Aristocracy & Evolution / A Study of the Rights, the Origin, and the Social Functions of the Wealthier Classes

by W. H. Mallock

Stript to his shirt, was come to lead the van.

BYRON.

LONDON
ADAM AND CHARLES BLACK
1898

PREFACE

The word aristocracy as used in the title of this volume has no exclusive, and indeed no special reference to a class distinguished by hereditary political privileges, by titles, or by heraldic pedigree. It here means the exceptionally gifted and efficient minority, no matter what the position in which its members may have been born, or what the sphere of social progress in which their exceptional efficiency shows itself. I have chosen the word aristocracy in preference to the word oligarchy because it means not only the rule of the few, but of the best or the most efficient of the few.

Of the various questions involved in the general argument of the work, many would, if they were to be examined exhaustively, demand entire treatises to themselves rather than chapters. This is specially true of such questions as the nature of men’s congenital inequalities, the effects of different classes of motive in producing different classes of action, and the effects of equal education on unequal talents and temperaments. But the practical bearings of an argument are more readily grasped when its various parts are set forth with comparative brevity, than they are when the attention claimed for each is minute enough to do it justice as a separate subject of inquiry; and it has appeared to me that in the present condition of opinion, prevalent social fallacies may be more easily combated by putting the case against them in a form which will render it intelligible to everybody, and by leaving many points to be elaborated, if necessary, elsewhere.

I may also add that the conclusions here arrived at, with whatever completeness they might have been explained, elaborated, and defended, would not, in my opinion, do more than partially answer the questions to which they refer. This volume aims only at establishing what are the social rights and social functions, in progressive communities, of the few. The entire question of their duties and proper liabilities, whether imposed on them by themselves or by the State, has been left untouched. This side of the question I hope to deal with hereafter. It is enough to observe here that it is impossible to define the duties of the few, of the rich, of the powerful, of the highly gifted, and to secure that these duties shall be performed by them, unless we first understand the extent of the functions which they inevitably perform, and admit frankly the indefeasible character of their rights.

