True, the plants of the I.G., like most other munition plants, have a dual function for peace and war. But their recent vital use for the latter brings them without doubt within the scope of the above clause. Are they still equipped for war purposes? Very drastic action will have been necessary by the Inter-Allied Commission of Control to justify a negative answer. Has that action been taken? If not, the I.G., a second Krupp, remains in splendid isolation, secure behind our mediaeval but generous conception of munitions, for fifty per cent. of the German shell fillings, the message of their guns, were eventually provided by the I.G. It is true that they were manufactured in synthetic dye and fertiliser plants, but the explosives were none the less violent and the poison gases none the less poisonous. Do we understand that the Allied and Associated Governments voluntarily leave Germany in unquestioned possession of this vast source of munitions in the face of the Treaty Article 168?
Article 169 wisely requires that any special plant intended for the manufacture of military material, except such as may be recognised as necessary for equipping the authorised strength of the German Army, must be "surrendered to be destroyed or rendered useless." The most formidable examples of such excess production were, and remain, the nitrogen fixation and the nitric acid plants of the I.G. The factories of the latter represent explosives and poison gas capacity far in excess of the authorised needs of the German Army. Why, then, should they be left. intact?
What is the authorised equipment of the German Army? In the first place the manufacture and use of poison gas is specifically forbidden by the Treaty. The plants in question are therefore all in excess of authorised production, and should be destroyed or rendered useless. At present, to the best of our belief, they stand ready to produce at short notice at the rate of more than 3000 tons of Poison gas per month. Does this mean that we admit them as authorised equipment? If so, we are ourselves contravening another clause of the Treaty.
The Treaty tabulates the authorised equipment in stock of shell. Based on the figures, we find that the actual war explosives production of the I.G., which, we believe, still largely remains available, could meet the total stock allowed to Germany by the current production of little more than one day!
Even if the Treaty provided authority, could these plants evade their just penalties on the ground of commercial world need?
Consider the question of German poison gas, all produced within the I.G., and its use and manufacture in Germany forbidden by the Treaty. It was made in converted or multiplied dye plants, or in special plants of the same type. Germany's great advantage was due, unquestionably, to her pre-war dye monopoly. The 1913 figures for production and home consumption are given below, under (A) and (B) :
A B C
Country. Dye Production, Home Dye Dye Production,
1913. Consumption. 1918,
Tons Tons Tons
Germany 135,000 20,000 135,000
(probably
more)
Switzerland 10,000 3,000 12,000
France 7,500 9,430 18,000
U.K . 4,500 31,730 25,000
U.S.A 3,000 26,020 27,000
Other Countries 3,000 72,820 4,000
—— —— ——
Total 163,000 163,000 221,000
The completeness of the German monopoly stands clearly revealed. If, therefore, any plants capable of making dyes were built for poison gas or explosives during war, they could find no post-war raison d'etre unless the feeble production of other countries had even further diminished.
Do the above figures (C) justify such an assumption? There is an increase of production outside Germany of nearly 60,000 tons per annum. Almost all of this, representing development under definitely expressed national policy, must be maintained unless we wish to revert to the exceedingly dangerous situation of a German dye and poison gas monopoly. Much of this 60,000 tons per annum German excess could be covered by plants used or built specially for poison gas or explosives.
There is every reason, for world peace, to eliminate such excess plants. There is no important reason, for commerce, to maintain them. In addition, many of them represent excess capacity which should be destroyed because they originated solely for the exploitation of a forbidden weapon. Even if a generous ruling, superimposed on the Treaty, offered these guilty plants a new lease of life because of their urgent peace-time use, the claim could not be supported before neutral experts. The Treaty provides authority for the disarming of certain chemical munition plants. Nothing but the most drastic economic need can justify departure from this critical disarmament measure. The need may justify Treaty exemption for other types of munition production in which the disarmament aspect is not so overwhelmingly important. The matter demands examination. We can hardly conceive that this has not been done. Are our missions equipped to meet the best German commercial minds on such a matter? In any case, Allied Governments have already wisely adopted a dye industry policy inconsistent with the special Treaty immunity of the excess I.G. munition plants. Our figures remove any ground for the economic argument.