[27] These defects in method have not escaped the sharp eyes of the latest historian of the German wars, Camille Jullian, Histoire de la Gaule, IV, Paris, 1914, p. 117 ff. He notes especially the failure to create a great system of converging roads, establish numerous strong garrisons, found colonies, and maintain a powerful army in the land. Yet under the influence of the theory of conquest he can explain all these grave errors only as due to the ignorance and incapacity of the ageing emperor and his entourage. “Il y a eu, de la part d’Auguste, de veritables aberrations militaires” (p. 117) ... “Une puérile ignorance des situations se montra dans la politique romaine au delà du Rhin” (p. 118) ... “L’empereur vieillissait, et il semblait que sa vieillesse pesât sur tout son entourage” (p. 119). Such a position is logical indeed but quite inadmissable. One must surely recognize in this the reductio ad absurdum of the whole theory of conquest.
[28] The amount of such legal business that Varus did is emphasized by Velleius (II, 118) and Florus (II, 30, 31), but not mentioned at all by Dio (56, 18, 1) who says merely that the Germans “were establishing markets and making peaceful gatherings”. Dio’s account is a more military and political document; Varus there is acting in an understandable if not wholly sagacious fashion. But Velleius and Florus wish to point a contrast between the man of the forum and the man of the camp, and in so doing make Varus out to have been an utter fool. Of course advocates and law suits belong to the conventional equipment of the forum, and must be played up in such a picture. There is grave doubt whether Varus had any more of such matters to adjust than any other Roman general after the presence of the Roman soldier and merchant came to be no unusual thing in the land.
[29] This time Dio alone (56, 18, 3) mentions this feature: “he gave them orders like slaves and in particular collected property from them as from subjects.” It is singular indeed that neither Velleius nor Florus is aware of any such striking change in Roman policy, the more so as Velleius (II, 117) expressly calls attention to the avarice of Varus (“pecuniae vero ... non contemptor”) in a short character study and sketch of his previous record, so that some reference to his exactions must inevitably have been made had Velleius ever heard of them. The fact that he mentions nothing of the kind is the very strongest argumentum ex silentio against the correctness of Dio’s statement, as far as it can be considered a matter of general policy. Or, to look at the situation for a moment in its broader connections: our three main sources are equally at pains to explain the reversal of the situation in Germany, and this they very naturally do by assuming that there was a marked change of policy under Varus. All are at the same time noticeably under the ban of a tradition which represented the earlier campaigns in Germany as having produced a marked change in the character of the inhabitants: so profound was the peace established by Drusus that even the climate seemed to have been affected thereby (Florus, II, 30, 37); Tiberius as early as 8 B. C. had made Germany practically a tribute-paying province (Velleius, II, 97, 4); the barbarians established fairs and conventions, and were rapidly growing Romanized without realizing it (Dio, 56, 18, 3). Now inconsistently enough with this picture, both Velleius and Florus, when they come to the time of Varus, describe the Germans as fierce and warlike barbarians who found irksome the piping times of peace and were ready to fall upon their masters at the slightest occasion (Velleius, II, 117, 118; Florus, II, 30, 30 and 32). On the other hand the more philosophical or consistent Dio recognized a discrepancy in these two pictures of the Germans, and sought to avoid it by representing the Germans as experiencing a re-transformation. Peaceful and pious men would not attack their masters even if they were weak and incautious, therefore Varus must be presented as a typical tyrant who treats the Germans “as slaves” and levies tribute upon them “as subjects.” Florus also (II, 30, 31) ascribes to Varus the characteristics of the conventional tyrant (libidinem ac superbiam ... saevitiam), traits about which his contemporary Velleius, who had no occasion to flatter Varus, and certainly did not do so, knows nothing whatsoever. These rhetorical flourishes in Florus are the less excusable, as they are perfectly gratuitous, for the attack of the Germans is already otherwise quite sufficiently motived in his own narrative. Of course, the mere facts are that the Germans had never been broken, pacified and civilized, and that therefore their attack on Varus needs no specific explanation other than that he was careless enough to give them their chance. Dio’s artless acceptance of the palpably exaggerated reports concerning the earlier campaigns leads him to falsify history in the interests of an illusory consistency.
[30] Certainly if the causarum patroni excited the peculiar animosity of the Germans the publicani must have done so much more, yet not even Florus mentions the latter.
[31] It is an axiom of historians of the ancient history of the East not to accept at face value the numerous boastful announcements of the receipt of tribute. In a very great many cases this was nothing more than an exchange of gifts, as little “tribute” on one side as on the other. Of course the Romans gave many valuable presents to German chieftains, otherwise it would have been impossible to maintain their friendship, the case of Flavus, the brother of Arminius, being especially in point (Tacitus, Ann., II, 9).
[32] Tacitus, Ann., IV, 72 ff. The very phrase which Tacitus uses of the outbreak of war, “pacem exuere” (IV, 72, 1), shows clearly that it was nothing like a revolt; no civil or military commanders are mentioned, only “qui tributo aderant milites.” On the friendly relations with the Frisians which were long maintained after their first contact with the Romans, see Gardthausen, Augustus, I, p. 1076.
[33] The parallel case of the friendly Indians, who, especially in the early period of colonization, frequently gave the white men valuable aid and material assistance, is very much in point.
[34] We must here consider the impassioned language which Tacitus (Ann., I, 59) puts in the mouth of Arminius: “Germanos numquam satis excusaturos, quod inter Albim et Rhenum virgas et secures et togam viderint. aliis gentibus ignorantia imperi Romani inexperta esse supplicia, nescia tributa: quae quoniam exuerint”, etc. That this is a violent ex parte harangue, and in no sense to be regarded as an exact statement of facts Tacitus makes sufficiently clear by calling Arminius “vaecordem” at the very moment of introducing him. On the other hand these expressions may not be wholly without justification. That criminals, outlaws, and marauders may have been beaten and beheaded is not in itself improbable. How else should a Roman commander punish injuries to his fellow citizens, or disloyalty to political or military agreements? That an occasional legal adviser was to be found on the staff of the commander in chief is altogether natural. And finally that assistance of any kind in the form of service or the furnishing of supplies may have been called “tribute” by an excited patriot need occasion no surprise. But it must be a weak case indeed that can find no better arguments than such statements as these for its support.
[35] Dio, 56, 19, 1 and 5; 22, 2ᵃ (Zonaras).
[36] The siege of Aliso is, of course, abundantly described. The sea coast was not given up at all, as is well known, and whatever castella may have been there were no doubt maintained. A small force was kept among the Chauci, to the remote northwest (doubtless on the sea coast), until after the death of Augustus (Tacitus, Ann., I, 38; Gardthausen, Augustus, I, p. 1227). The Taunus fort is the only other whose location is even approximately known. Germanicus found it a ruin some years later (see references [n. 17] above), and it might conceivably have been destroyed at this time, but it is much more likely that the enemy did not appear in sufficient force to do this so far from the seat of the uprising, and so close to the unshaken legions of the upper Rhine. It was no doubt abandoned and dismantled voluntarily by the Romans when they felt constrained to concentrate their strength. Now these three regions are the only ones in which we have any definite record that Roman outposts were stationed. As usually happens when one examines these rhetorical flosculi they are found to be either in flat contradiction to the definite facts, or else improbable in themselves.