[34] Ch. Gailly de Taurines, Les Légions de Varus, Paris, 1911, p. 312: “Grâce à Arminn, sept siècles plus tard, Charlemagne, conquérant latin, champion de la Rome nouvelle, retrouvera, sur le même sol, les tribus germaniques de l’interieur dans l’état même—ou peu s’en faut—ou les avait laissées Germanicus. De leur existence, durant ces sept siècles, elles n’avaient été capables de laisser à la postérité ni un monument, ni un souvenir, ni une inscription, ni une pierre.” Cf. also Fustel de Coulanges, Histoire des Institutions politiques de l’ancienne France, Paris, 1891, II, p. 227: “Nous ne possédons aucun document de source germanique ... nous n’avons pas un livre, pas une inscription, pas une monnaie.”
[35] Delbrück, op. cit., p. 53: “Viel schlimmer ist der Geist der Literatur dieser Epoche, der ganz und gar von Rhetorik beherrscht ist. Diese Schriftsteller wollen nicht erzählen, wie es gewesen ist, oder wie sie möchten, dass die Leser glauben sollen, dass es gewesen sei, sondern sie wollen vor allem durch die Kunst ihrer Rede Empfindungen erwecken und Eindruck machen. Mir scheint, dass bei zahlreichen Untersuchungen, die den Schlachten des Arminius und Germanicus bisher gewidmet worden sind, diese Charakter-Eigenschaft unserer Quellen, wenn auch oft hervorgehoben, doch kritisch noch lange nicht stark genug in Rechnung gezogen worden ist.”
[36] For a glaring example of how history should not be written, as though all the labors of scholarship had been in vain, and Florus or Dionysius of Halicarnassus were models of historical style, one might cite the highly dramatic account of the battle as repeated by Leighton, History of Rome, New York, 1891, p. 436: “Without troubling about military measures he [Varus] travelled over the country, imposed taxes and pronounced decisions as if a praetor in the forum at Rome. Among the bold and turbulent Germans the spirit of freedom and independence only slumbered; it was not broken. The national hero Arminius raised the standard of revolt. Under this prince a confederacy of all the tribes between the Rhine and the Weser was formed to throw off the yoke of Rome. The governor collected three legions and advanced in 9 A.D. to quell the revolt. The Germans retired; but the Romans pushed on until they had advanced into the Teutoberger [sic] forest. Then Arminius turned and defeated them with tremendous slaughter. The defiles of the woods were covered far and wide with the corpses of the army, for nearly 40,000 soldiers perished. The eagles were lost and Varus perished with his own hand. The news of the disaster caused the utmost alarm in Rome. The Emperor himself was astounded. In his despair he dashed his head against the wall and exclaimed ‘Varus, Varus! give me back my legions.’”
[37] Creasy, op. cit., p. 182: “It is a great fallacy, though apparently sanctioned by great authorities, to suppose that the foreign policy of Augustus was pacific. He certainly recommended such a policy to his successors, either from timidity, or from jealousy of their fame outshining his own; but he himself, until Arminius broke his spirit, had followed a very different course.”
[38] Cf., e. g., the poem Hermann (in twelve books, 2nd ed., 1753) by Christopher Otto von Schönaich, beginning:
“Von dem Helden will ich singen, dessen Arm sein Volk beschützt,
Dessen Schwert auf Deutschlands Feinde für sein Vaterland geblitzt;
Der allein vermögend war, des Augustus Stolz zu brechen,
Und des Erdenkreises Schimpf in der Römer Schmach zu rächen.”
See also J. E. Riffert, “Die Hermannschlacht in der deutschen Literatur,” Herrigs Archiv, 63 (1880), pp. 129-76; 241-332; W. Creizenach, “Armin in Poesie und Literaturgeschichte,” Preussische Jahrbücher, 36, pp. 332-40.