"The Austrian Germans wish to see Austria subordinated to German policy, and with the help of a subordinated Austria, the sphere of German political and economic activity would extend from Hamburg to Asia Minor."
Similarly also he warned Great Britain in the National Review for October, 1902, that if Pan-German plans were realised,
"Austria would become an appanage of Germany as regards international relations, and the policy of Europe would be obliged to reckon, not with a free and independent Austria, but, owing to Austria's unconditional self-surrender, with a mighty, almost invincible Germany.... The Pan-Germans are right, the Czechs are an arrow in the side of Germany, and such they wish to and must and will remain. Their firm and unchangeable hope is that they will succeed in making of themselves an impenetrable breakwater. They hope for no foreign help; they neither wish for it nor ask for it. They have only one desire, namely, that non-German Europe may also at last show that it understands the meaning of the Bohemian question."
In 1906 Dr. Kramář wrote again in detail on the plans of German domination in Central Europe, in the Adriatic and in the Near East. In a book on Czech policy he declared that to prevent the realisation of these plans was the vital interest of the Czech nation: "A far-seeing Austrian policy should see in the Czech nation the safeguard of the independence of the State." And then followed the famous passage which formed part of the "evidence" quoted against him during his trial for high treason:
"If Austria-Hungary continues her internal policy by centralising in order to be better able to germanise and preserve the German character of the State, if she does not resist all efforts for the creation of a customs and economic union with Germany, the Pan-German movement will prove fatal for her. To preserve and maintain a state the sole ambition of which was to be a second German State after Germany, would be superfluous not only for the European Powers, but also for the non-German nations of Europe. And if, therefore, a conflict should break out between the German and the non-German world and the definite fate of Austria should be at stake, the conflict would surely not end with the preservation of Austria."
And on November 10, 1911, he admitted that his former hopes for the destruction of the Austro-German Alliance and a rapprochement between Austria and Russia proved to be in vain:
"... I had an aim in life and a leading idea. The events of the annexation crisis have proved calamitous for the policy which I followed all my life. I wished to do everything which lay within the compass of my small powers, to render my own nation happy and great in a free, powerful and generally respected Austria ... I have always resented the fact that when they talked about Austria people really meant only the Germans and Magyars, as if the great majority of Slavs upon whom rest the biggest burdens did not exist. But now--and no beautiful words can make me change my opinion on that point--an entirely independent policy has become unthinkable, because the only path which remains open to Vienna leads by way of Berlin. Berlin will henceforward direct our policy."
4. To offer any proofs that the present war was deliberately planned and provoked by the Governments of Berlin, Vienna and Budapest seems to me superfluous. Who can to-day have any doubt that Austria wilfully provoked the war in a mad desire to crush Serbia? Who can doubt that Austria for a long time entertained imperialist ambitions with respect to the Balkans which were supported by Berlin which wished to use Austria as a "bridge to the East"?
No more damning document for Austria can be imagined than Prince Lichnowsky's Memorandum. He denounces Austria's hypocritical support of the independence of Albania. In this respect he holds similar views to those expressed in the Austrian delegations of 1913 by Professor Masaryk, who rightly denounced the Austrian plan of setting up an independent Albania on the plea of "the right of nationalities" which Austria denied her own Slavs. Professor Masaryk rightly pointed out at that time that an outlet to the sea is a vital necessity for Serbia, that the Albanians were divided into so many racial, linguistic and religious groups and so uncivilised that they could not form an independent nation, and that the whole project was part and parcel of Austria's anti-Serbian policy and her plans for the conquest of the Balkans. Prince Lichnowsky admits that an independent Albania "had no prospect of surviving," and that it was merely an Austrian plan for preventing Serbia from obtaining an access to the sea.
He apparently disagrees with the idea of "the power of a Ruling House, the dynastic idea," but stands up for "a National State, the democratic idea." That in itself seems to indicate that he is in favour of the destruction of Austria and its substitution by new states, built according to the principle of nationality. He admittedly disagrees with the views of Vienna and Budapest, and criticises Germany's alliance with Austria, probably knowing, as a far-sighted and well-informed politician, that Austria-Hungary cannot possibly survive this war.