did this tremendous Russian rearmament signify at a time when Germany before the seizure of power, was impotent? I now told the Führer that in spite of this basic attitude I always feared this danger from Russia and had always recognized it, but that I was asking him rather to leave this danger in abeyance and, if at all possible, to direct Russia’s interests against England.
And indeed I said to him:
“We are at present fighting against one of the greatest world powers, the British Empire. If you, my Führer, are not of exactly the same opinion, then I have to contradict you, because I am definitely of the opinion that sooner or later the second great world power, the United States, will march against us. This will not depend on the election of President Roosevelt; the other candidate will also not be able to prevent this. Then we shall be at war against two of the largest world powers. It was your masterstroke at the beginning of the war to make possible a one-front war; you have always pointed that out in your Kampf. In the case of a clash with Russia at this time, the third great world power would be thrown into the struggle against Germany. We would again stand alone, against practically the entire world; the other nations do not count. And again we would have two fronts.”
And he replied,
“I fully appreciate your arguments. I appreciate the Russian menace more than anybody else, but if we should succeed in executing our plans as prepared in the fight against the British Empire, and if these were only half-way successful, Russia would not launch her attack. Only if we should become deeply involved in a serious conflict in the West, would I be of your opinion, that the Russian menace would increase enormously.”
I was even of the opinion that the quick assent of the Russians to the settlement of the Polish crisis was given in order that Germany, free from that side, would be all the more likely to get into this conflict, because the German-French-British conflict would come about thereby, and it would be entirely understandable, as far as Russian interests were concerned, to bring about this conflict and come out of it as well as before. I furthermore told the Führer that, according to my reports and evidence, Russian rearmament would reach its climax in the year 1942-43, or perhaps even in 1944. Before then we should, however, succeed, if not in achieving a peace by victory on our part, at least in coming to an arrangement with England. This, however, would be possible only if decisive successes were achieved against England. At that time the German Air Force with all its weight was being employed in the attack on England. If now a new front should be formed for an attack on Russia, a considerable part of these air forces, more than half, two-thirds, would have to be diverted to the East. For practical purposes an energetic air attack on England would thereby cease. All the sacrifices up to that time would be in vain; England would be given a chance to reorganize and build up her shattered aircraft industry undisturbed.