[82] Timæus, vol. xii., p. 117.
[83] Republic, book vii., p. 70 of vol. x.
[84] Phædrus, vol. vi., p. 55.
[85] The Sophist, p. 261, 262. The following little-known and decisive passage, which we have translated for the first time, must be cited:—"Stranger. But what, by Zeus! shall we be so easily persuaded that in reality, motion, life, soul, intelligence, do not belong to absolute being? that this being neither lives nor thinks, that this being remains immobile, immutable, without having part in august and holy intelligence?—Theatetus. That would be consenting, dear Eleatus, to a very strange assertion.—Stranger. Or, indeed, shall we accord to this being intelligence while we refuse him life?—Theatetus. That cannot be.—Stranger. Or, again, shall we say that there is in him intelligence and life, but that it is not in a soul that he possesses them?—Theatetus. And how could he possess them otherwise?—Stranger. In fine, that, endowed with intelligence, soul, and life, all animated as he is, he remains incomplete immobility.—Theatetus. All that seems to me unreasonable."
[86] Timæus, p. 119: "Let us say that the cause which led the supreme ordainer to produce and compose this universe was, that he was good."
[87] Bouquet, discourse of Diotimus, vol. vi., and the 2d part of this vol., The Beautiful, [lecture 7].
[88] Republic. Ibid.
[89] Book xii. of the Metaphysics. De la Métaphysique d'Aristotle, 2d edition, p. 200, etc.
[90] On this fundamental point, see [lecture 3], in this vol.—2d Series, vol. i., lecture 5, p. 97. "The peculiarity of intelligence is not the power of knowing, but knowing in fact. On what condition is there intelligence for us? It is not enough that there should be in us a principle of intelligence; this principle must be developed and exercised, and take itself as the object of its intelligence. The necessary condition of intelligence is consciousness—that is to say, difference. There can be consciousness only where there are several terms, one of which perceives the other, and at the same time perceives itself. That is knowing, and knowing self; that is intelligence. Intelligence without consciousness is the abstract possibility of intelligence, it is not real intelligence. Transfer this from human intelligence to divine intelligence, that is to say, refer ideas, I mean ideas in the sense of Plato, of St. Augustine, of Bossuet, of Leibnitz, to the only intelligence to which they can belong, and you will have, if I may thus express myself, the life of the divine intelligence ..., etc."
[91] Vol. ii. of the 2d Series, Sketch of a General History of Philosophy, lectures 5 and 6, On the Indian Philosophy.