[72] See the Phædrus and the Banquet, vol. vii. of our translation.
[73] We shall not be accused of perverting the holy Scriptures by these analogies, for we give them only as analogies, and St. Augustine and Bossuet are full of such.
[74] See part ii., The Beautiful, [lecture 6], and part iii., [lecture 13], on the Morals of Sentiment. See also our Pascal, preface of the last edition, p. 8, etc., vol. i. of the 4th Series.
[75] See the admirable work of Bossuet, Instruction sur les états d'Oraison.
[77] See especially in our writings the regular and detailed refutation of the double extravagance of considering substance apart from its determinations and its qualities, or of considering its qualities and its facilities apart from the being that possesses them. 1st Series, vol. iii., lecture 3, On Condillac, and vol. v., lectures 5 and 6, On Kant. We say, the same Series, vol. iv., p. 56: "There are philosophers beyond the Rhine, who, to appear very profound, are not contented with qualities and phenomena, and aspire to pure substance, to being in itself. The problem stated as follows, is quite insoluble: the knowledge of such a substance is impossible, for this very simple reason, that such a substance does not exist. Being in itself, das Ding in sich, which Kant seeks, escapes him, and this does not humiliate Kant and philosophy; for there is no being in itself. The human mind may form to itself an abstract and general idea of being, but this idea has no real object in nature. All being is determinate, if it is real; and to be determinate is to possess certain modes of being, transitory and accidental, or constant and essential. Knowledge of being in itself is then not merely interdicted to the human mind; it is contrary to the nature of things. At the other extreme of metaphysics is a powerless psychology, which, by fear of a hollow ontology, is condemned to voluntary ignorance. We are not able, say these philosophers, Mr. Dugald Stewart, for example, to attain being in itself; it is permitted us to know only phenomena and qualities: so that, in order not to wander in search of the substance of the soul, they do not dare affirm its spirituality, and devote themselves to the study of its different faculties. Equal error, equal chimera! There are no more qualities without being, than being without qualities. No being is without its determinations, and reciprocally its determinations are not without it. To consider the determinations of being independently of the being which possesses them, is no longer to observe; it is to abstract, to make an abstraction quite as extravagant as that of being considered independently of its qualities."
[78] On the school of Alexandria, see 2d Series, vol. ii., Sketch of a General History of Philosophy, lecture 8, p. 211, and 3d Series, vol. i., passim.
[79] See the previous [lecture].
[80] 3d Series, vol. i., Ancient Philosophy, article Xenophanes, and article Zeno.
[81] The Sophist, vol. xi. of our translation, p. 261.