CONTENTS

• BOOK I
  • CHAPTER I
    THE FUNDAMENTAL ERROR IN MODERN SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY
    • Science during the middle of this century excited popular interest mainly on account of its bearing on the doctrines of Christianity • [3]
    • Its popularity is now beginning to depend on its bearing not on religious problems, but on social • [3]
    • Science itself is undergoing a corresponding change • [4]
    • Its characteristic aim during the middle of the century was to deal with physical and physiological evolution • [4]
    • Its characteristic aim now is to deal with the evolution of society • [5]
    • Social science itself is not wholly new • [5]
    • What is new is the application to it of the evolutionary theory • [6]
    • This excites men by suggesting great social changes in the future, • [7]
    • which will give a speculative meaning to the history of humanity, • [8]
    • or secure for men now existing, or for their children, practical social advantages • [8]
    • Men have thus a double reason for being interested in social science, and sociologists a double reason for studying it; • [9]
    • and it has attracted a number of men of genius, who have applied to it methods learned in the school of physical science • [9]
    • Yet despite their genius and their diligence, all parties complain that the results of their study are inconclusive • [10]
    • Professor Marshall and Mr. Kidd, for instance, complain of the fact, but can suggest no explanation of it • [10]
    • What can the explanation be? • [11]
    • The answer will be found in the fact just referred to—that social science attempts to answer two distinct sets of questions; • [12]
    • and one set—namely, the speculative—it has answered with great success; • [12]
    • it has failed only in attempting to answer practical questions • [13]
    • Now the phenomena with which it has dealt successfully are phenomena of social aggregates, considered as wholes; • [13]
    • but the practical problems of to-day, with which it has dealt unsuccessfully, arise out of the conflict between different parts of aggregates • [15]
    • Social science has failed as a practical guide because it has not recognised this distinction; • [16]
    • and hence arise most of the errors of the political philosophy of this century • [16]
  • CHAPTER II
    THE ATTEMPT TO MERGE THE GREAT MAN IN THE AGGREGATE
    • Whatever may be done by some men, or classes of men, sociologists are at present accustomed to attribute to man • [17]
    • Mr. Kidd’s Social Evolution, for instance, is based entirely on this procedure • [17]
    • He quotes with approval two other writers who have been guilty of it; • [18]
    • who both attribute to man what is done by only a few men; • [19]
    • and the consequences of their reasoning are ludicrous • [20]
    • Mr. Kidd’s reasoning itself is not less ludicrous. The first half of his argument is that religion prompts the few to surrender advantages to the many, which, if they chose to do so, they could keep • [21]
    • The second half is that the many could have taken these advantages from the few, and that religion alone prevented them from doing so • [21]
    • This contradiction is entirely due to the fact that, having first divided the social aggregate into two classes, he then obliterates his division, and thinks of them both as “man” • [22]
    • Mr. Kidd’s confusion is the result of no accidental error. It is the inevitable result of a radically fallacious method; • [24]
    • and of this method the chief exponent is Mr. Herbert Spencer, • [24]
    • as a short summary of his arguments will show • [25]
    • Mr. Spencer starts with saying that the chief impediment to social science is the great-man theory; • [25]
    • for, if the appearance of the great man is incalculable, progress, if it depends on him, must be incalculable also; • [26]
    • but if the great man is not a miraculous apparition, he owes his greatness to causes outside himself; • [27]
    • and it is these causes which really produce the effects of which he is the proximate initiator • [27]
    • These effects, therefore, are to be explained by reference not to the great man, but to the causes that are behind the great man • [28]
    • The true causes, says Mr. Spencer, of all social phenomena are physical environment and men’s natural character • [29]
    • The first physical cause of progress was an exceptionally fertile soil • [29]
    • and an exceptionally bracing climate • [29]
    • All the conquering races came from fertile and bracing regions • [30]
    • There were other regions more fertile, but these were enervating; and hence the inhabitants of the former enslaved the weaker inhabitants of the latter • [30]
    • Again, division of labour, on which industrial progress depends, was caused by difference in the products of different localities, • [31]
    • which led to the localisation of industries • [32]
    • The localisation of industries in its turn led to road-making; • [33]
    • and roads made possible the centralisation of authority and interchange of ideas • [33]
