I am not going to argue with you as to whether states base their foreign politics on things other than war as a matter of argument, but look at Paragraph 7: “All theoretical and practical R-preparations (armament) are to be drawn up with a primary view to readiness for a sudden war.”
That is that you, as far as the Navy was concerned, you had to be ready then for an immediate war footing, have the Navy on an immediate war footing, isn’t that right?
RAEDER: No, no. This concerns the sequence of the things to be taken for granted. The armament plan listed the most important immediate requirements of the Navy and at that point I say here that this applied to weapons to be used in a war where there was no time to prepare and that is, in plain language, the mobile fleet, which must be in a state of constant readiness. It had to be kept ready for action at a moment’s notice and it had to receive priority. All other matters, such as quarters, and things that had nothing to do with direct combat, were attended to afterwards.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I thought that is what I put to you, that the fleet had to be ready and ready for war. However, you have given your account of it.
Just turn over, if you will be so good, to Page 66 of Document Book 10, Page 285 of the German document book; Document Number C-189, My Lord.
[Turning to the defendant.] Now, I want to raise just this one point on which you made a point in your examination and which I must challenge. You say in Paragraph 2:
“The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy expresses the opinion that later on”—and I ask you to note the words “later on”—“the fleet must anyhow be developed against England and that therefore from 1936 onwards the large ships must be armed with 35 centimeter guns.”
Now, are you telling the Tribunal, that “gegen England” does not mean “against” in the sense of in antagonism to, directed against, in opposition to—that it merely means in comparison to? Are you seriously saying that, are you?
RAEDER: I explained the other day that we are dealing here with the question of keeping up with other navies. Up to that time we were keeping up with the French Navy which had 33 cm guns. Then England went beyond that in mounting 35.6 cm guns on her ships and then, as I said before, France went beyond England in using 38 cm guns. Thus I said to the Führer that our 28 cm guns which we believed we could use against the French Dunkerque class would not be heavy enough, and that we would have to take the next bigger caliber, that is 35.6 like those of the English ships. That was never done because the French began to use 38 cm guns and our Bismarck class followed the French lines.
That comparison of calibers and classes of vessels was at that time quite customary and was also...