Richard Bond, the Messman—Sikh Grass-cutters—Choice of Camps—General Lloyd's Opinions—Lieut.-Colonel Irvine and Sir H. Maddock—Position at Sobraon—Brigadier E. Smith's Plan—Colonel Irvine's Plan—Goolab Singh's Policy—Sir Robert Dick's Division—Major-General Gilbert's Division—Sir Harry Smith's Division—Brigadier A. Campbell—Sir Joseph Thackwell—Brigadier Scott—British Batteries—Rockets—Sikh Batteries—Assault on the Sikh Entrenchments—Brigadier Stacey—Captain Cunningham's Account—The 10th Foot—Lieut.-Colonel Franks—Sikh Entrenchments stormed—Sirdar Sham Singh destroys the Pontoon—Sikh Retreat cut off—Great Loss of the Sikhs—Peace Principles inapplicable to India—Sikhs driven across the Sutlej—Tej Singh.
On the 30th of January, 1846, about noon, we moved out and proceeded a distance of two miles, expecting to meet the Sikh cavalry, who were encamped by the bridge of boats, but after having waited for two or three hours we were doomed to be again disappointed.
On the 1st of February, our mess-waiter, Richard Bond, died, he had been for some weeks past in bad health, yet, being anxious not to be separated from his regiment, in which he had served for many years, the poor man accompanied us from Cawnpore, and though apparently of an Herculean frame, an insidious malady gained upon him; and on the 1st of February poor Bond was numbered among those who have been. Mors sola fatetur quantula sint hominum corpuscula. He was an old and meritorious servant: and as a member of the Mess Committee at this period, I feel happy in paying this passing tribute to his memory.
Whilst on an out-line picquet on the 2nd, I heard most distinctly the Sikh drums from the camp in our right front, about six o'clock in the afternoon. During the day also my patrols brought in five grass-cutters in the employ of the enemy. After having questioned them I released them with a warning not to appear near our camp again. This was by no means an uncommon ruse de guerre, while pretending to cut grass they were in fact spying out the land.
On the 7th of February, our regiment again changed ground, from the right to the extreme left. The whole army was encamped in a line nearly parallel to the river Sutlej, from which it was distant not more than a mile and a quarter, and in some parts even less. It is a rule in forming a camp, not to make it within reach of the fire of the enemy's guns; and at the same time to shew as extended a front as possible, both for the purpose of overawing the adversary, and of watching his movements. The same rule applies on having crossed a river, to avoid exposure to the fire of the enemy who occupies the bank which you have quitted.
In reference to the choice of camps, I may perhaps be excused if I again refer to the able and very scarce work on the Art of war by the well known author of the "Seven Years' War in Germany."
"The choice of camps," he says, "depends on two principles: the one geometrical and the other the effect of genius. The first consists in calculating the distance relative to the number and species of troops which compose the army; the other in seeing all the combinations that may be formed on a given piece of ground, with a given army, and in the choice of that precise combination which is most advantageous. This unacquirable and sublime talent is much superior to the other, and independent of it. Great geniuses have a sort of intuitive knowledge; they see at once the cause and its effect, with the different combinations which unite them—they do not proceed by common rules successively from one idea to another, by slow and languid steps. No, the whole with all its circumstances and various combinations is like a picture, all together present to their mind: these want no geometry, but an age produces few of this kind of men; and, in the common run of Generals, geometry and experience will help them to avoid gross errors.
"The perfection of our art would be, no doubt, to find a construction or an order of battle equally proper for all kinds of ground. But this being impossible, the only thing remaining for them to do is to find such a construction and such a formation of the troops as may, with the greatest simplicity, and, consequently velocity, be adapted to those numberless circumstances which occur. This should be the constant subject of their studies, but can never be obtained without geometry."
POSITIONS of the BRITISH and SIKH CAMPS on the 4th Feb. 1846