THE PRESIDENT: I think perhaps that would be a good time to break off then.
[A recess was taken.]
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Now, Mr. President, as Dönitz-94, I submit a chart of the German blockade zone dated 17 August.
Admiral Wagner, just for the sake of repeating, what were the limits of the German blockade region in relation to the U.S. fighting zone?
THE PRESIDENT: I thought you had already told us that. You told us that the blockade zone was the same as the American zone, didn’t you?
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes, Mr. President, I thought that we had not been understood quite correctly before the recess.
[Turning to the witness.] What was the naval practice of the enemy as far as this operational zone was concerned? Was there any practice that they followed?
WAGNER: Yes, the practice on the part of the enemy was identical with ours. In the areas controlled by us in the Baltic, in the eastern part of the North Sea, around Skagerrak and later on in the Norwegian and French waters, the enemy used every suitable weapon without giving previous warning, without notifying us in advance by which means of combat other ships were to be sunk—submarines, mines, aircraft, or surface vessels. In these regions the same thing applied to neutrals, and especially to Sweden.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Now, I would like to confront you with a statement by the First Lord of the British Admiralty. You will find this on Page 208 of the document book, Volume IV. This statement is dated 8 May 1940, and I have ascertained, Mr. President, that unfortunately it is wrongly reproduced in the British document book; so I shall quote from the original.
“Therefore we limited our operations in the Skagerrak to the submarines. In order to make this work as effective as possible, the usual restrictions which we have imposed on the actions of our submarines were relaxed. As I told the House, all German ships by day and all ships by night were to be sunk as opportunity served.”