JODL: On this morning when the Führer spontaneously ordered the immediate preparation of an attack on Yugoslavia, I proposed to him, or at least I mentioned to him, that after concentrating our troops we ought first to clarify the real situation, the political situation, by an ultimatum. He refused to do so. He said, “That will not be of any use.” Field Marshal Keitel has already confirmed this.
DR. EXNER: Tell me, was that on 27 March?
JODL: Yes, that was on the 27th. May I give proof of this. On the evening of the 27th the order was issued...
THE PRESIDENT: I do not think it is necessary if the Defendant Keitel said it, and you say it, and there is no cross-examination about it.
DR. EXNER: But I feel that there is something important.
JODL: A document was submitted, Document 1746-PS, Exhibit GB-120, on Page 70 of the document book.
DR. EXNER: Page 71.
JODL: Yes, the text is on Page 71. If the Court will compare this sentence on Page 71, Paragraph 1, with the sentence on Page 69 of the document book a difference will be noticed. Page 69 contains the order signed by the Führer, and it begins with this sentence which I shall quote:
“The military Putsch in Yugoslavia has altered the political situation in the Balkans. Even if she makes a declaration of loyalty, Yugoslavia must be considered as an enemy and therefore beaten as quickly as possible.”
This, as appears from the date, was issued on 27 March. I worked that whole night at the Reich Chancellery, which is another proof of the sudden nature of the whole case. At 4 o’clock on the morning of the 28th, as stated on Page 71, I put the following aide-mémoire, this operational aide-mémoire, into the hand of General Von Rintelen, our liaison officer with the Italian High Command. In it I had written—I quote: