RAEDER: No, I did not expect at all that such a measure as the secession from the League of Nations, where we had always been treated unjustly because we had no power behind us, would result in a war with any other power. Nevertheless, it was right to take such eventualities into consideration.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. That is good enough for me.
Now, just let us look at the same document book, Document Number C-153, on Page 107 of the English version and Page 164 to 167 of the German version. That is, you will remember, your armament plan for the third armament phase, and I would just like you first of all to look at Paragraph 3.
In (a) and (b) of Paragraph 3 you give the general basis for your arrangements:
“(a) For the military leaders a sound basis for their strategic considerations, and
“(b) For the political leaders a clear picture of what may be achieved with the military means available at a given time.”
RAEDER: Yes, it is quite obvious that such a plan would have this purpose.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And that your political leaders were to make their plans on what armed forces you had available for war, if necessary. That was what you were contemplating then, was it not?
RAEDER: Yes, that is a matter of course; I reported to the Führer that I could put a certain military strength at his disposal during that year. The Chief of State must know that in order to know what he can count on. But that has nothing to do with plans for war. That is the case in every state. On the other hand, I cannot influence the political leader as to what he wants. I can only report what I could have. Therefore, I had nothing to do with political matters. I only did what is necessary and what is done in every state.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And just look at Paragraph 7.