The idea of a conspiracy between him and the members of the Cabinet or between him and the commanders was quite contrary to Hitler’s own nature, as the testimony of several witnesses showed in the course of the Trial. This was proved with particular emphasis by the testimony of the Swedish industrialist, Dahlerus, who by reason of his excellent and extensive connections both with Britain and Germany was in the course of time able to obtain an objective picture of both countries, and who during his negotiations with Chamberlain and Halifax on the one hand, and Hitler and Göring on the other, was best able to recognize the difference between the parliamentary British Government and the German dictatorship of Hitler. The account of Dahlerus proves convincingly that the difference was irreconcilable. After he had spoken with Chamberlain and Halifax, a discussion with the Cabinet naturally took place before a final decision was taken. On the other hand, when in the night of 26 to 27 August 1939[[52]] Dahlerus had a discussion of decisive importance with Hitler, at which only Göring was present, Hitler at once made six propositions, without saying a word to any of the Cabinet members or any of the military commanders, without even consulting Göring who sat by silently; proposals, moreover, which did not exactly tally with what he himself had told Sir Nevile Henderson a short time before. A stronger argument against a conspiracy with commanders or members of the Cabinet can hardly exist, unless it be the equally important fact which the witness Dahlerus added, namely, that during the entire 2½ hours Göring did not dare say a single word, and that it was humiliating to see the degree of servility which Hitler demanded even of Göring, his closest associate.[[53]]
All these Hitler speeches are full of contradictions. Such contradictions naturally impair clarity of thought, and they rob individual ideas of their importance. When reading the documents in their entirety, the number of contradictions becomes evident, as the witness Admiral Schulte-Mönting correctly pointed out during his examination and cross-examination. It is just because of such contradictions and often illogical thinking that the evidential value of the documents is diminished. Naturally it is difficult for a military adjutant like Hossbach or Schmundt to record unclear and contradictory trains of thought; and it is also easy to understand that a military adjutant will be inclined to introduce as clear a line of thought as possible, and will in consequence be misled into applying to certain ideas which have become clear to him more stress than they were actually given in the speech itself. To this can be added a remark of Raeder, who not only points to the contradictions, but especially to Hitler’s overactive imagination, and very appropriately calls him a “master of bluff.”[[54]]
Moreover, in every speech of that type Hitler followed a very definite tendency. He had a definite purpose in view, namely, to bring about the desired impression on all or some of his hearers, either by intentional exaggeration or by making things appear deliberately harmless. While he spoke, Hitler followed the intuition of the moment; as Schulte-Mönting termed it, he wandered from his notes. He thought aloud and wished to carry his hearers away, but he did not want to be taken at his word.[[55]] Everyone will agree with me that such practices and such purposefully designed speeches give no clear indication at all of Hitler’s true views at the time. In addition, there is this to be said about all these documents in general:
Following his address of 23 May 1939—known as the “Little Schmundt”—Raeder had an interview with Hitler alone in which he called Hitler’s attention to contradictions in his address and also to the contradiction arising out of Hitler’s assurance to Raeder personally that he, Hitler, would under all circumstances settle the case of Poland equally peacefully. Hitler thereupon put Raeder’s mind completely at rest and told him that he had a firm hold on matters, politically. This was stated by the witness Schulte-Mönting[[56]] who added that Hitler allayed Raeder’s misgivings about the contradiction between the speech of 23 May 1939 and his other statements by telling him that for him, Hitler, there were three grades of keeping matters secret: Firstly, by private conversation with one partner; secondly, the thoughts he kept to himself; and thirdly, some ideas which he himself did not fully think out.
I believe this way of thinking as explained by Hitler himself illustrates most strikingly how little reliance could ultimately be placed on statements which he made before a small or a large group of people. It seems to me quite plausible, therefore, that Raeder based his deliberations neither on Hitler’s general speeches nor on the address before the commanders which was discussed here, but went solely by what Hitler told him in private discussion. In this respect, the statements of Sehulte-Mönting, Böhm, and Albrecht[[57]] all prove that as late as 1939 Hitler was still, in private conversation, repeatedly giving Raeder the explicit assurance that there would be no war; and he did this whenever for some reason or other Raeder was particularly anxious and drew Hitler’s attention to the dangers ahead.
In conclusion, therefore, I believe it may be said that the so-called key documents are extremely interesting in assessing Hitler from a psychological point of view, but that their evidential value as regards Hitler’s real intentions is very limited and slight. One cannot reproach Raeder for not letting himself be guided by the tendentious and deliberate speeches which Hitler made before his commanders on the spur of the moment, and preferring to rely on assurances which Hitler himself gave him and on the fact that until the summer of 1939, until the very outbreak of the war, these assurances were in perfect accord with the facts and with Hitler’s actions, that is, with the four naval agreements and the Munich Pact.
It is understandable that Raeder did not permit this basic attitude to be shaken by these speeches to the commanders-in-chief, though they were undoubtedly of a questionable nature, but that he held steadfastly to his belief that Hitler would not deceive him. The fact that we now subsequently realize that Hitler did after all deceive Raeder in his private conversations with him, and also by his special second and third grade of secrecy, does not indicate any guilt on Raeder’s part, but solely on Hitler’s. The vast amount of material in this connection does not indicate that in 1938 and 1939 Raeder planned a war of aggression in violation of international law, but reveals only that Hitler planned a war of aggression in violation of international law.
This completes my general treatment of the key documents and I now ask the Tribunal’s permission to add a few points on each individual document, since the Prosecution again and again stressed these documents as the basis for the charge of conspiracy.
Hossbach Document, discussion of 5 November 1937 in the Reich Chancellery:
The crucial passages of this document are obvious, and the Prosecution has cited them often enough. But in dealing with this document it should be taken into consideration that both Göring and Raeder stated here that Hitler announced in advance his intention of following a certain trend or purpose in his speech. Hitler was dissatisfied with the measures taken by Field Marshal Von Blomberg, and especially by Generaloberst Von Fritsch, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, and felt that progress in the rearmament of the Army was too slow. Hitler therefore intentionally exaggerated, and since this was known only to Göring and Raeder, it is natural that the impression which the speech made on Neurath, who had no idea of this intention, was entirely different and considerably alarming.