“Should political developments call for armed intervention against Yugoslavia, it is the German intention...” et cetera.
I must admit that, in this instance, I ventured a little into the political field, but in so doing I thought that if Germany did not clarify the political situation beyond any doubt, Italy perhaps might do it.
DR. EXNER: The next document is also evidence of the suddenness of this decision, and I have had it printed on Page 73, Volume 1. That is the order issued by the High Command of the Army on the basis of these directives—the order for deployment of troops for the operation. That is Document R-95, Exhibit GB-127, Page 73, of Volume I, as I have already stated, and it says there:
“As a result of the change in the political situation...” et cetera—and then—“there will be concentrated...”—and then the last paragraph states—“The operation will be given the code name ‘Project 25.’ ”
I ask you, Generaloberst, can anything be gathered from this?
JODL: The order issued was not until 3 April...
DR. EXNER: No, 30 March.
JODL: ...30 March.
DR. EXNER: Did the operation receive the code name “Project 25”?
JODL: A code name for this operation was ordered for the first time 3 days after the Putsch, which proves that it had not been planned in 1937 as was once stated here.