“The Influence of the Legal Position of Germany upon the War Crimes Trial,” Dr. Hermann Mosler, Assistant Professor of the University of Bonn, published in Sueddeutsche Juristen-Zeitung, volume 2, No. 7, July 1947.

Article published in Neue Justiz (New Justice), by Dr. Alfons Steininger, Berlin, volume I, No. 7, July 1947, pages 146–150.

In an article by George A. Zinn, Minister of Justice of Hessen, entitled “Germany as the Problem of the Law of States,” the author points out that if it be assumed that the present occupation of Germany constitutes “belligerent occupation” in the traditional sense, then all legal and constitutional changes brought about since 7 May 1945 would cease to be valid once the Allied troops were withdrawn and all Nazi laws would again and automatically become the law of Germany, a consummation devoutly to be avoided.

Both of the authorities first cited directly assert that the situation at the time of the unconditional surrender resulted in the transfer of sovereignty to the Allies. In this they are supported by the weighty opinion of Lord Wright, eminent jurist of the British House of Lords and head of the United Nations War Crimes Commission. For our purposes, however, it is unnecessary to determine the present situs of “residual sovereignty.” It is sufficient to hold that, by virtue of the situation at the time of unconditional surrender, the Allied Powers were provisionally in the exercise of supreme authority, valid and effective until such time as, by treaty or otherwise, Germany shall be permitted to exercise the full powers of sovereignty. We hold that the legal right of the four Powers to enact C. C. Law 10 is established and that the jurisdiction of this Tribunal to try persons charged as major war criminals of the European Axis must be conceded.

We have considered it proper to set forth our views concerning the nature and source of the authority of C. C. Law 10 in its aspect as substantive legislation. It would have been possible to treat that law as a binding rule regardless of the righteousness of its provisions, but its justification must ultimately depend upon accepted principles of justice and morality, and we are not content to treat the statute as a mere rule of thumb to be blindly applied. We shall shortly demonstrate that the IMT Charter and C. C. Law 10 provide for the punishment of crimes against humanity. As set forth in the indictment, the acts charged as crimes against humanity were committed before the occupation of Germany. They were described as racial persecutions by Nazi officials perpetrated upon German nationals. The crime of genocide is an illustration. We think that a tribunal charged with the duty of enforcing these rules will do well to consider, in determining the degree of punishment to be imposed, the moral principles which underlie the exercise of power. For that reason we have contrasted the situation when Germany was in belligerent occupation of portions of Poland, with the situation existing under the Four-Power occupation of Germany since the surrender. The occupation of Poland by Germany was in every sense belligerent occupation, precarious in character, while opposing armies were still in the field. The German occupation of Poland was subject to the limitations imposed by the Hague Convention and the laws and customs of land warfare. In view of these limitations we doubt if any person would contend that Germany, during that belligerent occupation, could lawfully have provided tribunals for the punishment of Polish officials who, before the occupation by Germany, had persecuted their own people, to wit: Polish nationals. Now the Four Powers are providing by C. C. Law 10 for the punishment of German officials who, before the occupation of Germany, passed and enforced laws for the persecution of German nationals upon racial grounds. It appears that it would be equally difficult to justify such action of the Four Powers if the situation here were the same as the situation which existed in Poland under German occupation and if consequently the limitations of the Hague Convention were applicable. For this reason it seems appropriate to point out the distinction between the two situations. As we have attempted to show, the moral and legal justification under principles of international law which authorizes the broader scope of authority under C. C. Law 10 is based on the fact that the Four Powers are not now in belligerent occupation or subject to the limitations set forth in the rules of land warfare. Rather, they have justly and legally assumed the broader task in Germany which they have solemnly defined and declared, to wit: the task of reorganizing the German Government and economy and of punishing persons who, prior to the occupation, were guilty of crimes against humanity committed against their own nationals. We have pointed out that this difference in the nature of the occupation is due to the unconditional surrender of Germany and the ensuing chaos which required the Four Powers to assume provisional supreme authority throughout the German Reich. We are not attempting to pass judicially upon a question which is solely within the jurisdiction of the political departments of the Four Powers. The fixing of the date of the formal end of the war and similar matters will, of course, be dependent upon the action of the political departments. We do not usurp their function. We merely inquire, in the course of litigation when the lives of men are dependent upon decisions which must be both legal and just, whether the great objectives announced by the Four Powers are themselves in harmony with the principles of international law and morality.

In declaring that the expressed determination of the victors to punish German officials who slaughtered their own nationals is in harmony with international principles of justice, we usurp no power; we only take judicial notice of the declarations already made by the chief executives of the United States and her former Allies. The fact that C. C. Law 10 on its face is limited to the punishment of German criminals does not transform this Tribunal into a German court. The fact that the four powers are exercising supreme legislative authority in governing Germany and for the punishment of German criminals does not mean that the jurisdiction of this Tribunal rests in the slightest degree upon any German law, prerogative, or sovereignty. We sit as a Tribunal drawing its sole power and jurisdiction from the will and command of the Four occupying Powers.

Examination will disclose that C. C. Law 10 possesses a dual aspect. In its first aspect and on its face it purports to be a statute defining crimes and providing for the punishment of persons who violate its provisions. It is the legislative product of the only body in existence having and exercising general lawmaking power throughout the Reich. The first International Military Tribunal in the case against Goering, et al., recognized similar provisions of the IMT Charter as binding legislative enactments. We quote:

“The making of the Charter was the exercise of the sovereign legislative power by the countries to which the German Reich unconditionally surrendered; and the undoubted right of these countries to legislate for the occupied territories has been recognized by the civilized world.”[562]

“These provisions are binding upon the Tribunal as the law to be applied to the case.”[563] [Emphasis added.]

Since the IMT Charter and C. C. Law 10 are the products of legislative action by an international authority, it follows of necessity that there is no national constitution of any one state which could be invoked to invalidate the substantive provisions of such international legislation. It can scarcely be argued that a court which owes its existence and jurisdiction solely to the provisions of a given statute could assume to exercise that jurisdiction and then, in the exercise thereof, declare invalid the act to which it owes its existence. Except as an aid to construction, we cannot and need not go behind the statute. This was discussed authoritatively by the first International Military Tribunal in connection with the contention of defendants that the IMT Charter was invalid because it partook of the nature of ex post facto legislation. That Tribunal said: “The Charter makes the planning or waging of a war of aggression or a war in violation of international treaties a crime; and it is, therefore, not strictly necessary to consider whether and to what extent aggressive war was a crime before the execution of the London Agreement.”[564] [Emphasis added.]