Probably the most important point in the clause is its interpretation with regard to the Haber process. Its critical importance in the manufacture of explosives is so great that our neglect to use the Treaty to remove the monopoly is a direct menace to peace. This process undoubtedly saved Germany in 1915 and is largely responsible for the three years of war agony which followed. It can only have missed specific reference in the Treaty on account of its claim to represent the fertiliser rather than the explosives industry. To yield to such views, however ideal the motives, is to threaten the greater ideal of world peace.
Limitation of Armament.—This clause, covering only war development, cannot be regarded as a serious safeguard for the future. It is rather the fruits of victory, the logical outcome of Allied success and the German breach of faith. But the Treaty of Versailles contains an admission of the importance of chemical warfare for the future. Article 171 states: "The use of asphyxiating, poisonous, or other gases and of analogous liquids, materials, or devices being prohibited, their manufacture and importation are strictly forbidden in Germany. The same applies to materials specially intended for the manufacture, storage, and the use of the same products or devices." What kind of guarantee is this? How far is it supported by other disarmament? It is very important to answer these questions. In a sense the full execution of the other relevant Treaty clauses would provide a partial answer. We deal with these in the next chapter.
Report of the Hartley Mission.—Chemical warfare is the point faible in world disarmament. Judging from the above clause of the Treaty, it is clear that this is not fully recognised. Once again our trust is invited in mere prohibition. The lesson of the war is not learnt. The chemical menace is not countered. Why should this be? There are two main reasons. In the first place, very few had any conception of the tremendous growth in this branch of warfare, for facts had rarely been disclosed, and those with no direct contact with chemical warfare were relying on impressions. The vivid recollection of the first German cloud attack, and of the introduction of mustard gas, have, for most people, obscured the solid facts of the case. The great importance of the projector, the high percentage of chemical shell used by the enemy artillery, and the tremendous undertaking involved in protecting an army of millions with a modern gas mask, have not been grasped. The Hartley report clearly revealed the importance of the German dye factories for chemical warfare production. But we have a shrewd idea that it left many of its official readers much better informed on production than on the use of the materials concerned, that is, on the military value of chemical warfare.
New Conceptions in Chemical Disarmament.—The second difficulty preventing a full understanding of the case lies in the fact that chemical disarmament involves certain conceptions which are remote from the normal military outlook. Let us examine the matter as simply as possible.
During the many discussions on disarmament in Paris, various principles were suggested as a basis. One which received recognition in the Treaty was the limitation of the number of projectors or guns, using the term "projector" in a general way to cover all projectile-throwing weapons. Thus, in the sense implied, rifles, machine-guns, field and heavy guns are projectors. Recent writers have termed gas a projectile, one which, on account of its fluid nature, ignores the limitations of explosive shell and multiplies their radius of action indefinitely. This is true—with one most important qualification. Gas has never entirely depended upon the usual form of projector, the gun, and with the limitation of the latter its dependence will decrease. New forms of chemical weapon will evolve. Now it is true that almost every form of warfare which one can conceive depends for success on some sort of projector, and it is also true that the manufacture of these projectors can be controlled, because it is usually so complicated. These remarks apply, for example, to the manufacture of a field or heavy gun. But there is one serious exception to the covering power of this method of limitation. You cannot carry on tank warfare without ordinary projectors, but you can run a chemical campaign without them.
Facing the difficulties which are before any League of Nations or international body planning world disarmament, let us assume armament reduced to a police basis. In other words, the use of force is not entirely ruled out, but is limited to the minimum required for reducing local disorder, maintaining the peace, and contributing to any general scheme for preventing war. The nations, then, agree to limit their personnel and material within certain prescribed bounds. The work of the League of Nations, or central organisation, does not finish here. We cannot assume that permanent purity of national intentions, in other words, some check or guarantee must be instituted. This may take the simple form of systematic reporting by nations and their inspection by the League. Here we meet with considerable difficulty. Unless some simple covering principle for inspection can be determined upon, we shall end up with one-half the world inspecting the administration and organisation of the other. The matter becomes an absurdity.
Limitation, Mechanical and Chemical.—Considering the present trend of war development, we can divide the factors requiring limitation into three classes—the combatants, and weapons of a mechanical and chemical nature.
Tank Disarmament.—A little thought will show that the limitation of the number of projectile-throwing weapons covers the first two types, and is a matter which is not theoretically beyond the possibility of inspection. Periodic inspection could reasonably be regarded as a check against very big scale production beyond the normal scope of industry, for such weapons as rifles, machine-guns, field and heavy guns. If we consider the most important new mechanical war appliance, the tank, we find it no exception to the above remarks. Without projectors, that is, machine-guns, rifles, etc., it merely becomes a means of conveying troops and material from one place to another.
Two possibilities then arise. The number of tanks required might be so small that they could be suitably armed with light projectors without entering upon large-scale production. Secondly, the tank might become an offensive weapon without projectors, by the use of some chemical contrivance. This merely goes to prove that steps must be taken to limit the output of the tank itself. Are such steps possible? We assume that the modern tank is, and will increasingly become, a weapon practically as specific as a big gun, requiring a number of special parts which normal industry does not provide, and that the production concerned can be controlled by inspection with the same order of difficulty as that of the bigger projectors. We now come to the third type requiring limitation under a disarmament scheme.
Chemical Limitation.—Can we limit chemical armament? Our review of production has shown the impossibility of doing so, unless we completely wipe out the organic chemical industry which is essential for world progress by its contribution of dyes, drugs, and other synthetic commodities. The factories of the organic chemical industries are more silently converted into arsenals than any other type. It is true that, under normal conditions of warfare, the decisive success of a chemical campaign might be restricted by the use of other weapons, such as artillery. But, under conditions where the latter are seriously limited, the chemical weapon becomes, relatively, of much greater importance. One of the main trends in chemical warfare was the development of devices which would give long-range chemical effects without a complicated form of projector, or with none at all. Having thus shown the independence of the chemical weapon, under conditions of limitation of armament, we are faced with an important question. What can be the guarantees for the limitation of chemical warfare?