Subject: Treatment of enemy terrorist airmen.

The Foreign Office agrees to the intended measures as a whole, notwithstanding the clearly palpable objections from the viewpoint of foreign policy and international law.

Examination in detail should differentiate between cases of lynching and cases of special treatment by the SD.

I. In cases of lynching, a sharply defined establishment of criminal facts according to paragraphs 2–4 of the letter of June is not very important. First, a German authority is not directly responsible; death has already taken place before some German authority deals with the matter. Further, the circumstances will be such, as a rule, that it will not be difficult to represent the case in a suitable manner on publication. Accordingly, in cases of lynching, the principal aim will be to deal suitably with the individual case on publication.

[Handwritten marginal note] only this was the aim of our letter.

II. The procedure suggested for special treatment by the SD[299] with subsequent publication, would only be defensible if Germany would openly repudiate at the same time, and in this connection, the obligations under international law which are in force now and which Germany still recognizes. When an enemy airman has been apprehended by the armed forces or by the police and been transferred to the airmen reception camp Oberursel, his legal status has become eo ipso that of a prisoner of war. Concerning the criminal prosecution and sentencing of prisoners of war and the carrying-out of death sentences against prisoners of war, definite rules have been established by the Prisoners-of-War Convention of 27 July 1929, such as, e.g., article 66, which provides that a death sentence may be carried out no sooner than 3 months after notification of the death sentence to the protecting power; in article 63: sentencing of a prisoner of war only by the same courts and according to the same procedure as applicable to members of the German Armed Forces. These regulations are so precisely worded that it would be hopeless to try to veil any infraction thereof by a clever form of publication of individual cases. On the other hand, the Foreign Office cannot recommend a formal renunciation of the prisoner of war convention on this occasion.

[Handwritten marginal note] this is already being prevented by the intended segregation.

[Handwritten marginal note] No—owing to segregation and the special treatment immediately following.

A way of escape would be the following, viz, that suspect enemy airmen should not be allowed at all to have the legal status of prisoner of war; that means that one should tell them immediately on capture, that they were not to be considered as prisoners of war but as criminals, that they be handed over, not to authorities competent for prisoners of war such as a prisoner of war camp, but to the authorities competent for the prosecution of criminal acts, and that they then be sentenced in special summary judicial proceedings. If, during the interrogation under these proceedings, the circumstances prove that this special procedure is not applicable to the case on hand, then in individual cases the concerned airmen could afterwards be given the legal status of prisoners of war, by transfer to the airmen reception camp at Oberursel. Of course, even this opening would not prevent Germany from being blamed for infractions against valid agreements, and perhaps not even the taking of reprisal measures against German prisoners of war. Anyway, such an opening would enable us to keep to a clear viewpoint and free us of the necessity of either openly repudiating valid agreements or of making use, on publication of every single case, of excuses which nobody will believe. Of the facts mentioned under 2–4 of the letter of 13 June, the facts mentioned under 1 and 4 are legally unobjectionable. The facts under 2 and 3 are legally not unobjectionable. However, the Foreign Office is prepared to disregard that.

[Handwritten marginal note] yes, this too is possible.