Research.—In the first place, can any research results accrue under Treaty or League conditions? The chief poison gases used during the war owed their discovery, as individuals, to pre-war research which was not stimulated by the need for an offensive chemical. Phosgene was discovered in 1811 by J. Davy, while experimenting on the action of sunlight on a mixture of carbon monoxide and chlorine. Guthrie, in 1860, trying to throw light on some theoretical aspects of organic chemistry, examining the nature of certain so-called radicles or groups of atoms, came across a family of compounds of which mustard gas, or B:B dichlordiethylsulphide, was a member. This he found to be a dangerous substance, but the nearest members of the series were harmless.
These substances will arise as a result of normal chemical research. We admit they may multiply much more quickly if work is specially directed towards their discovery, but it is practically impossible to control such work. The research worker's nearest confidante and laboratory companion might be unaware that he was developing some new vitally important chemical for warfare. No serious person can claim the possibility of a check upon such research. If, then, the Government of any country desires to provide its chemical factories with suitable subjects for chemical warfare production, these can be produced under ANY international arrangements, however prohibitive.
Production.—But what of production? Here, again, we have an entirely different problem compared with that of limiting the output of a gun. Let us assume that the production of some vitally important new organic compound involves four different steps, and that the last step produces the toxic substance. This is a fair assumption. Let us further assume the most favourable condition for detection, i.e. {t}he final product is a liquid or gas with obviously toxic properties. Given a big organic chemical industry, there is no possibility of detection by open methods of control. With regard to the first three steps, in practically every case they will be related to some new or existing dye, drug, photographic, or other commercial organic product. The products of these first reactions can either be stored, ready for the rapid realisation of the last reaction, in which case there is no possibility of detection, or the reaction can be completed and the materials passed without exposure through a standard type of plant to an easily concealed container. The only type of inspection which could possibly cope with such a problem would require to probe deeply into the technical and commercial secrets of the factories and plants, and could even then be misled owing to the constantly developing nature of the compounds produced. The inspectors would require to be numerous and as closely in touch with the plants and processes as the actual factory staffs.
Consider the Leverkusen works for a moment. They cover a very wide range of products, are admirably planned on a well thought out and rational scheme, and there is a reason for the position of every unit. Their methodical arrangement would be of more assistance to inspection in this than in any other large organic chemical works with which we are acquainted. Even under such favourable conditions satisfactory inspection would be most difficult. Each one of the twenty huge blocks contains many units of plant, and is devoted to the production of primary, intermediate or finished materials. For the inspection of suspected poison gas production, an examination of the first two would be of no assistance, for the war and peace materials would be identical. Differentiation would occur in the dye and finished product blocks. Each one of these blocks may be producing as many as one hundred different compounds at the same time, and each one of these compounds may, itself, involve two, three, or four different stages. The members of one official mission, when asking to be shown the plant for the manufacture of p-amidophenol, an important dye and photographic chemical, were taken to a large building filled with assorted plant, and were told by the guides, "We have no special plant for the product you mention; we make it in this building with a great many other products, for it is our principle not to have plant which makes one product only, but is readily adaptable for making a variety." In many of the processes the materials do not appear to the naked eye after their introduction into the first plant unit, being fed by gravity or pressure from one enclosed apparatus to another. It would be absolutely essential for any inspection to conduct chemical tests at the different stages. The difficulty of inspection is incontestable. It could be done with a large staff, but we must remember that the Rhine plants are, themselves, but a small corner of the whole world of industry requiring inspection. Even under the most favourable conditions for detection, the chances are exceedingly small. But, in most cases, an enemy with a strong organic chemical industry need not undertake manufacture during peace. He could rely on the potentialities of his chemical industry, which would enable him to commence production in his existing plant immediately on the outbreak of war. The question of the use of the chemical then arises. If of an exceedingly novel and decisive nature, it could take its share of use in the limited number of guns available; on the other hand, it might be capable of use in one of the very simple weapons already devised for chemicals, or to be devised in the future.
Consider the Livens projector, by no means a favourable case. The latest German designs have a range well over a mile. This range maybe increased. Yet the Livens projector can be made without serious or obvious war modification of plant, in a tube works, where the bomb can also be produced. The very nature of chemical warfare is such that great accuracy is not required, and simplification of production of the gas projector follows naturally. We conclude from the above that whatever treaty or international arrangements exist for prohibiting chemical warfare, we can find no safeguard in practicable methods of control, and must find safety in some other measure.
