JODL: I had very many doubts which a careful study of the Hague rules of warfare could not dispel. Neither Field Marshal Keitel nor I prepared such a draft; but members of my staff, on their own initiative, asked for drafts and for the views of various departments. Thus Document 1263-PS came into being, to which I shall return later.
THE PRESIDENT: That is Document 1263-PS?
DR. EXNER: 1263. It is Page 104, Volume II of my document book, 1263-PS, RF-365; but we shall deal with that later.
THE PRESIDENT: Did you say Page 204?
DR. EXNER: No, Page 104, Volume II.
[Turning to the defendant.] Please continue.
JODL: My wish was an entirely different one. It was my intention to avoid an order altogether, and I rather expected that as a result of the announcement in the Wehrmacht communiqué—an announcement which was certainly not kept secret but which was broadcast over the air to the entire world—the British Ministry of War would approach us again, either directly or via Geneva, as it had done on several previous occasions. And I hoped that in this way the whole matter would be shifted to the sphere of the Foreign Office. However, that did not happen. The British War Ministry remained silent.
In the meantime 10 days had passed and nothing had been done. Then on 17 October General Schmundt, the Chief Adjutant of the Führer, came to me and said that the Führer was demanding an executive order. I gave him the following answer, word for word:
“Please give him my best regards, but I will not issue an order like that.” Schmundt laughed and said, “Well, I cannot tell him that,” and my reply was, “Very well, then, tell the Führer that I do not see how a decree like that could be justified under international law.”
And with that he left. I hoped now that I would be asked to come to the Führer, so that at last, after many months, I should again be able to speak to him personally.