I do not think it is at all certain that this order had any effect one way or the other.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: What do you mean “one way or the other”?
GODT: I mean whether it meant an increase or a decrease in the number of losses among enemy seamen.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: There is one argument I did not quite understand. You pointed to the fact that approximately 12 captains and chief engineers were made prisoner after this order was issued. Do you mean by that that only in these few cases was it possible, without endangering the submarine, to carry out the order to transfer such officers from the lifeboats?
GODT: It is too much to say that it was only possible in these few cases, but it does afford some indication of the number of cases in which it was possible.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: I shall now show you the wireless message which went to Kapitänleutnant Schacht. It is on Page 36 of the Prosecution’s document book. This message, too, was sent as “top secret.” What was the reason for that?
GODT: It is a definite and severe reprimand for the commander.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: How far was that reprimand justified? Schacht had not received previous instruction to rescue Italians only?
GODT: No, but it had been assumed that U-boats would realize that it was of primary importance that allies should be rescued, that is, that they should not become prisoners of war. Apart from that, several reminders had been issued in the course of operations warning commanders to be particularly careful. After that came Schacht’s report, which appeared at the time to indicate that he had disobeyed orders. Viewed retrospectively, Schacht’s action must have taken place before Commander, U-boats, issued the order in question, so that in part at least, the accusation was unjustified.
FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Were any further rescue measures carried out by U-boats after this order was issued in September 1942?