GODT: Yes.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: But then, how is it possible that Korvettenkapitän Möhle gave lectures on this order apparently until the end of the war?
GODT: Korvettenkapitän Möhle had access to all wireless messages issued by Commander, U-boats. He was entitled to select from these signals anything he thought necessary for the instruction of commanders about to go to sea. It made no difference whether the order was marked “Admonition” or “Current Order.” He had obviously taken out this message and had had it among the material to be used for these instructions to the commanders.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did Möhle ever ask you about the interpretation of that order?
GODT: No.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Did you ever hear of any other source interpreting this order to mean that survivors were to be shot?
GODT: No.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Can you judge from your own experience whether this order had, or could have had, any effect practically on Allied naval losses?
GODT: That is very difficult to judge. At that time something like 80 percent of all U-boat attacks were probably carried out under conditions which made any attempt at rescue impossible. That is to say, these attacks were made on convoys or on vessels in close proximity to the coast.
The fact that some 12 captains and engineers were brought back as prisoners by U-boats is an indication of what happened in the other cases. It is difficult to say with any degree of certainty whether it was possible to take rescue measures in all cases. The situation was probably such that the Allied sailors felt safer in the lifeboats than they did, for instance, aboard the U-boat and probably were glad to see the U-boat vanish after the attack. The fact that the presence of the U-boat involved danger to itself is proved by this same case of the Laconia, where two U-boats were attacked from the air while engaged in rescuing the survivors.