We had not as yet received our military stores and supplies from Delhi. A well-stocked magazine, was apparently much needed. Many considered that Umballa was the most advantageous spot for establishing such a depôt, being 150 miles from Ferozepore, and seventy-one from Loodianna. Ferozepore was thought too isolated; delay, therefore, was imperative, and it was of no use to anticipate events.
The reader may easily conclude that the Sikhs, seeing our additional troops, guns and stores moving up to the army, did not remain idle, for they had a great game at stake, being no less than the future fate of a kingdom. They were buoyed up by their success at Buddiwal; the whole army under Tej Singh had re-crossed the Sutlej. The bridge-head, which secured so important an advantage, was enlarged; and, in the very face of the British army, they unremittingly carried on their warlike preparations. They seemed confident of victory, and ready to carry war and destruction into the very heart of their enemy's country, when our unlooked-for and glorious victory at Aliwal, proved to them that they were not invincible.
The announcement in our camp, on the 29th, of Sir Harry Smith's victory at Aliwal, caused considerable sensation. As for myself, I must confess that it was a great disappointment to me not to have taken a part in this engagement. I had written just before to Sir Harry Smith, who, as I have already observed, had been in the Rifle Brigade with my father, during the Peninsular war, expecting that he would have some fighting, and asking to be employed as his aide-de-camp. It was now too late. The news of the brilliant victory came, and put an end to all chance of my witnessing a battle in that quarter.
The object of Sir Harry in moving from our camp was doubtless to prevent the Sikhs from marching towards Delhi and intercepting our supplies. He succeeded in taking the little town and fort of Dhurmkote, which was filled with grain, and thus secured the regular supplies of the army. Having accomplished the reduction of the place, he received intelligence from head-quarters, that Runjoor Singh had crossed the Sutlej with 40,000 Sikhs, and had taken up a position on the road to Loodianna, for the purpose of intercepting our supplies from that town, which he threatened with an attack. This was accompanied by an order to Sir Harry Smith to proceed immediately to Loodianna.
Four regiments of infantry, three of cavalry, and eighteen guns composed the whole of the detachment under the command of this brave general, when on the 21st of January he proceeded to Buddiwal, a small garrison close to Loodianna, which was occupied by Runjoor Singh, and 10,000 of his men. Sir Harry Smith endeavoured by a détour to reach Loodianna, and effect a junction with the Brigade stationed there, before undertaking any engagement with the Sikhs. The latter, however, relying upon their superior numbers, provoked an attack by a brisk fire from their formidable artillery. A severe contest followed, and the British General after sustaining heavy losses, deemed it prudent to fall back upon Loodianna. This he effected by a very skilful evolution, and succeeded in holding the place.
Dr. M'Gregor, in his history of the Sikhs,[23] states that Runjoor Singh, younger brother of Lena Singh Mujetheea,[24] commanded the division of the Sikh army destined to act against Loodianna, as well as to seize the siege-train in progress to join our army, which were the two objects to be held in view by Sir Harry Smith. Dr. M'Gregor says: "Had he (Sir Harry) stopped to return the fire of the Sikhs at Buddiwal, all fear for Loodianna might have been removed; but then there was the risk, that if discomfited, Runjoor Singh might have crossed the country, and captured the siege train, which was escorted by only a Native Infantry regiment, and the 11th Light Cavalry, with a few Artillerymen. The condition of Sir Harry Smith was such, that he could not hope effectually to drive Runjoor Singh across the Sutlej that day, and he probably considered—like a good general, brought up in the school of Wellington, and disciplined in a corps like the immortal old 95th—that half measures were worse than useless. Besides, though making a great sacrifice of baggage, and even of lives, there was the hope that his forbearance would be construed into fear by the Sikhs, who might, in consequence, be induced to meet him in a fair field, where he would have an opportunity of accomplishing the two objects which he had in view; namely, the defence of Loodianna, and the safety of the train, closing all, perhaps, with the entire discomfiture of the Sikhs, when his troops should be a little refreshed." The whole of the Sikh force was not, it was believed, at Buddiwal, therefore the apprehension of Sir Harry Smith, doubtless, was that the other division might get to Loodianna. Buddiwal was at the time in the possession of Sirdar Ajeet Singh, a chief under our protection, who, after the operations at Moodkee and Ferozeshah, burnt a portion of the barracks of H.M. 50th Foot, at Loodianna, and then took possession of Buddiwal, where he made prisoner Assistant-Surgeon R.G.D. Banon, 62nd Foot (now Surgeon of the 96th Foot), and kept him in confinement for twenty-five days,—twelve of which in irons. The Sikhs in vain tried to induce him and the other Europeans who were in the fort, to join their army. They were released after the battle of Sobraon.
