“In opposition to the bloodthirsty pacifists who reject modern weapons, but who immediately clamor for their presence on the battlefield when one must resist attackers... This leads to the conclusion that armaments are not the main reason for wars. The history of the years 1926 to 1931 is not that of a race for rearmament, but that of a slowly developing deterioration of the international situation because of the economic and political chaos, which made disarmament impossible and rearmament unavoidable...
(Page 222) “The Germans actually repeated their successful tactics in circumventing treaties, the very tactics they had used in Napoleon’s time. And yet, one wonders what other honor-loving nation in the same circumstances would not also have done its utmost to circumvent a treaty which had been forced upon it at the point of the bayonet...
(Page 232) “The following 6 months brought Germany’s return, Hoover’s failure and that of the French plans, and the complete change in the atmosphere through Hitler’s seizure of power. However dreadful this was for the peace of the world—the other powers, above all France, have only themselves to blame for it... We should have exerted more pressure upon the French and made greater efforts to keep a moderate government in office in Germany.
(Page 256) “...they felt they were still being treated as outlaws...”
I would like to ask that these opinions of the British general which, as I already said, had the approval of the Foreign Secretary, Mr. Anthony Eden, be taken into consideration. In this connection I want to refer also to the statements by the following statesmen: Paul Boncour, Henderson, Briand, and Cecil; these statements were submitted by Dr. Schacht’s defense (Schacht Document Book Number 3, Exhibit Schacht-12) on the same subject matter and were accepted by the Tribunal; I also want to refer to the book by Viscount Rothermere: Warnings and Predictions (Page 100).
In examining and deciding whether the Defendant Keitel knowingly violated the military clauses of the Treaty of Versailles in the meaning of the Indictment, the Tribunal will have to consider the facts which have been presented. Individual charges against him on this point have not been made.
It is unquestionable that from 1933 on rearmament took place in the Reich. The Defendant Keitel has admitted that, and he stated that in the official positions he held up to 30 September 1934 and from 1 October 1935 on he participated in this rearmament in accordance with the functions incumbent on him. Like everything the Germans do, the rearmament too was well thought-out and organized. The Prosecution collected data for that; especially Document Number 2353-PS and the transcripts of the sessions of the Reich Defense Committee.
During the hearing of evidence the total picture of this period from 1935 to 1938 was not clearly defined. The Prosecution arranged its presentation of evidence retrospectively and drew a conclusion from the results of the war as to the motive for the rearmament, but at the same time it deduced from the fact, which cannot be denied and has not been denied, that this rearmament could not have been planned and carried out by any one man, that it constituted a joint plot for the purpose of aggressive war.
Now, where is the decisive criterion: in military armament or in other preparations for war from which the conclusion may be drawn that these measures have an aggressive character, that is to say, that they aim at an aggressive war? In principle, from armament itself nothing can be deduced as to the alleged intentions; armament may, in fact it must, look just the same if carried out for security and defense as it would if applied to aggressive war. Therefore, if the intention of rearmament for the purpose of a plot is to be determined, distinction must be made between:
(a) Armament and preventive measures which must be taken in case a mobilization should become necessary for defense at any time;