[37] A brief summary of the provocations offered by the Germans may not be superfluous in support of such a statement. Caesar’s first campaign in Germany, in 56 B. C., was preceded by the invasion of the Usipetes and Tencteri (Bell. Gall., IV, 1), and by the refusal of the Sugambri to yield up the survivors (Bell. Gall., IV, 16). The second crossing, in 53 B. C., was due to the fact that the Treveri had received assistance from across the Rhine (Bell. Gall., V, 27; VI, 9). Disturbances in Gaul and Germany compelled Agrippa’s crossing in 37 B. C. (Dio, 48, 49, 2). In 29 B. C. the Suebi crossed the Rhine, and were defeated by Carinas, but no invasion of Germany followed (Dio, 51, 21, 6). The punitive expedition of M. Vinicius in 25 B. C. was occasioned by the maltreatment of merchants (Dio, 53, 26, 4). In 19 B. C. Gaul was disturbed by German invaders, but Agrippa restored order without being compelled to invade Germany (Dio, 54, 11, 1). The campaign of Lollius in 17 B. C. was to drive out the Sugambri and others who had crossed the Rhine after having put to death Roman citizens in their own confines (Dio, 54, 20, 4). The first act in Drusus’ campaigns was to beat back the Sugambri who began the war with a raid into Gaul (Strabo, VII, 1, 4; Dio, 54, 32, 1). Rome was by this time clearly disgusted with a situation which allowed so much opportunity for disturbance, and decided now to spread the terror of her arms far and wide on the right bank of the Rhine. For the next few years the Germans were too busy defending themselves to take the offensive. The moment, however, pressure was relaxed, new troubles started, as in 7 B. C. (Dio, 55, 3, 3), although no serious reprisal was undertaken by the Romans this time. Again, after Tiberius went into exile, “Germania ... rebellavit” (Velleius, II, 100, 1), and this disturbance must surely be brought into connection with the extensive campaigns of Domitius in 2 B. C. (Dio, 55, 10ᵃ, 2; Tacitus, Ann., IV, 44). More troubles in Germany which required to be “pacified” in 4 A. D., inaugurated the second period of activity (Suetonius, Tib., 16). Tiberius remained on the offensive until the Pannonian revolt called him away in 6 A. D. From this time until the defeat of Varus there is a blank in our information; nevertheless, from the consistent record of other Roman leaders who never went into Germany except on strong provocation, and not always even then, we feel certain that some threat of trouble in the back country alone could have tempted Varus forth on this occasion. Rome always let the Germans studiously alone as long as they kept the peace; it would have been utterly unprecedented for Varus to go into the German forests in search of trouble, were his presence not demanded there. Under the circumstances, while the Pannonian revolt was still in progress, to have wantonly run any serious risks with so small an army would have been sheer madness (cf. pp. 95, 99, 100 f.).
[38] Besides, as noted just above, this was only the crowning act of a general extensive policy of reprisal, which was intended to forestall the possibility of trouble in this quarter for a long time to come. On Maroboduus see Gardthausen, Augustus, I, p. 1152 ff.
[39] For the statements of Florus regarding the general establishment of castella, see [Appendix, Chapter IV, note 16] sub finem.
[40] Compare A. Wittneben, “Dareios’ Zug gegen die Skythen im Lichte des russischen Krieges von 1812”, Zeitschr. f. d. Gymnasialwesen, LXVI (1912), pp. 577-94, especially 588 ff. Wittneben quite properly insists that the move was not intended for conquest, but rather to clear the right flank of the Persians in a contemplated offensive against Hellas. As a demonstration it was eminently sagacious and successful, and he very properly draws a close parallel between this move and Caesar’s invasions of Britain and Germany (p. 593 f.). G. B. Grundy, The Great Persian War, London, 1901, p. 58 f., shows clearly “that the expedition in the form it was made was not ... an attempt at conquest”, and he regards it as either “a reconnaissance in force” or “a display intended to strike awe into the tribes beyond the newly won territory.” J. Beloch, Griech. Gesch., 2nd ed., II, 1914, p. 5 f., agrees with Grundy that no conquest was intended: “er wollte nur den Skythen seine Macht zeigen, um ihnen die Lust zu nehmen, den Istros zu überschreiten” (p. 6). Any other interpretation of this campaign seems to be quite untenable. On the date we follow Ed. Meyer, Gesch. d. Alt., III, p. 114 f.
[41] Xenophon, Anab., I, 1, 9.
[42] The purpose in both cases is excellently expressed by Caesar himself, Bell. Gall., IV, 20: “in Britanniam proficisci contendit (sc. Caesar), quod omnibus fere Gallicis bellis hostibus nostris inde subministrata auxilia intellegebat”; and IV, 16: “cum videret (sc. Caesar), Germanos tam facile impelli, ut in Galliam venirent, suis quoque rebus eos timere voluit, cum intellegerent et posse et audere populi Romani exercitum Rhenum transire.”
[43] On this expedition see Mommsen, Res Gestae Divi Augusti, p. 106 ff.; Gardthausen, Augustus, I, p. 789 f.
[44] See Mommsen, Res Gestae Divi Augusti, p. 108 f.
[45] On these see Mommsen, Res Gestae, p. 130 ff.; Gardthausen, Augustus, I, p. 1181 ff., II, p. 779 ff.; Domaszewski, Geschichte der römischen Kaiser, I, p. 222 f. The Dacians seem to have given provocation in every instance, and even in 11 A. D. once more invaded the empire, though we know nothing about a retaliatory campaign in Dacia on the part of the Romans upon this occasion; cf. Mommsen, op. cit., p. 132.
[46] Cf. M. Bang, The Cambridge Mediaeval History, 1911, vol. I, p. 195.