    • Next, as to men’s natural character, which is the other cause of progress, • [33]
    • their primitive character did not fit them to progress, • [34]
    • till it was gradually improved by the evolution of marriage and the family—especially of monogamy • [34]
    • Monogamy represents the survival of the fittest kind of sexual union • [35]
    • It developed the affections and the practice of efficient co-operation • [35]
    • The family being established, the nation gradually rose from it • [36]
    • One family increased, and gave rise to many families, which were obliged, in order to get food, to separate into different groups; • [36]
    • and the recompounding of these groups, for purposes of defence or aggression, formed the nation; • [37]
    • all government being in its origin military • [37]
    • But as the arts of life progress, industry emancipates itself from governmental control, and becomes its own master, and also forms the basis of political democracy • [37]
    • Now, if we consider all these conclusions of Mr. Spencer’s, • [39]
    • we shall find them to be all conclusions about aggregates as wholes, not about parts of aggregates • [39]
    • The only differences recognised by him between men are differences between one homogeneous aggregate and another, • [40]
    • and differences between similar men who happen to be occupied differently • [41]
    • But, as has already been said, the social problems of to-day arise out of a conflict between different parts of the same aggregate; therefore the phenomena of the aggregate as a whole do not help us • [42]
    • The conflict between the parts of the aggregate arises from inequalities of position • [43]
    • of which Mr. Spencer’s sociology takes no account • [44]
    • Social problems arise out of the desire of those whose positions are inferior to have their positions changed; • [45]
    • and the practical question is, is the change they desire possible? • [45]
    • To answer this question we must examine into the causes why such and such individuals are in inferior, and others in superior positions • [46]
    • Are inequalities in position due to alterable and accidental circumstances? • [47]
    • Or are they due to congenital inequalities which no one can ever do away with? • [47]
    • Social inequalities are partly due to circumstances; • [48]
    • but most people will admit that congenital inequalities in talent have much to do with them • [48]
    • Why then insist on this fact? • [49]
    • Because this fact is precisely what our contemporary sociologists ignore, • [49]
    • as Mr. Spencer shows us by his distinct admissions and assertions, as well as by the character of his conclusions • [50]
    • His condemnation of the great-man theory is a removal of all congenital inequalities from his field of study; • [51]
    • and he actually defines an aggregate as being composed of approximately equal units • [52]
    • His failure and that of others, as practical sociologists, arises from their building on this false hypothesis • [53]
  • CHAPTER III
    GREAT MEN, AS THE TRUE CAUSE OF PROGRESS
    • The ignoring of natural inequalities is a deliberate procedure. Let us see how it is defended • [55]
    • Let us examine Mr. Spencer’s defence of it • [55]
    • He defends it in two ways; • [55]
    • (1) by saying that the great man does not really do what he seems to do; • [55]
    • (2) by saying that what he seems to do is not really much • [56]
    • He admits that the great man does do something exceptional in war; • [57]
    • but denies that he does anything exceptional in the sphere of peaceful progress • [57]
    • But how does the great man fulfil his function in war? By ordering others • [58]
    • The great man, in peace, does precisely the same thing • [59]
    • Mr. Spencer, for example, orders the compositors who put his books into type • [59]
    • The inventor orders the men by whom his inventions are manufactured • [60]
    • The great man of business orders his employees • [61]
    • The hotel-keeper orders his staff • [62]
    • All these men resemble the great military commander; and if the latter is a social cause, so are the former • [63]
    • Next, as to the contention that the great man is the proximate cause only, and not the true cause— • [63]
    • This, as Mr. Spencer and three popular writers of to-day show us, • [64]
    • resolves itself into four arguments: • [65]
    • (1) That every first discovery involves all that have gone before it; • [66]
    • (2) that the discoverer’s ability itself is the product of past circumstances; • [66]
    • (3) that often the same discovery is made by several men at once; • [66]
    • (4) that the difference between the great and the ordinary man is slight • [66]
    • Simultaneous discovery only shows that several great men, instead of one, are greater than others • [67]
    • The extent of the great man’s superiority depends on how it is measured • [68]
    • It may be slight to the speculative philosopher, but to the practical man it is all-important • [69]
