Kornemann[82] indeed maintains that Augustus suddenly became warlike about the year 4 B. C. The events leading up to, and the evidence for, such a singular reversal of policy he gives as follows. In 5 B. C. the Roman senate agreed that Gaius Caesar, grandson of Augustus and heir presumptive, should be consul, as soon as he had attained the age of twenty. Augustus, with a successor thus assured, invited the people to share his own joy and that of the prince’s family in the celebration of public festivals, in the construction of buildings, in the distribution of largesses, donations, etc. to the public. At this time Augustus added to the Monumentum Ancyranum (which Kornemann believes was a political document written in five distinct parts and at as many different periods[83]), the second part, chapters 15-24, in which he enumerates with satisfaction all that he has done for the people, for the city of Rome, and for the army. Then in 2 B. C. Lucius Caesar obtains the same favor as his brother Gaius, and shortly thereafter aids in the establishment of the Roman protectorate over Armenia. Thereupon Augustus, forgetting that he had already represented himself as the champion of peace, and yielding to the love of military glory and conquest, added, about 1 B. C., a third part, chapters 25-33 with chapters 14 and 35, in which he sets forth what he has done to strengthen the Roman power in the provinces and to extend it beyond, dwelling all the while on the part that his grandsons and future successors have played in this achievement. However, Kornemann’s theory and the deduction therefrom as to Augustus’ attitude toward imperial conquest find contradiction in an article by Wilcken[84], who argues that while Augustus worked long over the document nothing was added after the year 6 A. D. Further, the three parts, honores, impensae, res gestae, form a whole, and were written at one and the same time. Augustus filled in the original outline with details which may be easily detected. For example in chapter 26 the provinces of western Europe are thus enumerated: Gaul, Spain, Germany. Now Germany, according to its geographical position, ought to stand at the head of the list, but its position of third in order is proof that it was inserted after the other two.[85] For Germany could not have been called a province until after the campaign of Drusus to the Elbe in 9 B. C. Hence the first outline of the res gestae antedates not only the year 1 B. C. (proposed by Kornemann), but even 9 B. C. Therefore Augustus’ warlike tendency developed, if at all, prior to 4 B. C., the date claimed by Kornemann.
This conclusion Kornemann combats[86] with the assumption that while the passage referring to the western provinces shows clear traces of interpolation, the name of Germany was not inserted until the year 6 A. D., at which time there was entered also the mention of Tiberius’ naval expedition to the coasts of that country in 5 A. D. The insertion of each item attests the desire which Augustus felt at that time to bring into relief the services rendered to Rome by his adoptive son and sole heir. But the chapter as a whole, he avers, is older than this, and the reasons for attributing it to the earlier date remain unshaken. Bésnier[87], on the other hand is undoubtedly right in saying that it is impossible to follow Kornemann in assigning precise dates to each fragment of the Monumentum Ancyranum and in tracing point by point, from 23 B. C. to 14 A. D., the successive accretions to the text. The most that can be said is that the three parts, honores, impensae, res gestae were written at three different times and that they correspond to the different and successive preoccupations of Augustus. We may feel certain, however, that Augustus did not revise his work just before his death, and that he ceased to add to it in the year 6 A. D.[88] Kornemann’s theories are super-subtle and break down under a cumulation of interdependent suppositions, besides being psychologically almost inconceivable. Their rejection by such scholars as Wilcken, Gardthausen, Koepp, Marcks, Vulić, and Bésnier completely invalidates his view as to Augustus’ attitude toward the expansion of the empire by conquests. Kornemann feels keenly, as do others, the psychological difficulties in the way of explaining Augustus’ Germanic campaigns as due to thirst for conquest. He therefore attempts to suggest a plausible motive, i. e., to give the young princes their “baptism of fire”, and a chance to win the military prestige, which down to that time every great Roman had had. But his effort fails for reasons which may now be summarized as follows: (1) If Augustus really was engaged in the conquest of Germany he had been at the task ever since 10 B. C., and not merely since 4 B. C. (2) The explanation offered creates far greater difficulties than it avoids. (3) There is no need of any explanation whatever, if one takes the simple straightforward view of events.
