GODT: Yes; I had overlooked that sentence.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Can I sum up, therefore, by saying that the first and fourth questions were put to you and answered by you, whereas questions 2 and 3 were not put to you and not answered by you?
GODT: Yes.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: In the War Diary of the Naval Operations Staff there is a note which says, “Commander, U-boats, considers such ports extremely valuable even as temporary supply and equipment bases for Atlantic U-boats.” Does that note mean that Admiral Dönitz was working on this question before your visit to Berlin? Or what was the reason for the note?
GODT: That was my own opinion, which I was entitled to give in my capacity as Chief of the Operations Department.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Was that the first time that plans for bases were brought to your notice?
GODT: No. We had been considering the question of whether the supply position for U-boats could be improved by using ships—in Iceland, for instance.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Were these considerations in any way connected with the question whether one ought to start a war against the country concerned?
GODT: No.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I shall now show you Document GB-91. This appears on Page 18 of the Prosecution’s document book. It is an operational order issued by Commander, U-boats, on 30 March 1940 and dealing with the Norwegian enterprise. Is it true, that this is your operational order?