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A. There arose in France, after the beginning of the Russian campaign, the resistance movement which became very active. Hitler complained to the justice administration of the armed forces that on account of their attitude they were not in a position to suppress that resistance movement. That is the general background for the Nacht und Nebel Decree.
In detail this is what happened—In the beginning of October 1941 I received a letter from Field Marshal Keitel—but I want to state here that Keitel was always at headquarters, whereas I was always in Berlin. In this letter, which all my assistants have read, Keitel passed on a directive which he had received from Hitler. The letter was quite long, several pages in handwriting. In that letter, it was expressed that Hitler considered the resistance movement in France a tremendous danger for the German troops. It could be seen that the methods previously used were not sufficient to suppress that movement. There was no sense in passing sentences of prison terms—considering conditions as they were—which were handed down after a long period. That was not the right deterrent which the armed forces should employ; therefore, new means would have to be found.
Q. Now, Witness, you have given us some background on the history of the Nacht und Nebel Decree. Will you tell us with some particularity how the Nacht und Nebel program was supposed to work? In what way were the resisters to be handled under the Nacht und Nebel Decree?
A. Yes. That was also stated in that letter by Keitel. The Fuehrer demanded that Frenchmen who were suspected of such acts, during night and fog—that is where the expression comes from—should be brought across the border and that in Germany they should be held completely incommunicado. That should only not apply in those cases where immediately a death sentence could be passed in France. This measure could be used as a deterrent but not the procedures as had been used heretofore. That was the general plan of Hitler’s which did not include anything about the question as to who should deal with these people after they had been brought to Germany.
Q. Now, Witness, did you, in your position with the High Command of the Armed Forces negotiate with the Ministry of Justice regarding the Nacht und Nebel Decree?
A. Yes, but not immediately. At first, in a lengthy conference with Field Marshal Keitel, I tried to thwart the entire plan because I disagreed—I definitely disagreed with it. Details about that conference, I am sure, are not interesting for us now. In doing that, I only had a very limited success; that is, Keitel said that he would be ready to speak to the Fuehrer once more. But already on the occasion of this first conference, he stated that the Fuehrer insisted on the carrying out of that concept and he used a term which I cannot forget. Hitler had said with reference to that—“Nobody can deny that I am a revolutionary of considerable stature. Then I should know best how uprisings can be suppressed.” Keitel then spoke once more to Hitler, as he stated, but it was of no avail. According to Keitel’s information, Hitler said that there were things of which he understood more than jurists do.
In the conference with Keitel, I raised the question immediately as to who should deal with these matters in Germany now. Thereupon, Keitel said, that it would be most according to the desire of the Fuehrer if the Secret State Police would deal with it. But we were against that from the very beginning, and also Admiral Canaris was against it with the same severity.
After the argument had gone back and forth, I received the permission from Keitel to get in touch with the Ministry of Justice.
Q. Do you have any reason which you can state at this time as to why Hitler preferred the Ministry of Justice rather than the army court system to deal with Nacht und Nebel cases?