The Magyars realised from the beginning the importance of an understanding between themselves and Prussia, and they directed their foreign policy accordingly. The setting up of dualism in 1867, which finally established the German-Magyar hegemony in Austria-Hungary in the interests of Prussia, was the work of two Magyars--Julius Andrassy and Francis Deak, who took advantage of Austria's defeat at Sadova to further their interests. In 1870, when Vienna contemplated revenge against Prussia, the Magyars again intervened in favour of Prussia. When questioned as to Hungary's attitude, Andrassy, then Premier, declared in the Hungarian Parliament that under no circumstances would he allow any action against Prussia, and exerted all his influence in Vienna to that effect. It was also due mainly to Magyar influence that all attempts of the Czechs to weaken German influence in Austria were frustrated. Francis Joseph always promised to be crowned King of Bohemia when he wished to placate the Czechs in times of stress for Austria: in 1861, 1865, 1870 and 1871. But he never carried out his promises. In this he was guided not only by considerations of dynastic interest, but also by the advice of the Magyars.
But the most decisive and fateful exercise of Magyar influence upon Austria's foreign policy occurred in 1879, when the Austro-German Alliance was finally concluded. This was equally the work of Bismarck, who spared the defeated Austria in order to make an ally of her, and of a Magyar--Count Andrassy--who from 1871 to 1879 was the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister. It was this Magyar help which made Bismarck utter words of gratitude and declare in 1883:
"Our political judgment leads us to the conviction that German and Magyar interests are inseparable."
It is true that there always was a Magyar opposition against Austria (though never against Prussia). But this opposition was used as a weapon to extort concessions from Austria. At the bottom of their hearts, however, the Austrian Germans were always at one with the Magyars in their common desire to oppress the Slavs. And the responsibility of Count Tisza for the present world catastrophe is just as great as that of the Kaiser himself.
3. The Czechs saw clearly the progress of events. Bismarck was well aware of the importance of Bohemia, for he declared that the master of Bohemia would become the master of Europe. He did not desire to annex any Austrian territory, since he knew that sooner or later Germany would swallow the whole of Austria, as she has done in this war. Indeed, at the Congress of Berlin in 1878, Bismarck did not conceal his intention of using Austria-Hungary in Germany's interests. At the bottom of his heart he was at one with the radical Pan-German writers, like Lagarde, Treitschke, Mommsen, Naumann and others, who openly declared that the Slavs should be subjugated and the Czechs, as the most courageous and therefore the most dangerous of them, crushed.
The Slavs always bitterly opposed the encroachments of Germanism, and saw in it their chief enemy. The Czech leader Palacký rejected the invitation to Frankfurt in 1848 and summoned a Slav Congress to Prague. It is true that Palacký at that time dreamt of an Austria just to all her nations. He advocated a strong Austria as a federation of nations to counterbalance Pan-Germanism. Yet at the same time Palacký has proved through his history and work that Bohemia has full right to independence. He was well aware that a federalistic and just Austria would have to grant independence to the Czecho-Slovaks. But later on he gave up his illusions about the possibility of a just Austria, when he saw that she abandoned the Slavs entirely to German-Magyar hegemony, and declared that Bohemia existed before Austria and would also exist after her. In 1866 he wrote:
"I myself now give up all hope of a long preservation of the Austrian Empire; not because it is not desirable or has no mission to fulfil, but because it allowed the Germans and Magyars to grasp the reins of government and to found in it their racial tyranny."
Exasperated by the pact of dualism which the Czechs never recognised, Palacký went to Moscow and on his return declared:
"I have already said that I do not cherish any hopes of the preservation of Austria, especially since the Germans and Magyars made it the home of their racial despotism; the question therefore as to what will happen to the Slavs hitherto living in Austria is not without significance. Without attempting to prophesy future events which for a mortal man it is difficult to foreshadow, I may say from my inner conviction that the Czechs as a nation, if they fell under the subjection of either Russia or Prussia, would never rest contented. It would never fade from their memory that according to right or justice they should be ruled by themselves, that is by their own government and by their own sovereign. They would regard the Prussians as their deadly enemies on account of their germanising rage. But as to the Russians, the Czechs would regard them as their racial brothers and friends; they would not become their faithful subjects, but their true allies and, if need be, vanguards in Europe."
Moreover, modern Czech politicians always clearly saw what the Germans were aiming at. Dr. Kramář, for instance, foresaw the present situation with remarkable perspicacity. In the Revue de Paris for February, 1899, he wrote on "The Future of Austria," declaring that her subject nationalities should be on guard lest she should become a vassal of Germany and a bridge for German expansion into Asia: