There are some circumstances which occurred at the battle of Aliwal, deserving of prominent notice. The enemy had a great many guns, which were playing with considerable effect upon the British troops. Major, now Lieutenant-Colonel G. S. Lawrenson, C.B., who commanded the Brigade of Horse Artillery, finding his men and horses falling, to save the delay of waiting for orders, instantly galloped up his brigade of guns to within a short distance of the Sikhs, wheeled round, unlimbered, and, by a brisk cannonade soon forced their gunners to quit their guns for a time. Had the cavalry charged at the same moment, I am assured they would have taken the guns. It was one of those exhibitions of decision and promptitude in war, which well merits, and did receive its reward. It was probably the suddenness of the movement which prevented the immediate support by troops.
The Sikhs made a singular disposition of their infantry in this battle for receiving the charges of the British cavalry. Instead of forming in squares they were arranged into triangles, the apex being in front and opposed to the British, the men also in the rear, or base line, knelt down, so that when the 16th Lancers broke through the front face they were received by fixed bayonets. The French system was followed in these dispositions; and a few French officers were alone wanting to animate the enemy with hopes of success, however futile such hopes must have proved. For, opposed to a force commanded by one of our ablest and most experienced generals, nothing but ruin and utter destruction could, under any circumstances have fallen to the lot of our rash, though brave foe.
The 16th Lancers suffered greatly, for the Sikhs fought with the most obstinate bravery. Preferring a voluntary death, even when all hope of resistance was at an end, they determined that their lives should be purchased at a high cost. Captain Bere of that gallant regiment was most successful in his efforts, having been seen to charge through the wedge of Sikhs, and back again more than once. And cordially do I congratulate a brother officer, Lieutenant T.J. Francis, on having had the good fortune to be present in this glorious action. He had but lately returned from England, and, at the commencement of the campaign, was on his way to the upper provinces with a detachment of recruits. Being anxious not to lose the opportunity of seeing service with Sir Harry Smith's division, Lieutenant Francis hastened up, and arriving opportunely for the battle, obtained permission to accompany the 16th Lancers to the field. After the action, Brigadier Cureton, who commanded the cavalry, thanked Lieutenant Francis for his valuable services, which commendation I had the pleasure of reading from a copy of an extract from the brigade orders a day or two after.
The late Colonel Cureton of the 16th Lancers, who was unfortunately killed at Ramnuggur, had been known to say that Lancers should never be employed in charges with the enemy in less than a squadron, and from the results of this battle many cavalry officers have questioned whether the lance is the best weapon for cavalry in India. In the charges at Aliwal the Sikhs have been known to receive the point into their bodies and then to kill their adversary by cutting him down. The Sikh could not extract the lance, nor had the Lancer time to draw his sword.
There is no doubt that Lancers should never charge in small parties. Nothing less than a wing should attempt to break squares of infantry.
The charge in line, of a broken enemy is another thing. Marshal Marmont, in his "Esprit des Instructions Militaires," p. 45-50, says: "Cavalry should have one pistol; heavy cavalry, with lances and sabres and some few carbines, should be employed to fight infantry, the light cavalry to finish. The hussar or light cavalry soldier will, single-handed, beat the lancer. Cuirassiers should be armed with the lance and straight sword. The first rank should charge with the lance couched, and the second rank with the sabre in hand. As soon as the shock is effected, and the ranks are mingled, the sabres must do their duty. Lancers are equally successful against cavalry in line, especially if the enemy have only sabres. The cavalry in line should have lances chiefly, the sabre as an auxiliary."
Though Marmont was educated as an artillery officer, his great military experience entitles his opinion to be received with due respect, no matter to which branch of the profession he may refer. The Lancers were not employed in the Peninsular war, nor yet at Waterloo, consequently the 16th is the first Lancer regiment which has had the honour of testing the lance in open conflict, and against bodies of hostile infantry.
After the engagement at Buddiwal on the 22nd of January 1846, the Sikh troops under Runjoor Singh suddenly evacuated that place, and proceeded in the direction of Loodianna, keeping close to the river, where they secured a number of boats with the apparent intention of re-crossing to the right bank to join the main army. Whether this was a feint, or whether Runjoor Singh, having received intimation of the advance of reinforcements with whom his forces might not be equal to cope, desired to secure the means of a hasty retreat; or, whether he was following the example of Tej Singh, and acting a double part, remains uncertain. However this may be, Sir Harry Smith lost no time in taking possession of the place which had been evacuated by the Sikhs, who were soon after joined by a large reinforcement of their own body. The troops under Runjoor Singh, amounting to between 15,000 and 16,000 men, were immediately on the move, and preparing for fresh aggressions.
Sir Harry Smith saw that a collision was inevitable, and his own strength having been reinforced from head-quarters, he proceeded, on the morning of the 28th to reconnoitre the enemy's troops, and, if compelled, to give him battle. Sir Harry encountered them near the village of Aliwal, on their way to Jugraon, with the intention of occupying that town. The Sikhs, finding that Sir Harry was about to out-flank them, suddenly changed their position, and drew up along a ridge with their right flanking the village of Aliwal, and their left resting on their own entrenched camp. With the extraordinary agility and rapidity of action which characterized the Sikhs throughout their engagements with the army of the Sutlej, the centre division of the Khalsa troops instantly threw up entrenchments, behind which they hastily placed their strong artillery, and opened a murderous fire upon the British.
Sir Harry's force amounted to only 11,000 men, being a fourth less than that of the enemy, but like an able tactician, knowing that by the superior activity and disposition of his troops he could bring more men into action against the different salient points of attack, than the enemy who opposed him, he overcame the odds of numbers.