More important, and very widely accepted, is the view that Augustus, in order to protect Gaul and Italy from the barbarians, was under the military and political necessity of conquering Germany. The year 16 B. C. is cited as the time which brought a significant change in Rome’s foreign policy[89], and committed Augustus to the subjugation of Germany. The reasons are stated broadly by Hertzberg[90] as follows: “es waren die Verhältnisse an der gesammten europäischen Nordgrenze des römischen Reichs, die schliesslich den grossen Staatsmann bestimmt haben, abermals und in sehr umfassender Weise, eine Arena auswärtiger Kriege zu eröffnen.” The events of this year were the barbarian invasions from all the boundaries of the north. From the Danube wild robber bands made their way into Macedonia. Germanic stocks, the Sugambri with the remnants and descendents of the Usipites and Tencteri, under the leadership of Melo[91], attacked and killed the Roman traders sojourning in their midst, crossed the Rhine, plundered Gaul far and wide[92], cut off and defeated the fifth legion under Marcus Lollius, and captured its standard.[93] To meet this danger Augustus himself was called to the Rhine, and although he found to his surprise that the enemy had retreated and the land was enjoying peace, he decided upon “einen Gegenstoss nach Germanien hinein und ... ein Vorschieben der Marken bis zur Elbe.”[94] It is also Gardthausen’s belief that by reason of Lollius’ defeat Augustus felt the necessity of protecting Gaul either by an offensive or a defensive policy; that he had to choose between either strengthening the army for holding the Rhine or the subjugation of Germany; and that he finally decided on the latter.[95] Eduard Meyer finds not only the protection of Gaul but the winning of a shorter and more distant boundary from Italy as reasons for Augustus’ wars against Germany[96]: “nur gegen die Germanen hat er sich nach der Vollendung der Organisation Galliens zum Kriege entschlossen: der selbe schien notwendig um Gallien zu sichern und womöglich in der Elblinie eine kürzere und zugleich weiter von Italien abliegende Grenze zu gewinnen.” So Schiller urges the same reasons.[97] Likewise it is Mommsen’s view[98] that Augustus’ change in policy was necessary to Rome’s security; that it is easy to understand how Roman statesmen, who, like the emperor himself, were opposed to a policy of subjugation, could no longer assume that it was expedient for the empire to halt at the Rhine and on the north slopes of the Alps; that “Great Germany” (so called by the Romans), which forced itself in like a wedge between the Rhine and Danube boundaries, and the Germans on the right of the Rhine, with inevitable boundary strife, were far more dangerous to Roman rule than the blazing torch in Gaul and the zeal of Gallic patriots. Hertzberg[99] thinks that Augustus was greatly influenced by the eager desire for war and adventure on the part of the three military leaders of his household, his spirited stepsons, Tiberius and Drusus, and his old friend and son-in-law Agrippa.[100] Gardthausen also believes[101] that, while preliminary conditions urgently demanding a strong offensive policy were at hand, the desire and vigorous support of such a policy by Tiberius and Drusus was a matter of considerable weight. As for Agrippa, he was either not an open advocate of imperial conquest or did not wish to hazard his well-deserved military reputation by new ventures; moreover advancing age and illness made him cautious. As long as he lived his voice was potent in the emperor’s counsels, and no attempt was made to break away from Augustus’ policy of peace. But with his death the situation changed; youth took the place of age, and while both Tiberius and Drusus were alike supporters of the now altered policy, Drusus must be regarded as the really aggressive factor. Ferrero at the very beginning of his chapter on the “Conquest of Germania”[102] discusses the reasons therefor. He rejects “the theory of ancient and modern historians” that Augustus’ unexpected decision for expansion by conquest can be “traced to no other cause than an inexplicable change of personal will.”[103] The urgency of the undertaking depended on the fact that it was the only possible means of preserving Gaul, the value of which had been revealed to Augustus by Licinus. Beside the economic advantages of this rich province great political advantages also were apparent. The western provinces were inferior to the eastern in population, and though national feeling affected to despise the orientals, eastern, particularly Egyptian influence, was spreading a more refined and intellectual civilization throughout Italy and the empire. “It is therefore not improbable” adds Ferrero, “that Augustus under the advice of Licinus may have regarded the rich and populous province of Gaul ... as a counterpoise to the excessive wealth and the teeming populations of the eastern provinces.” Finally we may note the view expressed by Seeck[104], viz., that Rome discovered from the events of the year 16 B. C. that only continued conquest would permit Roman territory bordering the empire’s boundaries to come to quiet and fruitful development; that the peaceful provinces had imperative need of the partially subdued ones at their side as a protection; that if these half-subdued territories became peaceful, and developed under Roman culture into a condition that attracted plundering bands, then the partially subdued must in turn be wholly subdued until some natural protecting border of sea or desert was reached. He concludes: “so wurde denn die Eroberung der freien Barbarenländer in noch grösserem Umfang ins Auge gefasst, als sie zwanzig Jahre früher beabsichtigt war.”
