c. Selection from the Argumentation of the Defense
EXTRACT FROM THE FINAL PLEA FOR THE DEFENDANT
BLOME[[90]]
Probably the most serious accusation against Dr. Blome seemed to be the allegation that he had proposed the murder of 25,000-30,000 tubercular Poles and had taken part in carrying out this plan. The evidence clearly shows, however, that this accusation is quite unfounded. I maintain on the contrary (a) it is not true that Dr. Blome approved or supported this murderous plan, and (b) it is also untrue that this plan was ever carried out. It is true, however, that it was Dr. Blome himself who prevented this devilish plan. It was Dr. Blome who, by his clever intervention saved the lives of the 25,000-30,000 tubercular Poles who were to be “liquidated.”
The documents show that this plan originated with Gauleiter Greiser and Reich Leader SS Himmler. Blome was then assigned to this matter because it was known that he had for many years made the fight against tuberculosis the aim of his life, and because he built his cancer institute in the same Gau which Gauleiter Greiser governed. Blome stated his attitude to this plan clearly at the time in the well-known letter of 18 November 1942. (NO-250, Pros. Ex. 203.) He discussed the three possibilities which existed and explained the pro’s and con’s of each of these three possibilities in detail. These three possibilities were either “Liquidation,” i. e., the murder of those Poles suffering from incurable tuberculosis, their internment in isolated institutions, or lastly, their settlement in a reservation. In his letter of 18 November 1942 (Appendix 25) he definitely rejected the first possibility and advocated the latter.
In this, Blome was completely successful. Greiser was so much impressed by Blome’s arguments that he no longer dared to carry out the liquidation of the Poles which had been decided upon. In fact, he submitted Dr. Blome’s memorandum to the Reich Leader SS Himmler, so that he should obtain a decision from Hitler himself. (NO-249, Pros. Ex. 202.) This was already a remarkable success for Blome, because Himmler had already ordered the liquidation of the Poles. Blome’s arguments made such an impression even on the bloodhound Himmler that, contrary to Greiser’s expectations, he cautiously put the matter before Hitler again and obtained his definite ruling. It should be remembered that this in itself would no longer have been necessary, because not only had Conti agreed to the murder, but from Greiser’s covering note of 21 November 1942 it is obvious that Hitler had also given his approval to the extermination of the Poles before.
Thereupon, after a subsequent examination of the matter, Hitler withdrew the extermination order and thus Himmler had no alternative but to do the same. This is clearly proved by Himmler’s letter of 3 December 1942. (NO-251, Pros. Ex. 204.)
The extermination of the Poles did not take place; this is due to Blome.
Although these facts are incontestably proved by the documents presented, the prosecution nevertheless upheld the charge against Blome. This evidently was due to the peculiar wording of Blome’s letter to Greiser of 18 November 1942. The prosecution in their speech of 19 December 1946 described this letter a “devilish masterpiece of murderous intent.” In considering this case, the prevailing conditions should be borne in mind. Dr. Blome knew that the tuberculous Poles were lost, that their murder had been decided upon, unless it was possible on some grounds to change Hitler’s mind at the last moment. The statement of the witness Dr. Gundermann (Blome 1, Blome Ex. 8) proved that Blome at that time, as is confirmed by Blome’s own testimony (Tr. pp. 4574-78), strove for days for a successful wording of his letter; he repeatedly drafted the letter, then rejected the wording again, and finally introduced arguments in the letter which he hoped would be successful. From the very beginning he was aware, of course, that his intervention was bound to fail and have no success if he described Hitler’s planned extermination of the Poles as a crime and downright murder and solemnly protested against it. In this way Blome would have achieved nothing for the Poles, but would have had to expect to be brought before a court himself and sentenced for sabotaging an order of the Fuehrer, or to have disappeared in a concentration camp without any legal sentence. With such simple method as entering a solemn protest by calling on the laws of humanity or of justice nothing would have been achieved with Hitler, especially when he had already made up his mind and had decided on a certain matter and had already given the necessary orders for execution; in such cases Hitler was usually inaccessible and would not listen to any counterproposals. Dr. Blome knew this, of course, just as well as, for instance, the Gauleiter of the Lower Danube, who in connection with a similar problem (sterilization), in his letter of 24 August 1942 (NO-039, Pros. Ex. 153) pointed out the importance of “enemy propaganda,” as he considered this most likely to be successful. Dr. Blome therefore looked for reasons which would perhaps have a decisive influence on Hitler and these were either the Church or other nations. It is understandable that Hitler, in view of the tense situation at that time, in the middle of the Second World War, did not want to break completely with the Church, and he also had to consider the opinion of foreign countries so as not to antagonize neutral states. Dr. Blome speculated on these two points. In his letter of 18 November 1942 he emphasized in a skillful manner, and with full determination, these two points of view, and with those two references he achieved full success. (NO-250, Pros. Ex. 203.)
It may now be realized why Blome, in the early part of his letter, tried to give Hitler the impression that he (Blome) fully agreed with the plan as such for the extermination of the Poles, and why he even pretended that everything was already prepared for the execution of this plan. Hitler had, so to speak, only to press the button and 25,000-30,000 Poles would be done away with. This was merely a trick which Blome used in order to ensure a favorable consideration of his second and third proposals (internment or reservation).