(2) The position is somewhat different with regard to a charge which the Prosecution discussed in detail only during cross-examination, namely, the charge concerning the participation of the German Navy in U-boat constructions in Holland; in this connection the Prosecution has relied upon Document C-156, the book by Kapitän zur See Schüssler entitled, Der Kampf der Marine gegen Versailles, as well as on statements contained in the notes of the naval historian, Admiral Assmann, found in Document D-854.
These documents prove that the German Navy had a share in a U-boat designing office in Holland, the firm N. V. Ingenieurskantoor voor Scheepsbouw. This participation occurred during the period before the Navy was under Raeder’s command. The Tribunal will recall that Raeder did not become Chief of the Naval Command until 1 October 1928, whereas participation in the designing office in Holland dates back to 1923 and the following years.
May I emphasize, however, that in not a single instance was a U-boat built for the German Navy, and that consequently no U-boats were obtained or put into commission by the German Navy. In this connection I refer to the Versailles Treaty, Exhibit Number Raeder-1; Article 188 et sequentes of the Treaty of Versailles contain the terms with regard to the Navy. According to Article 188, Germany was bound to deliver her U-boats to the Allied nations or to dismantle them. This obligation Germany fulfilled completely. Moreover, Article 191 stipulates the following; I quote: “The construction and purchase of all submarine vessels, even for commercial purposes, is forbidden in Germany.”
It appears from this clear treaty clause that participation in the Dutch firm was not a violation of the Treaty of Versailles. According to Article 191, Germany was only forbidden to construct or purchase U-boats, moreover, strictly speaking, only in Germany.
As a matter of fact, no U-boat was built in Germany in violation of the Treaty, and no U-boat was built for Germany abroad either. Participation in a foreign designing office was not forbidden, nor was this the purpose of the Treaty of Versailles. The point was merely that Germany should not create a U-boat force for herself. The Navy, however, was permitted to participate in a designing office so as to keep abreast of modern submarine construction, to gather information for the future, and to lay the foundation for an eventual construction of submarines, when permitted, by training technical experts (See Exhibit Number Raeder-2, Lohmann Affidavit). The afore-mentioned documents, submitted by the Prosecution, prove that the submarines designed by the Dutch firm and built abroad were put into service abroad, namely by Turkey and Finland.
Even if one were to take the view that designing work also was prohibited, then what was said under Figure (1) also applies. The designing was limited to only a few submarines, so that this small number in itself proves that there cannot have been any intention of waging wars of aggression.
(3) In case the High Tribunal should be unable to follow this train of thought as a sole argument, I may point out in addition that the lack of an aggressive intention is also evident from the fact that the trivial violations of the treaty were in a certain way compensated. I refer to the second affidavit of Admiral Lohmann, Exhibit Number Raeder-8, which shows that according to the Treaty of Versailles Germany was allowed to build 8 armored ships, whereas in fact she only built 3; it shows also that instead of 8 cruisers only 6 were built up to 1935, and that instead of 32 destroyers or torpedo boats, only 12 destroyers and no torpedo boats were built. In fact, with regard to the really important weapons, and especially those which may be considered as offensive weapons, the Navy kept far below the maximum permitted by the Treaty of Versailles, and this indeed to such an extent that by comparison the trivial violations in naval matters hardly count.
(4) According to the Weimar Constitution of 11 August 1919, Articles 47 and 50 (Exhibit Number Raeder-3), the President of the Reich had supreme command of all the Armed Forces. In order to be valid, the decrees of the Reich President required the countersignature of the Reich Chancellor or the Reich ministers concerned, in this case, the Minister of Defense. I quote: “Responsibility is assumed through the countersignature.” Thus, from the point of view of constitutional law it is absolutely clear that the responsibility rests with the Minister of Defense or the Reich Government and the President of the Reich. It is, of course, true that before 1928, that is, before Raeder became the responsible Chief of the Naval Command, the Navy took a number of measures without the knowledge of the Reich Cabinet. But the evidence which I presented, especially the statement of the former Reich Minister Severing, shows that, contrary to the statements of the Prosecution, no secret measures were taken after Raeder became Chief of the Naval High Command. Severing has confirmed that the Müller-Stresemann-Severing Cabinet, in a Cabinet meeting of 18 October 1928, obtained a clear picture of the secret measures of the Armed Forces by interrogating Raeder as Chief of the Naval High Command and Heye as Chief of the Army Command.
Both Raeder and Heye, after they had given an explanation, were obliged and directed by the Cabinet, in conformity with the afore-mentioned paragraphs of the Reich Constitution, to take no future measures without the knowledge of the Minister of Defense or the Cabinet. At the same time the Cabinet established that the secret measures taken before Raeder’s time were only trifling matters, and expressly assumed responsibility for them. If the Cabinet, in conformity with the Constitution, assumed the responsibility, this amounted to a legally and constitutionally effective procedure which exonerated Raeder as Chief of the Naval High Command and relieved him of responsibility. It appears, therefore, to be inadmissible that the defendant, who no longer bears the responsibility, should be made responsible for actions for which the Cabinet assumed responsibility.
The attitude of the Cabinet in the Cabinet meeting of 18 October 1928 further shows that none of these actions can have had as their basis any criminal intent to wage a war of aggression, for even the Prosecution will not desire to assert that men like Stresemann, Müller, and Severing intended to wage wars of aggression, but instead will have to believe Severing when he says that Stresemann, Müller, and he himself assumed responsibility for these violations only because they were based purely on conceptions of defense. One will also have to believe Severing’s words that such conceptions of defense were justified, since in the twenties the danger that Germany might be attacked, for instance by Poland, was quite real, and she would then not have been in a position to defend herself with the small Armed Forces allowed her by the Versailles Treaty. This danger was particularly evident in connection with Polish border incidents in East Prussia and Silesia and during the occupation of Vilna, and it even increased when all attempts of Stresemann and Müller failed to achieve adherence to the promise to disarm which the other powers had given in the Versailles Treaty.