The “instructions,” which were of fundamental significance for the planning of military operations, are operational orders issued to the Commanders-in-Chief of the three Armed Forces’ branches by the Supreme Commander in this capacity. Before these instructions were drawn up Hitler discussed the military-technical aspect of each order with the competent OKW experts and also with the Defendant Keitel. The instructions, aside from opinions manifested by the individual experts, were exclusively the expression of the Supreme Commander’s wishes, and they were not directed to the OKW but to the Commanders-in-Chief of the three Armed Forces’ branches, to whom they were forwarded through the OKW. The three Armed Forces’ branches on their part ordered, on the basis of the general instructions, the details incident to their execution. Therefore, I shall not refer in this connection to the statement of the Charter according to which the carrying-out of orders is not accepted as a ground for exemption from punishment. For the transmission of the order was not an order issued by the OKW to the Armed Forces’ branches, but the forwarding of the expression of the wishes of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. The order directed to the OKW, if you will, referred in all cases to the elaboration of some desire expressed by the Supreme Commander and to the purely external act of transmitting the finished idea without having authority of expressing an opinion thereon. It must be assumed that the Prosecution, perhaps influenced by the defendant’s rank of Field Marshal, did not appreciate correctly this position of the Defendant Keitel. This rank had no relationship to the real authority of the defendant to issue military orders. One is inclined to imagine that a Field Marshal is a military commander. However, as we have seen, the Defendant Keitel had no command authority whatsoever.
Field Marshal Von Blomberg, whose testimony has been submitted to the Tribunal by the Prosecution, defines the position of the Defendant Keitel as Chef du Bureau. This definition is materially correct. A Chef du Bureau has to see to it that the bureau which he directs operates properly; that the affairs are correctly and promptly attended to by the competent officials. But he does not participate in the final decisions deemed correct by his superior, in this case the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. If this principle holds true in general, it is especially true here. It is known that Hitler did not accept any advice from Keitel concerning military decisions. This has been proved by the evidence, particularly by the testimony of General Jodl.
The Defendant Keitel has clearly outlined in Affidavit Number 8, called “Coordination in the State and in the Armed Forces,” his activity and that of the OKW. The affidavit gives an idea of the difficult and thankless work of the Defendant Keitel. It consisted mainly of a co-ordination of the desires and needs of the Armed Forces’ branches. It consisted, furthermore, in reconciling, divergencies as they arose and in the struggle against Hitler’s negative attitude toward any proper procedure, that is to say, through the competent departments.
In every branch of the Armed Forces there exist interests which differ from the interests of other branches and which cannot be entirely satisfied; sometimes they even oppose each other. This is true especially for the replacement of personnel, but also for the supply of everything that is required for special warfare.
The point of intersection of all these factual and personal differences of opinion was the OKW.
If one desires to estimate properly the incontestable fact that the Defendant Keitel was shown hostility and was personally judged unfavorably by nearly all sides, one must note that this fact occurred as a necessary result of the overlapping of factually opposing interests and personal differences of opinion, which Keitel tried to settle by means of co-ordination or mediation, that is, in nearly all cases by means of compromise. No particular personal experience is needed in order to know that the objective mediator will always incur the ingratitude of both parties. The same picture becomes evident in the relationship to the numerous offices which were endowed with special official authorities or which had Hitler’s favor and special confidence for personal, mostly Party political, reasons. One must realize these differences and overlapping interests to appreciate the heavy burden involved in Keitel’s position and, I might add, in order to judge correctly the significance of his position.
It is difficult to realize the special relationship between the leadership of the Armed Forces and the political sector because the functions of Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, of Reich War Minister and of head of State were from 4 February 1938 all embodied in the person of Hitler.
Therefore, since 4 February 1938, complete accord existed between the political leadership and the highest leadership of the Armed Forces since both powers resided in one and the same person.
The assumption of the Prosecution that the chief of Hitler’s military staff was closely connected with his superior Hitler and must therefore also be held responsible for political questions, if not as the perpetrator, then in some form as provided in Article 6 of the Charter, is erroneous.
In this connection there is no need to enter into the hierarchy of the Führer State and the binding character of the Führer order. The military hierarchy is older than the National Socialist ideology; moreover it must be stated and taken into consideration that the introduction of the absolute Leadership Principle into the Armed Forces signifies the final elimination of all efforts which could perhaps be regarded as democratic in a certain sense, or in any case as a restraint on the dictatorial appetite of Hitler. In this connection I refer to the affidavit of Keitel, Document Book 2, Number 9, “The OKW and the General Staff.” The rigid application of the Leadership Principle, judged retrospectively, gradually adulterated the healthy military principle of obedience into immoderate militarism. This found its expression, among other things, in the prohibition of all criticism, from the highest authorities to the lowest. I refer you to the speech made, by Hitler in the Kroll Opera House in 1937 or 1936, also to the critical marginal note—statement of General Winter—in the decree prohibiting applications for release on the part of the generals in 1938, and finally to the removal of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces and the War Minister.