“German administration in the Government General has failed grossly with respect to the tasks listed under “A”. Even if a relatively high percentage, namely, over 90 percent, of the delivery quota of agricultural products for the Armed Forces and the homeland was successfully met in the year 1942 and if the labor procurement requirements of the homeland were generally satisfied, nevertheless, on the other hand, two things must be made clear: First, these accomplishments were not achieved until the year 1942. Before that, for example, only 40,000 tons of bread grain had been delivered for the Wehrmacht. Secondly, and above all, there was the omission to create for the attainment of such performances those prerequisites of an organizational, economic, and political character which are indispensable if such performances are not to lead to a breakdown in the situation as a whole, from which chaotic conditions in every respect could eventually come about. This failure of the German administration can be explained in the first place by the system of the German administrative and governmental activity in the Government General as embodied in the Governor General himself, and secondly by the misguided principles of policy in all questions decisive for conditions in the Government General.
“I) The spirit of the German administration in the Government General.
“From the beginning it has been the endeavor of the Governor General to make a state organization out of the Government General which was to lead its own existence in complete independence of the Reich.”
Then I pass to Page 22 of the report, Paragraph 3 and I quote:
“3) The treatment of the native population can only be led in the right direction on the basis of clean and orderly administrative and economic leadership. Only such a foundation makes it possible to handle the native population firmly and if necessary even severely, on the one hand; and, on the other hand, to act generously with them and cause a certain amount of satisfaction among the population by allowing certain liberties, especially in the cultural field. Without such a foundation severity strengthens the resistance movement, and meeting the population halfway only undermines respect for the Germans. The above-mentioned facts prove that this foundation is lacking. Instead of trying to create this foundation, the Governor General inaugurates a policy of encouraging the individual cultural life of the Polish population, which in itself is already overshooting the goal but which, under the existing conditions and viewed in connection with our military situation during the past winter, can only be interpreted as weakness, and must achieve the opposite of the aim intended.
“4) The relationship between racial Germans and the Polish-Ukrainian population in the Government General.
“The cases are numerous in which the German administration has permitted the requirements of racial Germans in the Government General to be put into the background in favor of the interests of the Poles and Ruthenians, in its endeavor to win over the latter. The opinion was advanced that racial Germans resettled from somewhere else were not to be installed immediately as settlers, but for the duration of the war were only to be employed as farm workers. A legal foundation for the expropriation of Polish property has not been created so far. Bad treatment of racial Germans by their Polish employers was not stopped. German citizens and racial German patients were allowed to be treated in Polish hospitals by Polish physicians, badly and at great expense. In German spas in the Government General the sheltering of children of German citizenship from territories threatened with bombing, and of veterans of Stalingrad was hampered, while foreigners took convalescent vacations there, and so on.
“The big plans for resettlement in the Lublin district for the benefit of racial Germans could have been carried out with less friction if the Reich Commissioner for the Preservation of German Nationality had found the administration willing to co-operate and assist in the proper manner.”
I pass to Page 24 and quote, under C:
“The administrative system, embodied in the Governor General personally, and the material failure of the general German administration in the most various fields of decisive importance has not only shaken the confidence and the will to work of the native population, but has also brought about the result that the Poles, who have been socially divided and constantly disunited throughout their history, have come together in a united national body through their hostility to the Germans. In a world of pretense, the real foundations are lacking on which alone the achievements which the Reich requires from the Government General, and the aims which it must see realized in the latter, can be brought about and fulfilled in the long run. The non-fulfillment of the tasks given to the general administration—as happened, for example, in the field of the Preservation of German Nationality—led to a condition which made it necessary for other administrative bodies (the Reich Commissioner for the Preservation of German Nationality...and the Police) to take over these tasks.”