RAEDER: No. We could build 12 plus 4, which makes 16 torpedo boats of 200 tons. A torpedo boat of 200 tons could not be produced in a practical manner at that time because of the question of the motors and the question of seaworthiness. For that reason we did not build these torpedo boats for the time being but kept in service a number of quite old torpedo boats, built at the beginning of the century, in order to be able to train crews with them. We could no longer use these boats for fighting. But so that—as long as we could not replace these boats—we might have a few boats capable of action, however small, which could be of use in blocking the Baltic, I ordered that these patrol boats should be equipped to take torpedo tubes on board.
However, so that in 1932 we should not make our situation worse by open breaches of the Treaty, when we hoped that at the Disarmament Conference we might make some progress, I had one boat at a time armed in order to fit and test the armament; and I then had the armament dismounted again so that there was always only one boat available with armament at any one time. We planned to put the torpedo tubes on board the speed boats only if the political situation, that is, the situation after the Disarmament Conference, would permit it. That is what I say in Number 3 in the concluding sentence.
DR. SIEMERS: I can take it then that we were allowed to build 16 torpedo boats making 3,200 tons in all?
RAEDER: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: And instead we built only five speed boats totalling 200 tons?
RAEDER: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: Concerning the accusation made by the Prosecution that you did not count the speed boats against the torpedo boats you actually did not intend to keep anything secret; but you wanted to discuss it with the Control Commission when the time came?
RAEDER: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: Now I come to the most extensive document in regard to breaches which the Prosecution submitted, Document C-32, USA-50. The document is in Document Book 10a, Page 8; in the new document book of the British Delegation.
In this list all breaches are included under date 9 September 1933. The Prosecution justly points out that this compilation is very thorough; and the Prosecution presented it just as thoroughly, although, as I believe I can prove, they are, in the last analysis, small matters. I am compelled to ask the witness to answer these points in detail since they were brought up in detail. Breach Number 1 concerns the exceeding of the permitted number of mines. In Column 2 it states that according to the Versailles Treaty, that is, by the Commission, 1,665 mines were permitted; but we owned 3,675 mines. That is 2,000 too many. Will you please tell the Court the significance of this breach; it doubtlessly was a breach.