[47] An historical study of the buffer or allied state, as a device to strengthen a frontier, would be a profitable one to undertake. There seems to exist no comprehensive treatment of the phenomenon.
[48] See H. R. Hall, The Ancient History of the Near East, London, 1913, p. 466, for a brief statement of the facts. For the idea of a buffer state in this connection, compare E. Klamroth, Die wirtschaftliche Lage und das geistige Lehen der jüdischen Exulanten in Babylonien. Diss. Königsberg, 1912, p. 20, n. 4.
[49] For the events compare Hall, op. cit., p. 543 ff.; for the interpretation in terms of a buffer state, Klamroth, op. cit., p. 20. See [Appendix, Chapter IV, note 49].
[50] We accept upon this point B. Niese’s convincing arguments, “Neue Beiträge zur Geschichte und Landeskunde Lakedämons”, Nachr. d. Götting. Ges. d. Wiss., 1906, p. 101 ff., esp. pp. 131-7.
[51] See J. G. Droysen, Geschichte des Hellenismus, I, 2, p. 163 ff. This interpretation of events is much more plausible than that of J. Kaerst (Geschichte des hellenistischen Zeitalters, I, p. 369, and n. 2), who argues that the kingdoms of Taxiles and Porus were actually parts of the empire. J. B. Bury (A History of Greece, 2nd ed., 1913, p. 807) very properly maintains the position taken by Droysen.
[52] The Romanes Lecture: Frontiers, Oxford, 1898, p. 38.—J. Geffcken: Kaiser Julianus, 1914, p. 117 uses the expression “Pufferstaat” in speaking of Armenia.
[53] The most elaborate recent study of the policy of Augustus towards Armenia is by A. Abbruzzese, “Le relazioni fra l’impero romano e l’Armenia a tempo di Augusto”, Riv. di storia antica, VII (1903), pp. 505-21; 721-34; VIII (1904), pp. 32-61 (also separate, Padova, 1903). His attitude towards the diplomatic policy which Augustus followed is, however, hypercritical, and his thesis that a policy of economic absorption should have been followed is illusory. (Cf. De Sanctis, Riv. di filol. LIII (1905), p. 159 f.). A fairly satisfactory statement, though somewhat superficial, is P. P. Asdourian’s dissertation, Die politischen Beziehungen zwischen Armenien und Rom von 190 v. Chr. bis 428 n. Chr., Venedig, 1911. His statement, p. 79, of the policy of Augustus as one that attempted to maintain the controlling position in Armenia by peaceful means, or through political manoeuvers, is correct enough, but the sneering remark that this was due not to Augustus’ own inclination, but rather to the rivalry of Parthia is quite superfluous. Of course Rome’s relations to Armenia would have been quite different had there not been a powerful Parthian monarchy. In the mutual rivalries of Rome and Parthia lay the whole difficulty. The best general statement of the problem in its large outlines is in V. Chapot, La frontière de l’Euphrate etc., p. 377 ff. He also can make nothing out of Abbruzzese’s “lotta commerciale” theory (p. 382, note). Mommsen’s statement (Röm. Gesch., V, p. 370 ff.) of the general course of Augustus’ Armenian policy is admirable.
[54] This has been recognized by Gardthausen, Augustus, I, p. 706. That this danger was a real one is clear from the wars with the Gaetulians and Musulami, which seem to have broken out about the time of the accession of Juba, and, after dragging on intermittently for a generation, were ended only by the vigorous interposition of the Roman army under Cn. Cornelius Lentulus in 6 A. D. This is R. Cagnat’s certain interpretation of Dio, 55, 28 (L’armée romaine d’Afrique et l’occupation militaire de l’Afrique sous les Empereurs, 2nd ed., Paris, 1913, I, p. 3 ff., esp. 7 and 8). It seems that Augustus had let Juba struggle on as best he could for a whole generation against these wild tribes, and finally when he seemed unable longer to cope with the situation, he was given the assistance of a Roman army in an effort to end the trouble once for all. The whole situation and its treatment are perfectly typical of a developed buffer state policy.
[55] Even then the transformation was made rudely and without sufficient preparation, for a vigorous revolt broke out which was not completely put down until the year 42 or 43. It may very well be that Caligula’s act in dethroning and later executing Ptolemaeus was instigated solely by greed, as Mommsen (Röm. Gesch., V, p. 629, following Dio, 59, 25), remarks, but that the land itself was not turned over to another native prince was surely due to the belief now prevalent at Rome, that the work of the local dynasts was completed, and it was safe to incorporate the kingdom into the empire. This is also the view of R. Cagnat, op. cit., I, p. 28. On the whole the act of Caligula seems to have been justified; after the first revolt was put down we hear only of slight disturbances in the reign of Domitian (Cagnat, p. 38 ff.), and Hadrian (p. 45 f.), and thenceforward at occasional intervals until the great revolt of the third century. Upwards of 40 years of peace followed the inclusion in the empire, which is a long period, considering the time and the circumstances.