It is said, that though Sir Harry Smith was ordered not to fight before he had made a junction with Colonel Wheeler's detachment, yet that as the Sikhs had been moving to the south of Buddiwal, an action must inevitably have ensued, to prevent their advance towards our convoy. There were said to be three roads from Buddiwal to Loodianna. Buddiwal lies to the south-east of Aliwal and between it and Sirhind. Runjoor Singh's force was double that of Sir Harry Smith, besides which he had a large number of guns.
The fort at Loodianna contained all the sick of H.M. and the H.C. troops, which had marched from thence to join the army, as well as the ladies, women, and children belonging to those regiments. The only troops left there were the two Goorkha corps, the Nusseeree and Sirmoor Battalions,[25] but they were afterwards increased by the arrival of the 30th Native Infantry, the 1st Light Cavalry, and about 1,500 of the Pattiala Horse. The Pattiala Rajah was under our protection, and was one of those chiefs who early rendered assistance to our army, both in men, money, and supplies. He died very suddenly, soon after the battle of Ferozeshah, not without suspicion of having been poisoned, which is by no means an unusual method of securing the succession to a Rajahship. It is not impossible that he may have been killed by some of the true Sikhs, for his strenuous support of the British. A mystery hangs over this affair; and if we were to discard mystery from the records of Indian narratives, we should have little left to relate. The deceased Rajah's successor more than fulfilled the expectations of the Governor-General, and was, at the close of the campaign, confirmed in the possession of his estates, and invested by Lord Hardinge with the style and title of Maharajah, in consideration of his important services.
The alarm at Loodianna was natural, for a Sikh force having burnt down part of the cantonments, the appearance of a second, and more powerful force would be conclusive in the minds of most persons as to the fate of the station. It fama per urbes Subathoo et Simla. At Umballa the alarm was still greater. Dr. M'Gregor, in his History of the Sikhs, p. 136, writes: "We may smile at the fears which prompted this fugacious movement,[26] but had Sir Harry Smith not advanced to Loodianna, there is every reason to believe that the siege-train might have been lost, Loodianna pillaged and burnt, the hill stations destroyed, and Umballa, and even other places in the Provinces, sacked and occupied; so that the movement of the 1st division was one of the utmost importance, and not only prevented such sad disasters, but was followed by one of the best managed actions on record." That the train was in some danger is evident, from the fact that the Commander-in-Chief despatched for its security the 3rd Infantry Brigade, under the command of Brigadier Taylor, towards Dhurmkote, which lies to the west of Aliwal, and about half way between Loodianna and Ferozepore. On the 30th of January, this Brigade returned to camp.
Now, if we look at the map we shall see, that on the 28th, the day of the battle of Aliwal, the convoy would have been but a short distance south-west from Dhurmkote, perhaps twenty miles. And, again, if we suppose a line to be drawn from Dhurmkote, in a direction twenty miles to the south-east, which extreme point is called Bussean, we shall find that the Sikh troops at Buddiwal were very near to the convoy, on the night of the 27th of January. The escort for the convoy was extremely weak; for a corps of Native Infantry, and another of Native Cavalry, would not (after the late actions), have been above 1,200 men strong. This convoy was very inadequately protected, and such as our brave Commander-in-Chief would not have sent. Until joined by Taylor's brigade, from the neighbourhood of Kurnaul, it was in imminent danger. Had the Sikhs seized the convoy, the battle of Sobraon could not have taken place when it did; moreover, from delay, the season would have been sickly; and great loss must have ensued from this cause alone.