If Dr. Blome had written that he declined to approve such an order of the Fuehrer, that, in consequence, no preparations for its execution had been made, and that he would rather resign than become a party to a mass murder, then Hitler would have had his customary outburst, and Blome would have been finished as far as he was concerned; he would, of course, have entirely disregarded the protest of such a “saboteur,” and in the interests of so-called “reasons of State,” the Fuehrer’s orders would have been strictly carried out. To prevent this, Dr. Blome had to pretend for the time being, that he was ready to acknowledge the Fuehrer’s orders as a matter of course and, where possible, to participate personally in their execution, if Hitler, as Head of the State, so desired. However, when weighing the pro’s and con’s, Dr. Blome was able to bring to the foreground points of view against the plan of extermination which conceivably might greatly impress Hitler.
Blome’s letter of 18 November 1942 can only be explained thus, and was intended in this way. (Blome 1, Blome Ex. 8.) So Dr. Blome, on the strength of this letter, cannot be convicted. For it is certain that Hitler thereupon dropped his plan and completely rescinded his orders for the murder.
This success, which could hardly have been anticipated because of Hitler’s obstinacy and vainglory, completely justifies the defendant Blome. It proves that Blome’s conception was the right one and that his manipulations saved the lives of the Poles.
Another matter helped Blome considerably, which must not be overlooked here. Shortly before, Hitler had cancelled the continuation of the Euthanasia Program. Apparently he did this under the influence of numerous protests which had been made by the two Christian Churches. The reaction abroad also played a considerable part in this because mass destruction of the insane had been taken up repeatedly by the foreign press with particular reproaches against the Nazi regime. Dr. Blome made use of these points of view which had proved effective in the case of the Euthanasia Program, and they also produced telling effects in the case of the tubercular Poles.
Why did the prosecuting authorities maintain the accusation against. Dr. Blome in spite of all this? Apparently this was solely on account of an affidavit by the codefendant Rudolf Brandt. In his affidavit of 24 October 1946 Rudolf Brandt completely suppresses the letters which cause the complete rescinding of the plan for murder. (NO-441, Pros. Ex. 205.) He is silent about these letters, although it can be proved that they passed through his hands, were initialed, and handed down to lower offices by him.
During his examination by the defense, Rudolf Brandt was charged with untruthfulness. He was unable to offer an explanation, failed to answer, and was forced to submit to the charge of untruthfulness, of deliberate untruthfulness. Altogether, Rudolf Brandt has made an amazing number of affidavits; he has, without scruples, supplied the prosecution with practically every affidavit desired for the incrimination of codefendants, and with equal readiness, he has given affidavits for these same codefendants which directly contradicted his former assertions. What he confirms under oath today, he denies under oath tomorrow, and vice versa. However, it must be stated that the affidavit which Rudolf Brandt made against Dr. Blome, dated 24 October 1946, was the climax of his mendacity. After the experiences in this trial, and after having become acquainted, as we have, with a man like Rudolf Brandt, it would be ridiculous even to consider attaching any weight to the affidavit of a man such as we have got to know in Rudolf Brandt. His affidavit of 24 October 1946 has been entirely refuted by documents introduced by the prosecution. It is unnecessary, therefore, to examine to what extent Rudolf Brandt’s untruthfulness can be traced to his state of mental health.
During the session of 9 December 1946 the prosecuting authorities announced:
“The prosecution will introduce evidence to show that the program was in fact carried out at the end of 1942 and the beginning of 1943, and that as a result of the suggestions made by Blome and Greiser, many Poles were ruthlessly exterminated and that others were taken to isolated camps, utterly lacking in medical facilities, where thousands of them died.”
This evidence has not been produced so far by the prosecuting authorities, although the defense, during the session of 17 March 1947, referred in particular to this lack of evidence. The assertions of a Rudolf Brandt in this respect cannot be evaluated as “evidence,” even if it had not been completely retracted and even if it had not already been completely refuted by additional documents submitted by the prosecution. If the prosecuting authorities had succeeded in producing the witness Perwitschky, who had already been proposed in 1946, and who had been approved by the Tribunal, then his testimony would have produced additional clear proof that Blome actually prevented the proposed mass murder.
We know that later fate of these Poles who suffered from incurable open tuberculosis from the affidavit of Dr. Gundermann, the highest medical officer of the Warthegau (the territory in which the tubercular Poles were to be liquidated). (Blome 1, Blome Ex. 8.) The fight against tuberculosis was a legal task of the Public Health Offices which were subordinated in the Warthegau to the witness Dr. Gundermann. As a result of difficulties caused by the war, it was not possible to accommodate during the war, either in restricted institutions or in a segregated area, those suffering from tuberculosis; these two possibilities, which had been examined in a letter dated 18 November 1942 from Blome to Greiser were therefore out of the question for the time being. (NO-250, Pros. Ex. 203.) Therefore, the tubercular Poles were provided for according to the same legal regulations which applied to tubercular Germans in Germany proper. Legal regulations notwithstanding, a separate Tuberculosis Welfare Office, with Polish physicians and nurses, was established in the various health offices of the Warthegau. (Blome 1, Blome Ex. 8.) Therefore, the contention of the prosecution “that the accommodation of sick Poles in restricted institutions resulted in the comparatively rapid death of the sick” or, that the transportation of the sick into a reserved area meant that, “they were left to their fate, provided with few physicians and with few or no nursing personnel,” is devoid of application. (Tr. pp. 757-59.)