If the Prosecution levels such manifold and grave accusations against Raeder, this is primarily because it has conceived a notion entirely foreign to the German Armed Forces, namely the notion of an admiral being responsible for foreign policy and for the outbreak of a war.

I shall disprove this conception and show that it was unjustified and unfounded even in Hitler’s National Socialist State. True, Hitler again and again placed politics in the forefront of the nation and endeavored to give the nation a one-track political education. Foreign countries knew this, and they may well therefore be all the more surprised by the fact that Hitler refrained from such political shaping in one single instance. Every administration, every organization, and every police institution was directed by Hitler on political principles, with the single exception of the Armed Forces. The Armed Forces, and the Navy in particular, remained for a long time and far into the war absolutely unpolitical. And not only did Hitler give Raeder an assurance to this effect, but he had also given the same assurance to Hindenburg as Reich President. This explains the fact, which has also been made clear in this Trial, that up to 1944 no officer could be a member of the Party, and if he was, then his membership was suspended.

After these preliminary reflections it will be understood why Raeder, as his interrogation showed, was disconcerted and amazed at these accusations which amount to a political charge. A man who is nothing but a soldier cannot understand why he should suddenly and without any relation to his military duties be made responsible for things which at no time came within the compass of his activity.

I shall naturally also discuss the military accusations, with the exception of submarine warfare, which, for the sake of uniformity, has already been dealt with by Dr. Kranzbühler on behalf of Raeder, too.

It will be seen from other military accusations, as for instance in the cases of Norway and Greece, that again and again there arises this discrepancy between the political and the military aspects: Raeder acted as Commander-in-Chief on the basis of military considerations, whereas the Prosecution now calls him to account on the basis of political considerations, by evaluating the military actions as political ones.

The first instance of this discrepancy already lies in the accusations raised against Raeder with regard to the period before 1933, that is, before National Socialism. In connection with these accusations it must not be overlooked that Hitler, the head of the alleged conspiracy for the waging of wars of aggression, did not rule Germany at that time, and yet already at that time there is supposed to have existed a common conspiracy between Hitler and a part of the defendants.

This is all the more surprising because Raeder, as a naval officer and after 1928 as Chief of the Naval High Command, at that time had nothing, absolutely nothing at all, to do with National Socialism, and did not even know Hitler and his co-workers in the Party. The accusations concerning the violations of the Versailles Treaty are included by the Prosecution in the conspiracy, although the violations did not take place under Hitler’s leadership, but under the leadership or with the approval of the democratic governments in Germany at the time. This shows that the Prosecution does not only want to attack National Socialism through this Trial, as has been emphasized again and again during the war and after the collapse, but that the Indictment extends its scope to large circles in Germany which had nothing to do with National Socialism, some of whom were even direct enemies of National Socialism.

(1) For this very reason it seemed to me extremely important to clear up the question of the violation of the Treaty of Versailles in the course of the presentation of evidence in the Raeder case. I have endeavored to do so with the approval of the Tribunal, and I am firmly convinced that I have succeeded. I need not discuss each of the violations, which have been treated in detail and which the Prosecution has produced in Document C-32. It should be sufficient if I refer to the extensive evidence as well as to the following facts:

Every single point was either a mere trifle or else a military measure—such as for example the antiaircraft batteries—based exclusively on the notion of defense. Raeder has plainly admitted that treaty infractions did occur, but the trivial nature of the infractions showed that these measures could not possibly have been connected with an intention to wage wars of aggression.

Moreover, I need only point out that from the legal point of view a treaty violation cannot ipso jure be a crime. Certainly the violation of a treaty between nations is no more permissible than the violation of a contract between private firms in commercial law. Such a violation is, however, not a punishable action, much less a crime. Even on the basis of the argument of the Prosecution, such action would be punishable only if the violation had been undertaken with criminal intent, that is, if it had been aimed at a war of aggression in contradiction to the Kellogg Pact. However, not even the Prosecution will be able to maintain this, and it has already indirectly intimated as much by refraining from taking up these points during the cross-examination of witnesses.