DÖNITZ: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Why did you put into the order, “The elementary demands of warfare for the destruction of ships and crews are contrary to rescuing”? What was the point of putting these words in, unless you meant to encourage people to destroy enemy ships and crews?
DÖNITZ: I explained that in great detail yesterday. I preached during all these years: You must not rescue when your own safety is in danger. In the case of the Laconia I myself in my anxiety and worry wirelessed that to the troops many times. Apart from that, I found again and again that submarine commanders were taking the danger from the air too lightly. I also showed how that is to be explained psychologically. I described yesterday the overwhelming increase of the air force, and consequently in no circumstances would I have again given my people as a reason that, if there is danger from the air, or since you are being endangered from the air, et cetera, you must not rescue, or rescuing would be contrary to the elementary demands of warfare; because I did not want to leave it to my commanders to discuss whether there was danger from the air or not. After all my experience of the losses suffered and in view of the ever-present air force, which as history has shown was becoming stronger and stronger, I had to give a clear-cut order to the commanders based on that experience: “You cannot go on like that, or while we rescue the enemy we shall be attacked and killed by the enemy.” Therefore this reasoning must not enter into it. I did not wish to give the commanders another opportunity of deliberating or discussing. I told you already yesterday that I could have added, “If now, in view of the danger from the air, we are killed by that self-same enemy while rescuing him, then rescue is contrary to the elementary demands of warfare.” I did not want to do that, because I did not want any more discussion. We all had the impression that this refrain, “Do not rescue if there is danger from the air,” was outworn, because this would have meant that the commanders would nevertheless lose their liberty of action, and might slip into this thing.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But if you had simply said, “You are forbidden to rescue,” and if you had wanted to give a reason, “You are forbidden to rescue because in view of the Allied air cover it is a matter of too great danger for the safety of yourself and your boat ever to rescue at all,” that would have been quite clear. Why did you not put it that way?
DÖNITZ: No, that is just what I could not do. I have just said so, because some commander in some naval theater might get the idea that there was no danger from the air, and the next moment the plane would appear and he would be struck down. I have already said all that in reply to your suggestion.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, you had two experienced staff officers with you at the time that you got this order out—Captains Godt and Hessler, had you not?
DÖNITZ: Yes, that is right.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And both Captain Godt and Captain Hessler advised you strongly against the issue of this order, did they not?
DÖNITZ: As far as I can remember, they said something like this, “The bulk of the submarines”—I have said that here—“the bulk of the U-boats, that is, more than 90 percent of the U-boats, are already fighting the convoys, so that such an order is out of the question for them.”
That was the question: Should we issue such a general order at all, and would not the further developments which forced us all the time to issue new orders, namely, “Remain on the surface as little as possible,” make such an order superfluous? However, since I was responsible for warding off every possible danger to a submarine, I had to give this order and my staff agreed with me perfectly as far as this measure was concerned.