    • As for the two other arguments, which admit the great man’s greatness, but deny that it is his own, • [71]
    • they are both true speculatively, but are practically untrue, or irrelevant; • [71]
    • just as statements of averages and classification of goods may be true and relevant for one purpose, and false and irrelevant for another • [72]
    • Thus the argument that the great man owes his faculties to his ancestors, and through his ancestors to the society which helped to develop his ancestors, though a speculative truism, • [73]
    • leads to nothing but absurdities if we apply it to practical life • [74]
    • For if the great workers owe their greatness to the whole of past society, the men who shirk work owe their idleness to it; and if the former deserve no reward, the latter deserve no punishment • [75]
    • The same argument applies to morals; and if accepted, we should have to admit that nobody really did, or was really responsible for, anything • [76]
    • Finally, let us take the argument that most of what the great man does depends on past discoveries and past achievements, to which he does but add a little • [77]
    • If this argument means anything, it must mean that greatness is commoner than it is vulgarly thought • [78]
    • But is this the case? Does Shakespeare’s debt to his antecedents make Shakespeares more numerous? • [79]
    • Shakespeare’s contemporaries had the same national antecedents that he had; but they could not do what he did • [80]
    • Men inherit the past only in so far as they can assimilate it • [80]
    • Socialists say that inventions once made become common property • [81]
    • This is absolutely untrue • [81]
    • The discoveries and inventions of the past are the property of those only who can absorb and use them • [82]
    • Thus the introduction of the past into the question leaves the differences between the great man and others undiminished • [82]
    • If the ordinary man does anything, the great man does a great deal more • [83]
    • and in practical reasoning he is a true cause for the sociologist • [83]
    • And, curiously enough, Mr. Spencer unconsciously admits this • [84]
    • He declares that the Napoleonic wars were entirely due to the maleficent greatness of Napoleon • [84]
    • He defends patents because they represent the very substance of the inventor’s own mind; • [86]
    • and he attributes the modern improvement in steel manufacture to Sir H. Bessemer • [87]
    • So much, then, being established, we must consider two difficulties suggested by it • [88]
  • CHAPTER IV
    THE GREAT MAN AS DISTINGUISHED FROM THE PHYSIOLOGICALLY FITTEST SURVIVOR
    • It may be objected that modern sociology does not, as here asserted, neglect the great man, for it adopts the doctrine of the survival of the fittest • [89]
    • It may be asked, on the other hand, what place the great man has in an exclusively evolutionary theory of progress • [90]
    • The fittest survivor is not the same as the great man • [90]
    • He plays a part in progress, but not the same part • [90]
    • The fittest men, by surviving, raise the general level of the race, and promote progress only in this way • [91]
    • The great man promotes progress by being superior to his contemporaries • [92]
    • The movement of progress is double; • [93]
    • one movement being very slow, the other rapid • [93]
    • The survival of the fittest causes the slow movement • [93]
    • The rapid movement is caused by the great man • [95]
    • Next, as to evolution—what does the word mean? • [95]
    • Its great practical characteristic, as put forward by Darwin, is that it is opposed to the doctrine of design, or divine intention; • [96]
    • and yet, according to Darwin, species resulted from the intention of each animal to live and propagate • [96]
    • Species, therefore, according to the evolutionist, is the result of intention, but not the result intended • [97]
    • Evolution, in fact, is the reasonable sequence of the unintended • [97]
    • This is as true of social evolution as it is of biological • [97]
    • Many of the social conditions of any age result from the past, but were intended by nobody in the past; • [98]
    • for instance, many of the social effects of railways and cheap printing • [98]
    • Therefore, whenever any great man produces some change intentionally he has to work with unintended materials • [99]
    • We can see this in the progress of dramatic art; • [99]
    • also in the progress of philosophy • [100]
    • And yet in each case the intended elements are equal or are greater than the unintended • [100]
    • We see the same thing in the history of the Times printing press • [101]
    • It was the result of many kinds of unintended progress, constantly recombined by intention • [102]
    • Evolution, in fact, is the unintended result of the intentions of great men • [104]
    • The unintended or evolved element in progress is what concerns the speculative philosopher • [105]
    • The intended element, which originates directly in the great man, is what is of interest for practical purposes • [106]