Mechanical and Chemical Preparations for War.—There is a fundamental difference in preparation for the mechanical and chemical methods of war. This difference necessitates special consideration for the chemical method from the point of view of disarmament. All the modern mechanical types of war appliances are characterised by their great structural intricacy, witness the Lewis gun with its innumerable complicated parts, the heavy and field guns with their wonderful mechanism, and the future tank with its anti-gas, anti-water, and general anti devices. This characteristic of great structural development has certain concomitants which are of considerable military importance. It imposes certain conditions on production, involving special factories for special parts and other factories for the assembly of those parts. It implies large scale experimentation for the improvement of the appliance. All this brings control and inspection within the region of the theoretically possible, and militates against sudden surprise. The structural characteristic also imposes certain important conditions in military training. It takes a definite period of time to create a machine-gunner who will humour the wonderful mechanism which he serves. He must know the different jambs, and simple repairs. He must be trained. The same remarks apply to any other structurally intricate appliance, such as the tank. In other words, this characteristic is a distinct check on any nation aiming at a sudden expansion from limited to war armament.
But consider the chemical method. The specific property of the chemical which gives it its military value is ultimately its influence on the human organism, which causes casualties or imposes heavy military handicaps on protected troops. There is, again, a question of structure, the chemical structure of the substance in question. This, however, does not involve the same aids to armament limitation as for the mechanical type, unless it be in a very restricted sense. In research, the discovery of the most effective chemical the world will ever see can occur by the use of a few beakers, pots and pans, and common chemicals, directed by a trained mind. Being atomic or molecular, the structure imposes no large scale conditions on the research. Nor is it fair to say that from the point of view of production there is a parallel between the complexity of the molecule and the plant required to make it. The chemically complicated Blue Cross arsenic compounds were produced by Germany in a plant which was simplicity itself when compared with the marvellous installation developed to produce oleum, a concentrated form of the relatively simple sulphuric acid, a fundamental substance in explosives production. Instead of manipulating a huge lathe, or forge, or exceedingly complicated multiple mechanical device, you manipulate temperatures and pressures and vary the reaction medium. Naturally, chemical engineering is very important, but its magnitude and complexity is in no sense parallel with the intricacy of the chemical molecule, whereas a distinct parallel exists for the mechanical war appliance. More than this, we believe that developments in both fields will exaggerate rather than diminish the difference. We see thus how, on general grounds, the chemical weapon tends to evade any normal condition of limitation which might be perfectly adequate for the mechanical type.
Recent Disarmament Proposals.—A superficial examination of recent disarmament speeches by prominent League of Nations advocates leaves one with the glow of inspiration produced by homage to a great ideal. But later reflection, in the cold light of reason, produces a critical, but not cynical, frame of mind. Disarmament depends for success on the way in which we tackle certain critical cases, The carrying out of the more commonly considered forms of disarmament will give immensely added importance to other forms of warfare which have already challenged supremacy in the keen competitive atmosphere of the great world war. The outstanding example is the chemical arm, whose peculiar requirements in any scheme of disarmament have been but vaguely understood.
The great case and rapidity with which the German dye factories mobilised for poison gas production on a super-industrial scale has already been demonstrated. It took forty years and more to develop those factories. Yet forty days saw many of their plants producing huge tonnages of poison gas, and as many hours were sufficient for others. In some cases, indeed, they were already producing eventual munitions long before the outbreak of war. We must not remain insensible to the double-edged nature of this industrial weapon. When with one hand Germany withdrew life-giving drugs from America, with the other she poured upon us an endless stream of deadly poison made in the same factories. Even when our textile industries were threatened through lack of indigo, from the very plants on which we had depended there issued a steady stream of mustard gas, each ounce of which threatened Allied limb and life. But how does this touch disarmament? Very simply. A few quotations from some recently published disarmament utterances will show that we are not pressing the point without need. But let us follow the matter through in a logical way.
The Covenant of the League;—Need for Guarantees.—We start from the sure ground of the Covenant of the League of Nations. Article 8, recognising the reduction of armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety, refers to the formulation and revision of plans for such reduction and states: "The members of the League undertake to interchange full and frank information as to the scale of their armaments, their military and naval programmes, and the conditions of such of their industries as are adaptable to warlike purposes." Here is the frank admission of the importance of such industries. But later exponents of the League express dissatisfaction with Article 8, claiming the wording to be vague. Thus, from Major David Davies, M.P.,[1] "The whole wording of Article 8 is vague. These proposals would not eradicate the old atmosphere of suspicion which has brought about so many wars. Nations who put their trust in the League are entitled to an assurance that the League will be able to enforce its decisions with promptitude. The proposals concerning armaments in Article 8 and elsewhere do not give this assurance. Something more definite is required," and he proceeds to lay down three aims which must be covered by an efficient disarmament scheme.