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“Criminal proceedings based on this draft will accordingly be characterized by the greatest possible speed, together with immediate execution of sentence and will therefore in no way be inferior to summary court proceedings. The possibility of applying the most severe penalties in every appropriate case will enable the penal law administration to cooperate energetically in the realization of the Fuehrer’s political aims in the Eastern Territories.”
One of the amendments to this decree, on 3 December 1942 states that no German attorney is to undertake the defense of Polish persons before tribunals in the Incorporated Eastern Territories. This, in effect, prevented any accused person before these courts from having defense counsel, since Polish lawyers were prohibited from engaging in any legal practice. That this provision was received favorably by Ministry officials is indicated by a letter from the president of the court of appeals in Koenigsberg addressed to the Reich Minister of Justice shortly after this supplementary decree became effective. The judge, in the course of his letter, says this:
“It is in the German interest to continue to prohibit the defense of Poles by German jurists * * *.
“I see no cause to lift or even to modify the present ban on defense of Poles by attorneys. On the contrary, the ban placed on the principle of rendering legal assistance to Poles by attorneys should be still further stressed and made more extensive.”
To put to rest any fear that the ban of German attorneys would result in a competitive hardship on them, this judge has the following to say:
“The fear that, in the future, former Polish attorneys or counsel may be called in to act as legal advisers to Poles and may gain influence over them (i.e., German counsel) seems to me improbable. In the Incorporated Eastern Territories of my district, where, although the population numbers about one million, only three attorneys are established, it has not been observed that former Polish attorneys or counsel are engaging in activities connected with matters of law.
“It is, of course, much easier for the tribunal to have the case of a person charged put before them by a lawyer nicely arranged and in the German language. But the judge must dispense with these facilities when such great issues are at stake for the German people.”
The Court will, in due course, have an opportunity to examine all of these documents and an opportunity to observe the ruthless manner in which this “special legislation” was administered. It is perhaps superfluous to quote a statement by the president of the court of appeals of Danzig summarizing the “situation” in his district for a 2-month period in 1942 following the effective date of the decree of 4 December 1941. “There were,” he says, “no complaints about too lenient decisions during the period reported on.”
The defendant Schlegelberger, shortly after the decree became effective, conferred with the Reich Governor of Eastern Territories and worked out a system of administration pursuant to the decree of 4 December 1941, which (1) provided for summary courts martial, (2) delegated to the Reich Governor the sole right to grant amnesty, and (3) agreed to the holding of civilian prisoners as hostages. In summarizing the results of this conference the defendant Schlegelberger assured the Reich Governor that the “interest of the State can best be served by regulating matters along the lines of our unanimous consent.”