• BOOK II
  • CHAPTER I
    THE NATURE AND THE DEGREES OF THE SUPERIORITIES OF GREAT MEN
    • The causality of the great man being established, we must consider more precisely what greatness is • [111]
    • Mr. Spencer will help us to a general definition of it • [112]
    • He divides the human race into the clever, the ordinary, and the stupid • [113]
    • Now if all the race were stupid, it is plain there would be no progress; • [114]
    • nor would there be any if all the race were ordinary; • [114]
    • therefore progress must be due to the clever, who are, as Mr. Spencer says, a “scattered few” • [115]
    • This is the great-man theory reasonably stated • [115]
    • For great men are not necessarily heroes, as Carlyle thought, • [116]
    • nor divided absolutely from all other men • [116]
    • Greatness is various in kind and degree, • [117]
    • but, at all events, there is a certain minority of men who resemble each other in being more efficient than the majority • [117]
    • We see this in poetry • [118]
    • in singers, • [118]
    • in the scholarship of boys at the same school, • [119]
    • and similarly in practical life • [119]
    • Enough men, as it is, have equal opportunities, to show how unequal men are in their powers of using them • [120]
    • No doubt a man may be ordinary in one respect and great in another; • [120]
    • but the majority are not great in any • [121]
    • The measure of a man’s greatness as an agent of social progress is the overt results actually produced by him • [121]
    • A selfish doctor, if successful, is greater than a devoted doctor, if unsuccessful • [122]
    • The fact that many men who produce no social results seem better and more brilliant than many men who do produce them, makes some argue that these results require no greatness for their production • [122]
    • But the most efficient forms of greatness have often nothing brilliant about them • [123]
    • A lofty imagination is often the enemy to practical efficiency; • [124]
    • and great efficiency is often independent of exceptional intellect • [125]
    • Intellect is required for progress, e.g. in invention; • [125]
    • but the inventor by himself is often helpless, • [125]
    • and has to ally himself with men whose exceptional gifts are unimpressive and even vulgar • [126]
    • Greatness is not one quality, but various combinations of many • [127]
    • Greatness, then, is merely those qualities which, in any domain of progress, make the few more efficient than the many • [127]
    • The great-man theory, then, merely asserts that if some men were not more efficient than most men, no progress would take place at all • [128]
    • But great men, in spite of these differences, all promote progress in the same way • [128]
  • CHAPTER II
    PROGRESS THE RESULT OF A STRUGGLE NOT FOR SURVIVAL, BUT FOR DOMINATION
    • In order to see how the great man promotes progress, we must consider that whilst the fittest survivor only promotes it • [130]
    • by living, whilst others die, • [130]
    • the great man promotes progress by helping others to live • [131]
    • He promotes progress not by what he does himself, but by what he helps others to do • [132]
    • We can see this by considering the progress of knowledge which, as J. S. Mill says, is the foundation of all progress • [132]
    • But all progress in knowledge is the work of “decidedly exceptional individuals,” • [134]
    • as Mill admits, though in curiously confused language • [135]
    • Now how do the exceptional individuals, when they acquire knowledge, promote progress by doing so? • [136]
    • They promote progress by conveying their knowledge to, and imposing their conclusions on, others • [137]
    • A similar thing is true of invention, which is knowledge applied • [138]
    • Invention promotes progress only because the inventor influences the actions of the workmen who make and use his machines • [139]
    • The man of business ability promotes progress also only by so ordering others that the precise wants of the public are supplied • [140]
    • And the same principle is obviously true in the domain of war, politics, and religion • [141]
    • Greatness, however, is not in all cases equally beneficial • [142]
    • The influence of some great men is more advantageous than that of others • [143]
    • Progress, then, involves a struggle through which the fittest great men shall secure influence over others, and destroy the influence of the less fit • [143]
    • We now come to another point of difference between the fittest great man and the fittest survivor • [143]
    • The social counterpart to the Darwinian struggle for survival is to be found in the struggle of labourers to find employment • [144]
    • But this is not the struggle to which historical progress is due • [145]
    • For the most rapid progress has taken place without any increased fitness in the labourers • [145]
    • The progressive struggle in industry is confined entirely to the employers; • [146]
    • and in every domain of progress it is confined to the leaders, to the exclusion of those who are led • [146]
    • In the progressive struggle between great men, the mass of the community play no part whatever • [147]
    • Let us take, for instance, two rival hotel-keepers • [148]
    • One becomes bankrupt, and the other takes over his hotel and his staff • [148]
    • The sole struggle is between the employers, not the employed • [148]
    • The staff of the unsuccessful hotel-keeper gain, not lose, by being employed by the successful • [149]
    • Historical progress, then, results from a struggle not for subsistence, but for domination • [149]
  • CHAPTER III
    THE MEANS BY WHICH THE GREAT MAN APPLIES HIS GREATNESS TO WEALTH-PRODUCTION
    • All gain by the domination of the fittest, except the few who fail to secure power for themselves • [151]
    • We must consider, however, that the great men who struggle for domination would not do so without some strong motive; • [152]