Gardthausen voices the belief[105] that political reasons also forced Augustus into a policy of imperial conquest. He himself from principle and character was a man of peace, but the man of peace had to reckon with both citizens and soldiers. Not only had he to convince the former ever anew of the absolute necessity of the form of government he had wrought out, but he was obliged to gratify the soldier’s desire for his natural element, by allowing him to break the eternal monotony of long service in peace by the glory and spoils of war. Unimportant wars, which, even when unsuccessful, were not sufficient to destroy the equilibrium of the state, seemed to be the best means to meet the wishes of the citizen and soldier classes. After the civil wars a time of rest was necessary to recruit the strength of the Roman state. This transition period was now past and the gaps which many battles had made in the ranks were now filled. Peace was no longer praised as the greatest blessing. Freedom for the Romans was forever gone, but as a recompense the empire could offer its subjects fame in war, and by foreign victories could also strengthen itself internally. Indeed even the opponents of Augustus’ government were easily reconciled to imperial expansion when they saw Rome’s position abroad bettered through the operations of the army, and the burdens of the individual diminished by the empire’s enlargement. But of special moment to the emperor was the temper of the army. The soldier loves war as such; the avarice of the commanders, the hope of the soldiers for booty, and the desire for adventure are all factors with which even a peace-loving prince must reckon. So Ferrero, wholly apart from conditions in Gaul, finds[106] a necessity for some military conquest by Augustus, and says further, that this necessity was recognized by Augustus by virtue of his acute appreciation of public opinion; that some important enterprise at this time had to be found, which would occupy the attention of the people as a whole, and would serve as a concession to the ideas of a new generation, which could not sympathize with the peaceful ideals of the early empire, and which was restive under Augustus’ social reforms. Further, Augustus saw clearly the decadence in Roman society; that the Roman aristocracy was now willing to die by a kind of slow suicide in physical and intellectual indolence and voluptuousness, tendencies which were personified by Ovid and which were beginning to act upon the new generation, as peace dispelled the recollections of the civil wars, and as Egyptian influence grew stronger.
By way of summary we may note at this point that of the long series of opinions and explanations given above:
(1) One set assume a sudden change of Augustus’ peace policy through mere desire of conquest for its own sake. These have been shown to have no basis in fact.
(2) Another set assume that Augustus, in order to protect Gaul and Italy, found it necessary to conquer Germany and make it a province. But this process as a protective policy, as Seeck admits, would have been a futile one, for it would have been necessary to continue it indefinitely. That is, as soon as each new province became civilized the bordering territory must have been subdued until some great natural barrier for a frontier was reached. Such a barrier did not exist. The great plains of Northern Europe were known by all, statesmen as well as geographers, and by none better than Augustus himself. Such a policy would have been one of sheer stupidity, a quality that we must not impute to one of the most astute political geniuses of the ancient world.
(3) Another set assume that Augustus was influenced in changing his policy by his stepsons, Tiberius and Drusus, and by the desire to give his grandsons, Gaius and Lucius Caesar, a chance to win military prestige. But on the one hand there is no evidence whatever for such an assumption, and on the other it is at variance with what we do know of Augustus’ caution and singular independence in dealing with matters of state.
(4) Still other views assume that Augustus was compelled to yield to the demands for war by army and citizens. But where is there a shred of evidence to show that the Roman army pined for conquest? On the other hand in the long and melancholy list of military revolts and imperial assassinations during the empire no cause is more frequently given than the dislike of active campaigning against a dangerous enemy, and the strictness of discipline which it demanded. Troops constantly revolted because they were compelled to leave comfortable quarters and go to distant ends of the empire on campaigns. Under great and successful generals like Trajan, there would not likely be revolts against profitable conquests, but where is the evidence to show that the army as such ever demanded conquests, and had to be appeased? Least of all conquests in Germany, where there was no spoil, nothing but privations, dense forests, untrodden ways, storms, and in particular a savage foe. Armies mutinied when ordered to undertake wars against the Germans: there is no instance of their urging a campaign against them. As for the demands of the citizens for wars it may be said that hatred of wars and praise of peace is the key note of the literature of the period. Nothing can be further removed from the demands for war than the spirit in which the elegiac poets, for example, pride themselves on their disinclination to encounter the perils and hardships of war. The senate and nobility were not eager for war, since an emperor’s conquest made him even more powerful and necessary to the state, while working a corresponding diminution in the prestige of the senate and the nobility. As for the plebs urbana, they had by this time lost practically all their political activity and influence. Neither their condition nor their temper would prompt them to yearn for a war, which would likely result in their being called away to service from the distributions of corn in the city, from the largesses of money, and from the games now more numerous and splendid than ever.