The main portion of the force at Loodianna was withdrawn, and a garrison thrown into the little fortress there. From this central position, already alluded to, both Loodianna and Ferozepore could be supported, and the safety of both places might be considered to be brought, in some measure, within the scope of the contingencies of a general action to be fought for their relief. All this is soon related; but most harassing have been the marches of the troops in completing this concentration. When their march had been further prolonged to this place, they had moved over a distance of upward of 150 miles in six days, along roads of heavy sand; their perpetual labour allowing them scarcely time to cook their food, even when they received it, and hardly an hour for repose, before they were called upon for renewed exertions.
When our leading corps reached Wudnee, a small jaghire of the late Maharajah Shere Singh, its garrison shut the gates of the fort against them; and, as our battering guns were far in the rear, it was determined to reserve it for future chastisement, and we remained content with compelling the village to furnish supplies (it could, however, provide little, except for our overworked cattle), under pain of enduring a cannonade and assault; this it did, without the necessity of firing a shot.
When we reached Wudnee, it was evident that the force before Ferozepore felt the influence of our movements, as we heard that a very large portion of that force had been detached to oppose our further advance; their feeling parties retired on the morning of the 18th before our Cavalry picquets, near the village and fort of Moodkee.
Soon after mid-day, the division under Major-General Sir Harry Smith, a brigade of that under Major-General Sir J. M'Caskill, and another of that under Major-General Gilbert, with five troops of Horse artillery, and two light field batteries, under Lieutenant Colonel Brooke, of the Horse Artillery (brigadier in command of the Artillery force), and the Cavalry division, consisting of H.M. 3rd Light Dragoons, the body-guard, 4th and 5th Light Cavalry, and 9th Irregular Cavalry, took up their encamping ground in front of Moodkee.
The troops were in a state of great exhaustion, principally from the want of water, which was not procurable on the road, when, about three P.M., information was received that the Sikh army was advancing; and the troops had scarcely time to get under arms, and move to their positions, when the fact was ascertained.
I immediately pushed forward the Horse Artillery and Cavalry, directing the Infantry, accompanied by the field batteries, to move forward in support. We had not proceeded beyond two miles when we found the enemy in position. They were said to consist of 15,000 to 20,000 Infantry, about the same force of Cavalry, and forty guns. They evidently had either just taken up this position, or were advancing in order of battle against us.
To resist their attack, and to cover the formation of the Infantry, I advanced the Cavalry under Brigadiers White, Gough, and Mactier, rapidly to the front, in columns of squadrons, and occupied the plain. They were speedily followed by the five troops of Horse Artillery, under Brigadier Brooke who took up a forward position, having the Cavalry then on his flanks.
The country is a dead flat, covered at short intervals with a low, but in some places, thick jhow jungle, and dotted with sandy hillocks. The enemy screened their Infantry and Artillery behind this jungle, and such undulations as the ground afforded; and whilst our twelve battalions formed from echelon of brigade into line, opened a very severe cannonade upon our advancing troops, which was vigorously replied to by the battery of Horse Artillery under Brigadier Brooke, which was soon joined by the two light field batteries. The rapid and well-directed fire of our artillery appeared soon to paralyse that of the enemy; and as it was necessary to complete our infantry dispositions without advancing the Artillery too near to the jungle, I directed the Cavalry under Brigadiers White and Gough, to make a flank movement on the enemy's left, with a view of threatening and turning that flank if possible. With praiseworthy gallantry, the 3rd Light Dragoons, with the 2nd brigade of Cavalry, consisting of the body guard and 5th Light Cavalry, with a portion of the 4th Lancers, turned the left of the Sikh army, and, sweeping along the whole rear of its Infantry and guns, silenced for a time the latter, and put their numerous cavalry to flight. Whilst this movement was taking place on the enemy's left, I directed the remainder of the 4th Lancers, the 9th Irregular Cavalry, under Brigadier Mactier, with a light field battery, to threaten their right. This manœuvre was also successful. Had not the Infantry and guns of the enemy been screened by the jungle, these brilliant charges of the Cavalry would have been productive of greater effect.
When the Infantry advanced to the attack, Brigadier Brooke rapidly pushed on his Horse Artillery close to the jungle, and the cannonade was resumed on both sides. The Infantry under Major-Generals Sir Harry Smith, Gilbert, and Sir John M'Caskill, attacked in echelon of lines the enemy's Infantry, almost invisible amongst wood and the approaching darkness of night. The opposition of the enemy was such as might have been expected from troops who had everything at stake, and who had long vaunted of being irresistible. Their ample and extended line, from their great superiority of numbers, far outflanked ours; but this was counter-acted by the flank movements of our Cavalry. The attack of the Infantry now commenced, and the roll of fire from this powerful arm soon convinced the Sikh army that they had met with a foe they little expected; and their whole force was driven from position after position with great slaughter, and the loss of seventeen pieces of artillery, some of them of heavy calibre; our infantry using that never failing weapon, the bayonet, whenever the enemy stood. Night only saved them from worse disaster; for this stout conflict was maintained during an hour and a half of dim starlight, amidst a cloud of dust from the sandy plain, which yet more obscured every object.
I regret to say, this gallant and successful attack was attended with considerable loss; the force bivouacked upon the field for some hours, and only returned to its encampment after ascertaining that it had no enemy before it, and that night prevented the possibility of a regular advance in pursuit.