    • and also that they cannot dominate others except by some particular means • [153]
    • Now the question of motive we will treat of hereafter. At present we will confine ourselves to the question of means • [153]
    • These vary in each domain of social activity • [153]
    • In some they are too obvious to need discussion • [154]
    • We need consider what they are only in the domains of politics and wealth-production • [155]
    • The question is most important in its bearings on wealth-production • [156]
    • The great man in wealth-production can influence the actions of others by two means only—by the slave-system and the wage-system • [157]
    • The slave-system secures obedience by coercion, the wage-system by inducement • [157]
    • Wage-capital, not fixed capital, gives the primary power to capitalism as a productive agent • [158]
    • Wage-capital is an accumulation of the necessaries of life, • [159]
    • owned or controlled by a few persons, • [159]
    • and apportioned by them amongst many, on certain conditions • [160]
    • Karl Marx entirely misunderstood what these conditions are • [160]
    • The essence of these conditions is that the many shall be technically directed by the few • [161]
    • The question of how much the few appropriate of the product is a separate question altogether • [162]
    • The corvée system or slavery would make wage-capital superfluous; and this shows what the essential function of wage-capital is • [162]
    • So-called “co-operation” is merely the wage-system disguised • [163]
    • There are, then, only two alternatives—the wage-system and the slave-system; • [164]
    • as we shall find by considering how the socialists can only escape the wage-system by substituting slavery • [165]
    • For they would secure industrial obedience by coercion, • [166]
    • not through the worker’s desire to earn his living. And this is the essence of slavery • [166]
    • Next let us consider the means by which the great directors of industry compete against one another • [167]
    • Under capitalism they do so, owing to the fact that the man who cannot direct industry so as to please the public loses his capital, and with it the means of direction • [167]
    • The wage-system is the only efficient means of competition of this kind • [168]
    • The socialists, though they affect to be opposed to competition altogether, • [168]
    • re-introduce it into their own system, • [170]
    • the only change being that it is associated with the slave-system, which is very cumbrous and inefficient • [170]
    • Competition between employers, then, is a part of every system that permits of progress; • [172]
    • and since the re-introduction of slavery is practically impossible, we must regard the wage-system as a permanent feature of progressive societies • [172]
    • We might reduce society to ashes, but this system and capitalistic competition would arise out of them; • [173]
    • for capitalistic competition means the domination of the fittest great men • [174]
    • The industrial obedience of the many to the few is the
    • fundamental condition of progress • [174]
  • CHAPTER IV
    THE MEANS BY WHICH THE GREAT MAN ACQUIRES POWER IN POLITICS
    • In discussing the means by which the great man wields power in politics, the debatable question differs from the question raised by his power in industry; • [176]
    • for the points that are debated in the case of the great wealth-producer are admitted by all in the case of the governor • [176]
    • The greatest democrat admits that the governor must be an exceptional man, • [177]
    • and also that he must be chosen by elective competition • [177]
    • There is a competitive element even in autocracies, • [178]
    • and democracies are essentially competitive • [178]
    • All parties also agree that laws must be enforced by pains and penalties • [179]
    • Democrats are peculiar only in their theory that the sole greatness required in their governors is a perceptive and executive greatness, which will enable them to carry out the spontaneous wishes of the many • [179]
    • This is the only point in which the democratic theory differs from the aristocratic • [180]
    • The democratic ruler is, theoretically, a balance for weighing the wills of the many, • [181]
    • or a machine for executing their “mandates”; • [182]
    • and there are signs which might suggest that the few in politics are really becoming the mere instruments of the many • [182]
    • But these signs are deceptive; for what seems the will of the many, really depends on the action of another minority • [183]
    • Opinions, to derive power from the numbers who hold them, must be identical; • [184]
    • but they seldom are identical till a few men have manipulated them • [184]
    • Thus what seems to be the opinion of the many is generally dependent on the influence of a few • [185]
    • The many, for instance, would never have had any opinions on Free Trade or Bimetallism if the few had not worked on them • [185]
    • Popular opinion requires exceptional men, as nuclei, round which to form itself • [187]
    • Thus even in what seems extremest democracy the few are essential • [188]
    • Democrats, however, may argue that under democracy the few do, in the long-run, carry out the wishes of the many • [188]
    • Even were this true, the current formulas of democracy would be false, for unequal men would be essential to executing the wishes of equals • [189]
    • Now in reality the few are never mere passive agents; • [189]
    • but nevertheless the many do impress their will on them to a great extent • [190]
    • The question is to what extent? • [191]
    • This introduces us to a new side of the problem—the extent of the power of the many • [191]
    • This is greater in politics than in industry; • [192]
    • and yet when we think it over we shall see that it is great in most domains of activity • [192]
    • We had to take it for granted at starting. We must now examine it • [193]